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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyses soft power in the light of neoclassical realist premises as part of the 
foreign policy toolkit of great powers to expand their sphere of influence. It argues that if nuclear 
armed great powers compete against the same type of powers to expand or sustain their sphere of 
influence over a populated region, they use soft power as a major expansive instrument while 
military power remains a tool to defend themselves and back up their foreign policies. Presenting 
its model of soft power, the thesis explores the role of soft power projection by great powers in the 
formation of the external alignment of regional states. It focuses on the Russia – West (i.e. the EU 
and the USA) rivalries over the states located between the EU and Russia (the region known as 
the “common (or shared) neighbourhood”) and on two of the regional states (Ukraine and Belarus) 
to test its hypotheses. It uses a long range of academic works, news media articles, official 
documents, public statements, reports of non-governmental organizations, etc. to pursue its 
analyses. The thesis concludes that, due to several factors, primarily the possibly catastrophic 
consequences of military clashes, soft power is deployed as an expansive instrument amidst the 
territorial rivalries between nuclear-armed great powers while military power remains a tool for 
defence and backing up foreign policies. The thesis, however, highlights that the success of soft 
power projection by great powers depends also on the internal structure of the regional states. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The Puzzle 
 
The external alignment strategies of the post-Soviet states in the territories between the 
European Union (EU) and Russia – the region which is known as the “common (or shared) 
neighbourhood” – pose a puzzle to the students of international relations. Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova, the three countries located in Eastern Europe and the three South Caucasian countries 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have pursued dissimilar foreign policy strategies despite the 
similarity between them in a number of crucial aspects, including the geostrategic environment 
and the geo-economic structure of the region. While Belarus has opted for bandwagoning with 
Russia in international relations, its neighbour Ukraine is on a pro-Western path aiming to join 
NATO which Russia treats as its major geopolitical rival in the region. Likewise, while Azerbaijan 
seeks to maintain neutrality between the West (i.e. the EU and United States) and Russia, its 
neighbours Armenia and Georgia align with Russia and the West, respectively. This thesis argues 
that the rivalries between Russia and the West are an influential factor in the formation of such 
diverse foreign policy strategies of the “common neighbourhood” states.  
For Russia, the countries located in its neighbourhood are of supreme importance for its 
international standing as a great power. Russia’s approach to the former Soviet territories is often 
noted as “Russia’s New Monroe Doctrine,” which “turns Russia’s formally independent, but weak, 
neighborhood into an exclusive Russian sphere of influence – just as the original doctrine of US 
President James Monroe, issued in 1823, turned the whole of the Americas into an exclusive US 
sphere of influence” (Skak 2010: 139).  In this respect, the former Soviet countries, especially 
Eastern European and South Caucasian countries, are extremely important for Russia, whose 
leaders, on many occasions, have not shied away from openly saying that Russia would do 
everything possible to prevent geopolitical shifts in this region that pose threats to Russia’s 
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national security.1 The Kremlin’s intention to reinstate its influence over the former Soviet states 
has been perceived as a geopolitical threat in Western capitals. Western leaders, in particular the 
Americans, have clearly stressed their determination to prevent or slow down Russia’s regional 
reintegration initiatives. Over the last two decades this confrontation has dramatically evolved. 
These geopolitical circumstances have exerted pressure on the foreign policies of regional states, 
made neutrality improbable and forced them to make a choice between the rival great powers and 
to align with one of them. 
Both Russia and the West have made use of various means to affect the decision regional 
countries make in their geopolitical orientation. However, although Russia deployed military force 
in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) as an attempt to avert the pro-Western drift of these 
countries, the conflicting great powers could not militarily enforce the regional countries to join 
their orbit. The threat of mutually assured destruction has deterred the military escalation of the 
conflict. This has downgraded the utility of military power to being an ultimo-ratio or, as Mark 
Galeotti (2016) points out, a “final ‘just in case’ option” and mostly a defensive instrument in the 
rivalries between nuclear armed great powers. Instead of military force, the conflicting great 
powers have been using non-military instruments in order to expand their influence over the 
regions which are also in the interests of rival great powers. Employing the instruments, which this 
thesis analyses under the notion “soft power,” Russia and the West have sought to reach out to the 
general public in target states and affect the foreign policy decisions of their respective states 
through influencing the masses. 
 Thus, this thesis analyses the great power rivalries as the independent variable vis-à-vis the 
foreign policy strategy of small states which are in between these rivalries. It pays particular 
attention to the policies of the great powers to reach out to and influence non-state actors (i.e. the 
general public, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, etc.) in those states with the 
eventual aim of impacting the foreign policies of their respective states. It also analyses the internal 
                                                 
1 Reuters (2015), “Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join NATO”, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/11/us-russia-nato-steps-idUSL1143027920080411 (accessed: 21 August 
2015). 
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conditions in the regional states under which the soft power policies of the great powers could 
wield successful outcomes. The thesis argues that as the internal autonomy of the state leaders 
decreases, the domestic non-state actors gain more scope to influence the policies of the 
government and the soft power policies of the external great powers find a more favourable 
environment in which to wield soft power and affect foreign policy decisions. The thesis pursues 
its analysis from the perspective of neoclassical realism and the concept of soft power and narrows 
down its empirical focus on the Russia – West rivalries between 2004 and 2014 over the “common 
neighbourhood” states in general, and over Belarus and Ukraine in particular. 
 
Literature Review and Research Gap 
 
Many scholars have tried to understand the factors behind the diversity and multiplicity of 
approaches to the external orientation of the “common neighbourhood” states. For example, a 
group of scholars, namely Giorgi Gvalia, David Siroky, Bidzina Lebanidze, and Zurab Iashvili, 
have explored the reasons behind Georgia’s shift to a pro-Western geopolitical orientation while 
most of the other small post-Soviet states maintain neutrality or bandwagon with Russia (Gvalia 
et al. 2013). They argue that the theories built on the external and international factors (e.g. 
“balance of power,” “balance of threat,” economic dependency etc.) fail to provide a convincing 
explanation for this situation. Instead, they put an emphasis on the state- and individual level of 
variables, especially the “elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the states,” in explaining the 
foreign policy behaviours of these states (ibid. 99). According to them, “The idea that Georgia is 
a European country (and thus not a post-Soviet state) drives the elite’s understanding of Georgia’s 
place in the world” (ibid. 112). They argue that such a perception of Georgia’s international 
standing amongst the political elites, and not the public opinion, explains the states’ foreign policy 
strategy: 
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“Although we do not wholly devalue the role of public opinion, we make the simplifying 
assumption that elite opinion largely shapes the foreign policy agenda, rather than the 
reverse, and that public opinion set the bounds of what is deemed acceptable” (ibid. 107).  
Although Gvalia et al. rightfully examine the role of the elite perceptions as an influential 
variable between the international political system and foreign policy, their relegation of public 
opinion to elite perceptions in terms of its effect on foreign policy is problematic and cannot be 
easily verified. The facts that (1) Georgia’s foreign policy strategy radically changed in the 
aftermath of the popular uprising of 2003 (Huseynov 2015), (2) the potential of the growing pro-
Russian sentiments amongst the Georgians to reverse the current pro-Western political course is 
often recognized by the political experts (Rimple 2015; Cecire 2015; 2016), (3) Russia’s anti-
Western soft power projection to affect public opinion in Georgia has been officially recognized 
by the Georgian political elite as a threat (Rukhadze 2016; Goguadze 2017) indicate that public 
opinion is a more influential variable than Gvalia et al. believe it is. 
In general, the role of public opinion as a potentially influential intervening variable in the 
formation of the external alignment of the “common neighbourhood” states is an under-explored 
and largely miscalculated issue.  According to conventional wisdom in scholarly studies of the 
region, the impact of the general public on foreign policy is rather limited in most of the post-
Soviet states. For example, in 2003, Viktor Chudowsky and Taras Kuzio, prominent scholars of 
Ukrainian studies, wrote that “Ukrainian society is passive, atomized and its power is ‘submerged’ 
relative to that of the state” and thus “public opinion [in Ukraine] is of minimal importance in the 
area of foreign policy” (Chudowsky et al. 2003: 273). In less than 15 years after this analysis, 
Taras Kuzio, in a co-study on Ukrainian foreign policy with Paul D’Anieri, realized that in fact 
public opinion “has arguably had a profound effect on the country’s foreign policy” (D’Anieri et 
al. 2017: 117). Thus, we can speak of a disinterest in and/or a misunderstanding of the public 
opinion – foreign policy nexus of the post-Soviet states in scholarly studies.   
14 
 
The scholars of international relations have also paid little attention to the fact that the role 
of domestic non-state actors as a potentially impactful political factor might tempt great powers2 
to reach out to and make use of them in order to affect the foreign policy of their respective state. 
This is advantageous when the sides are nuclear-armed great powers who cannot easily deploy 
military force against each other due to the threat of nuclear escalation. There is extensive literature 
on the policies of external actors to provoke regime change in a target state through interacting 
with its internal non-state players (e.g. civil society, media, political parties) (See for instance, 
Finkel et al. 2007; Muskhelishvili et al. 2009; Stewart 2009; Bunce et al. 2011; Vanderhill 2014). 
However, few academic studies have examined these policies from the perspective of geopolitical 
rivalries and political realism.   
In fact, the founders of realism underscored the importance of winning power over the 
minds and feelings of foreign publics. The concepts developed by Edward Carr (1951) (“power 
over opinion”) and Hans Morgenthau (1965a) (“cultural imperialism”) reflected on non-hard 
power elements. However, the next generations of the school focused on the systemic variables as 
the primary determinants of international relations, conceptualized power as the combination of 
military and economic capabilities and disregarded its non-material dimensions. Stephan Walt’s 
Origins of Alliances (1987) is one of the studies that widened its analysis beyond military and 
economic power. In his work, the policies of great powers to reach out to the domestic non-state 
actors of smaller states - what he calls “penetration” - are analysed as one of the strategies to affect 
their external alignment (Walt 1987: 218-262). However, he underestimates the potential of these 
policies:  
 “[T]he importance of transnational penetration is often exaggerated and… its effect on 
alliance formation is usually misunderstood. The opportunity to establish informal avenues 
of influence with another state usually requires cordial or even close relations, which 
                                                 
2 This thesis subscribes to the realist classification of great powers and smaller states in accordance with their 
population, territory, resources, economic capability, military power, political stability, and competence (Waltz 1979: 
131).  
15 
 
indicates that such ties are largely one result of alignment, not an independent cause… In 
short, penetration is not an especially common or powerful cause of alignment.” 
On the contrary, the advance of information and communication technologies strictly 
upgraded the potential of “penetration” as a foreign policy instrument. In 2004, Joseph Nye 
published his first major book on these policies, titled Soft Power: The Means to Success in World 
Politics. He theorized about the instruments states can utilize to communicate with the publics of 
foreign countries and wield power over popular opinion abroad under the notion of “soft power.” 
The post-Cold War developments in international relations, the pro-Western popular uprisings in 
post-communist states, the role of general public and non-governmental institutions in reshaping 
the regional geopolitical view provided empirical evidence to the growing potential of soft power. 
Gerald Sussman’s Branding Democracy: U.S. Regime Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe 
(2010) presented one of the first comprehensive analyses on the use of various public diplomacy 
and propaganda techniques to communicate with and influence non-state players in foreign 
countries in this period. However, many scholars rightfully maintain that the concept of soft power 
lacks “academic refinement,” is “under-theorized,” “misunderstood,” or “difﬁcult, if not 
impossible to test empirically’ (Ichihara 2006: 197; Li 2009a: 58; Vuving 2009: 3; Goldsmith et 
al. 2012: 555).  There have been numerous analyses on soft power, but neither Joseph Nye nor 
anybody else has provided clear answers to fundamental questions about the concept (e.g. What is 
soft power? How does it work? Who can produce it? Why do states need it?). The existing literature 
on soft power gives the impression that soft power is everything non-military.   
Nye (2013a) asserts that soft power is inextricably linked with Western norms and values, 
and therefore, states that are on different paths are bound to fail “miserably.” However, this 
assertion implies “an obligatory respect for international norms and institutions, as well as an 
adherence to freedom, democracy, liberalism and pluralism” (Wilson 2015: 289), but in reality, 
both democratic and non-democratic, liberal and illiberal states utilize soft power as part of their 
foreign policy toolkit and invest extensively in cultivating power over popular opinion abroad.  It 
is often acknowledged that non-democratic great powers also reach success in these policies 
(Kurlantzick 2007; Tsygankov 2005; Van Herpen 2015).  Thus, Joseph Nye (2011: 82), on the one 
hand argues that soft power is a dimension of power and does not have any contradiction with 
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political realism, on the other hand, as Giulio Gallarotti (2011: 19) correctly points out, presents 
his concept “as a subset of neoliberal logic.” 
In the aftermath of Joseph Nye’s introduction of the notion “soft power,” many academic 
works have been written addressing problems around the concept. One of the first major critical 
pieces on the soft power concept was Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical 
and Contemporary Perspectives edited by Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox. In their chapter in 
this book, Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos (2010: 24), critically analysing the soft power 
concept from a Gramscian perspective and the distinction it presents between consent and 
coercion, argue that “disregarding hegemony, Nye creates the illusion of an aspect of power that 
could exist by its own only through consent, ignoring the social reality populated by intrinsic 
mechanisms of coercion.” In response to this critique, Nye (2010: 217), in the same book, points 
out that “Even if Zahran and Ramos are correct that under hegemony, coercion and consent are 
complementary, that is not the same as saying that soft power is always rooted in hard power. 
Sometimes it is and sometimes it is not.” The Chinese scholar Mingjiang Li (2009b: 3) suggests 
that the term “soft use of power” would be more appropriate than “soft power,” because “soft 
power does not exist in the nature of certain resources of power but rather it has to be nurtured 
through a soft use of power.” The relationship between the two types of power still remains 
unclear. Neither Nye nor anyone else has ever written a convincing analysis on the distinction and 
relationship between hard power and soft power.  
The consideration of domestic non-state actors as a potentially powerful political player by 
neoclassical realism lays ground for its analysis of the use of soft power by great powers to affect 
the external alignment of states in contested regions. Neoclassical realism does not define power 
as only elements of material power, but includes other elements, such as “individual leadership 
(whether dominated by charismatic statesmen or trouble-makers), the quality of government, the 
competence of its administrators, and a government’s reputation or track record in world politics” 
(Ripsman et al. 2009: 297). The theory treats domestic political processes as an intervening 
variable between systemic factors and foreign policy. From this point of view, the intervening 
variable has the potential to “channel, mediate, and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external 
forces (primarily changes in relative power)” (Schweller 2004: 164). Neoclassical Realism, the 
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State, and Foreign Policy (2009), edited by Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro, 
is the first comprehensive book on neoclassical realism. The authors have refined the theory and 
elaborated on the distinctions and commonalities between it and other branches of realism. The 
book serves as a useful resource to understand neoclassical realism’s conceptualization of the 
internal political system as an intervening variable. It, however, has not explained the policies that 
great powers pursue to reach out to domestic non-state actors in target states and realize the desired 
shifts in their external alignment through the manipulation of their internal political system. Nor 
have other neoclassical realist scholars, some of whom have supported the incorporation of the 
soft power concept into the analytical toolkit of neoclassical realism (e.g. Rathbun 2008: 303-304; 
Berenskoetter et al. 2012), examined soft power as an instrument in the competition of great 
powers to expand their sphere of influence. 
 
Theoretical Argument 
 
The theoretical argumentation of the thesis is formed on the hypothesis that if nuclear 
armed great powers compete against the same type of powers to expand or sustain their sphere of 
influence over a populated region, they use soft power as a major expansive instrument while 
military power remains a tool to defend themselves and back up their foreign policies. However, 
the thesis underlines the point that the success of soft power projection by the great powers depends 
on the internal structure of the target states. If the leaders of a weak state, which is in between the 
rivalries of great powers who use soft power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis 
the society and other internal non-state actors, they can control the inflow of soft power projection 
from foreign states, offset the intervening influence of the domestic non-state actors on foreign 
policy making, and augment their chances to more prudently and independently follow the 
imperatives of the international political system. Conversely, if such autonomy does not exist, then 
the external powers find a favourable environment in which to wield soft power, the domestic non-
state actors can influence the external orientation of the state, and the state fails to offset their 
influence.   
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The non-military instruments the great powers deploy and the policies they pursue to communicate 
with the general public and the non-governmental organizations of the target states with the aim 
of impacting their foreign policy strategy are analysed in this thesis under the umbrella of the soft 
power concept. The thesis seeks to reconceptualise soft power in the light of neoclassical realism. 
This approach treats soft power as a dimension of power that states make use of to reach their 
foreign policy goals. The thesis establishes a model that would allow for the study of different 
sources of soft power and the strategies states develop to produce it. The reason that necessitated 
the reformulation of the concept of soft power is related to problems and contradictions in the 
existing literature on the subject. The model developed in this concept follows the logic of realist 
scholars in its analysis of soft power. Herein the thesis refers particularly to the concepts “power 
over opinion” of Edward Carr (1951), “cultural imperialism” of Hans Morgenthau (1965a), and 
“transnational penetration” of Stephan Walt (1987). It examines both public diplomacy and 
propaganda strategies as part of the great powers’ policies to wield soft power. According to this 
model, no matter whether it is deception or truth, seduction or manipulation, foreign aid or 
propaganda, all types of policies to reach out to foreign publics and intentionally affect their 
perceptions and attitudes can be gathered under the umbrella of soft power making. As militarily 
powerful states can use all types of military power (air force, navy, nuclear weapons, etc.) to force 
the target to do what is wanted of them, the states enjoying high levels of soft power can use a 
wide array of instruments to wield power over popular opinion of the target state with eventually 
similar purposes. The model also suggests its conceptualization of the hard power – soft power 
nexus. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of three parts besides the introductory section and conclusions. Part 1 
presents the analytical framework of the study. The part has two chapters. Chapter 1 forms the 
theoretical framework. The chapter discusses the nexus of neoclassical realism and soft power to 
explain the use of soft power in great power rivalries and its impact on the formation of the external 
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orientation of regional states. The second chapter of the part presents introductory information 
about the selected case (i.e. the Russia – West confrontation over the “common neighbourhood”) 
and methodology used to test the hypotheses presented in chapter 1. The chapter is divided into 
two main sections. The first section deals with case selection. The section provides information 
about the interests of the conflicting sides in the Russia – West confrontation over the “common 
neighbourhood” and discusses the “common neighbourhood” states and their classification. It 
divides the states into two groups (i.e. states with relatively strong state autonomy and states with 
relatively weak state autonomy) and presents the principles that have been taken into account in 
this classification. The second section of the chapter discusses the methodological design of the 
study. 
Part 2 is focused on the analysis of the independent variable which is defined as the rivalries 
between the West and Russia over the “common neighbourhood.” This part seeks to defend the 
argument that nuclear armed great powers deploy largely soft power to expand their sphere of 
influence over the territories that are in the interests of rival nuclear armed great powers. The part 
consists of two chapters. The first chapter discusses the hard power – soft power nexus in the 
foreign policies of Western powers concerning the regional states. Afterwards, the chapter focuses 
on the use of soft power in this context. The chapter provides an analysis of different dimensions 
of Western soft power. The second chapter of this part replicates the analytical framework of the 
previous chapter and applies it in the analysis of Russia’s policies with respect to the “common 
neighbourhood” states.  
The last part of the thesis focuses on the outcomes of the soft power competition between 
Russia and West. The part consists of two chapters. The first chapter will discuss the case of 
Belarus. In this study, Belarus represents “common neighbourhood” countries with stronger state 
autonomy, worse democracy records, and mostly pro-Russian or neutral geopolitical orientation. 
The chapter tests the hypothesis on the role of strong internal autonomy of the state leaders in their 
foreign policy amidst the rivalries between great powers. The second and last chapter of this part 
will explore the case of Ukraine as an example of “common neighbourhood” countries with less 
state autonomy, better democracy records, and mostly pro-Western geopolitical orientation. On 
the contrary to chapter 1, chapter 2 tests the hypothesis on the role of weak internal autonomy of 
state leaders in their foreign policy amidst the rivalries between great powers.  
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The thesis ends with a concluding section. This section is divided into three sub-sections. The 
first sub-section briefly reviews the problems this thesis has focused on and the hypotheses it has 
put forward. The following sub-section presents the empirical findings of the study. The sub-
section shortly overviews the discussions on the Russia – West confrontation over the “common 
neighbourhood” states and the cases of Belarus and Ukraine in this context. The concluding section 
ends with the presentation of the implications of the study for neoclassical realism and the concept 
of soft power.  
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PART 1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Chapter 1.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter is aimed at presenting the theoretical framework of the research. The chapter 
consists of two major sections. The section following this introductory part focuses on realism and 
its relatively new branch called “neoclassical realism.” This section will analyse the theoretical 
assumptions on the rivalries between great powers and their policies to communicate with the 
internal non-state actors of the states that are in between these rivalries. It also explores factors 
that impact the choice weak states make in their external alignment. The section focuses on the 
influence of the general public and non-governmental organizations as the intervening forces 
between the pressure that the international political system imposes on states (independent 
variable) and the foreign policy of these states (dependent variable). It also analyses the 
circumstances under which these non-state actors can become influential in the formulation of 
foreign policy. The autonomy of state leaders vis-à-vis domestic society is treated as the major 
indicator to measure the scope of the domestic non-state groups to impact state policies.  
Since neoclassical realism develops theories that includes both systemic and unit level 
factors in its analysis of foreign policy, it has been chosen as the guiding theoretical line of the 
thesis. However, neoclassical realism, along with other branches of realism, have paid little 
attention to the policies of the conflicting great powers to reach out to the domestic non-state actors 
of states that are in between their conflict. Although neoclassical realists have acknowledged the 
importance of the intervening power of domestic non-state actors in the formulation of foreign 
policy, they have not thoroughly analysed the policies of great powers to interact with these non-
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state actors in target states and seek to make use of them. The section serves also as an attempt to 
fill in this gap. 
The second section deals with the concept of soft power which covers the major strategies 
and instruments the great powers make use of to communicate with the non-state actors of regional 
states. The section provides a reconceptualization of soft power analysing it as an instrument 
developed by states in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The chapter ends with a brief 
conclusion which sums up the key points raised in the chapter.  
 
1.1.1. Realism: Neoclassical Realism  
 
The advocates of realism identify international politics as anarchy wherein there is no 
governing supranational authority. Under the circumstances of the absence of an overarching 
global authority, states are primarily concerned with their survival and therefore are in constant 
search for security (Morgenthau 1948: 21).  This approach builds its theory on the basis of three 
core principles (Vasquez 2004: 37): (1) International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for 
power (Morgenthau 1948: 13); (2) Domestic and international politics are two different sides of a 
coin governed by different moral, political and general social conditions (Morgenthau 1948: 21); 
(3) Nation-states are the most important actors for understanding international politics 
(Morgenthau 1948: 73-75).   
In different branches of the realist paradigm, the factors that impact and drive the struggle 
for power in international relations are differentiated at three levels of analysis: the individual, the 
state and the international system. Kenneth Waltz (2001) in Man, State and War, first published 
in 1959, characterizes these levels as three images: the first image (the individual), the second 
image (the state), and the third image (the international system). Mostly, adherents of realism have 
not limited their analyses to one image as the only determining factor of international politics. The 
complexity of the factors behind the behaviours of states in interstate relations has compelled 
realist scholars to include more than one image into their analysis. Below an overview of the three 
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images in the realist paradigm will be presented in the discussion on the three main branches of 
realism: classical realism, neo- (or structural) realism, and neoclassical realism.  
The first image emphasises the impact of human nature on the conduct of international 
relations. Most advocates of classical realism develop their theoretical analyses on the basis of the 
first image. The scholars who adhere to this idea believe that human nature is inherently 
problematic and unchanged. Hans Morgenthau, in the beginning of Politics among Nations (1967: 
4), asserts that “human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since 
the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece….” Likewise, in the thought of Edward Carr 
(1946), the roots of all politics and political conflicts are embroiled in man’s nature. In his view, 
“the desire to co-operate with others, to enter into reciprocal relations of good-will and friendship 
with them, and even to subordinate himself to them” and “egoism, or the will to assert himself at 
the expense of others” are rooted in human nature. Carr, like Morgenthau (1965b: 192), supports 
Aristotle’s characterization of man as a political animal, and believes that this view lays “the 
foundation of all sound thinking about politics” (Carr 1946: 95).  
Classical realist scholars also underscore the impact of other factors on foreign policy, 
although they put major emphasis on human nature. These scholars charge that the growing role 
of the masses in shaping foreign policy prevents states from conducting foreign policies free from 
the interference of public opinion and, thus, pushes the international struggle for power into 
relatively conflictual bounds and even into total war. In contrast to nationalist universalism3 which 
started to dominate international politics following the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ 
nationalist and democratic revolutions, monarchical sovereign states had autonomy vis-à-vis their 
societies, which in turn secured monarchs’ ability to sustain an international balance of power. For 
Morgenthau, the interference of the masses in shaping foreign policy brought about the disastrous 
conclusions (e.g. two world wars) of the first half of the twentieth century, and therefore, he (1948: 
431-433) advises diplomats to lead public opinion rather than follow it. Carr also criticizes idealist 
assumptions as the primary cause of the World War II and highlights the limited level of domestic 
                                                 
3 “Nationalist universalism” is a term coined by Morgenthau (1965a: 255-259) to describe the low domestic agential 
power of states on the account of increasing involvement of the masses in shaping foreign policies. 
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agential power of states as a crucial factor in the breakout of total wars (Hobson 2003: 55-59). 
Carr concludes that the tendency of states to pursue expansionist and conflictual foreign policies 
increases as its domestic agential power decreases (ibid.). Both Morgenthau and Carr believe that 
democratization and, consequently, the nationalization of international politics make conflicts and 
tensions intensify between states.  
As classical realists place the primary source of conflicts and the struggle for power 
amongst both individuals and states in human nature, for them the impact of an anarchic 
environment of international relations is a rather secondary and permissive factor. Unlike them, 
neorealist scholars deny the determining roles of the anthropological and unit-level sources of 
world politics and put a primary emphasis on system-level variables. Neorealism evaluates the 
structure of the international system in terms of an ordering principle, such as anarchy, and a 
particular distribution of power. In the thought of neorealist scholars (e.g. Waltz (1979), Walt 
(1987), Mearsheimer (2001)), the security dilemma which originates out of the anarchic order of 
international politics shapes the behaviours of states in interstate relations. Out of uncertainty of 
each other’s intentions, actions which are taken for one’s own security tend to be treated by others 
as a threat to their security and lead to arms races, conflicts and wars. However, Waltz (2001: 238) 
also recognizes the importance of the other two images: “The third image describes the framework 
of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces 
that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without 
the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.”  
Neoclassical realism, on the basis of the prior fundamental assumptions of the realist 
paradigm, emphasises the second and third image factors and conceptualizes the foreign policies 
of different types of states (great, medium, and small powers). Unlike those theories which 
privilege either domestic (innenpolitik theories) or systemic factors (structural theories), 
neoclassical realism develops theories that integrate these two-level variables in its analysis of 
foreign policy. Neoclassical realist scholars highlight the significance of unit-level expertise for 
an accurate understanding of foreign policy, and avoid treating states as black boxes, i.e. they do 
not ignore their distinctive internal characteristics (Rose 1998: 166). On the basis of Max Weber’s 
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classic definition of state,4 neoclassical realism develops its “top-down” conception of the state. 
In neoclassical realism, the state is treated as “the central politico-military institutions and top 
officials of the polity” which lacks complete autonomy vis-à-vis society (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 
27).    
The advocates of neoclassical realism underscore the constraints on great powers that 
originate in the international system and the domestic environment. In the case of regional powers, 
the same are highlighted in the subsystem (Lobell 2009: 46). In neoclassical realism, the state’s 
relative power position in the anarchic system of international relations is considered an 
independent variable. Structural variables – the relative distribution of power and anticipated 
power trends – play a causal role in shaping foreign policies (Taliaferro 2009: 198). The theory 
positions the internal dynamics of states as an intervening variable between the constraints of the 
international system and foreign policy.  Unlike neorealists, who see a direct translation of state 
leaders’ apprehensions of systemic imperatives into their foreign policy, for neoclassical realists 
this translation does not happen immediately and without obstacles (Walt 2002: 211). Domestic 
political processes are treated as imperfect transmission belts between systemic pressure and 
foreign policy (Schweller 2004: 164). Neoclassical realism suggests that these are actual political 
leaders and elite who make foreign policy choices, and so their perceptions of relative power and 
their ability to extract or mobilize societal resources to implement foreign policy matter (Rose 
1998: 147). The interference of the domestic actors (public, business and industrial sectors, labour 
unions, and other organized economic interest groups, media, legislature, ethnic and religious 
groups) into foreign policy making is another powerful intervening variable. This interference 
might constrain a state’s autonomy from the internal society and its ability to enact policy 
responses to systemic imperatives (Wohlforth 1993: 2).   
 
 
                                                 
4 According to Weber (1978: 904-905) “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state.”  
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1.1.1.1. (Neoclassical) Realism on Great Power Rivalries 
 
Realism underscores the struggle for power and survival as the underlying motivation of 
states’ behaviours in the international sphere. Notwithstanding the fact that the sources of this 
struggle are interpreted in different ways by realist scholars, they agree on its interpretation as the 
guiding principle of international relations. According to realism, states are concerned about the 
distribution of relative power capabilities in the system and are particularly focused on relative 
gains. They act with “zero-sum game” logic in their approaches to changes in the balance of power 
(Powell 1991). Therefore, states have to take care of their competitive power and maximize their 
probability of survival in the hostile environment of international politics. Waltz (1979: 118) 
asserts that those who do not follow this logic “will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to 
danger, will suffer.” Stephan Walt (1987: 17) defines balancing “as allying with others against the 
prevailing threat” and bandwagoning as “alignment with the source of danger.” This is an 
amendment to Waltz’s “balance of power” logic which maintains that states balance against the 
stronger power. The expansion of a great power’s sphere of influence and its amassing of 
increasingly more aggregate power reinforce its perception as a threat in the eyes of other great 
powers. Realist-minded scholars and politicians expect other great powers to counter this threat by 
allying against it (Walt 1987: 22). 
From this structural realist perspective, regional hegemons – that are powerful states which 
are dominating power in a certain region or regions (Mearsheimer 2001: 39) – seek to maximize 
their power and security by expanding their sphere of influence and undermining the bids of rival 
powers for regional hegemony. However, the prizes this struggle promises are limited. No great 
power has ever been able or is likely to be able anytime soon to become a global hegemon due to 
the “stopping power” of oceans (Mearsheimer 2001). This is why undermining the emergence of 
a regional hegemon overseas and not evolving into a global hegemony is considered as the 
uppermost objective for regional hegemons. The “fear that a rival great power that dominates its 
own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful 
great power’s backyard” (Mearsheimer 2001: 41-42) urges the regional hegemon to seek to prevent 
others from dominating their respective regions. 
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Neoclassical realism does not depart from this realist analysis of great power politics. The 
primary contribution of neoclassical realism has been to put forward the intervening influence of 
domestic factors. Advocates of neoclassical realism argue that systemic factors alone cannot 
explain, for example, the US strategy of containment during the Cold War or the Iraq invasion of 
the George W. Bush administration (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 2-3). From this perspective, the impact 
of the internal characteristics of states (i.e. domestic non-state groups, perceptions of state leaders 
and their autonomy from society, the capacity of state institutions to extract and mobilize 
resources, etc.) need to be likewise analysed in order to provide a more complete understanding of 
international relations (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 4). According to neoclassical realism, these factors 
exert intervening influence on the formulation of states’ foreign policy, however, the systemic 
variables provide permissive condition and remain an independent variable in this process 
(Taliaferro et al. 2009: 4). Thus, unlike other branches of realism, neoclassical realism combines 
systemic and unit level variables in its explanation of great power politics. 
International relations theories, however, have paid little attention to the policies of 
conflicting great powers to reach out to domestic non-state actors of states that are in between their 
conflict. Although neoclassical realists have acknowledged the importance of the intervening 
power of domestic non-state actors in the formulation of foreign policy, they have not thoroughly 
analysed the policies of great powers to interact with these non-state actors and seek to make use 
of them. One of the few realist scholars who have analysed these policies is Stephan Walt. In 
Origins of Alliances, he conceptualizes such policies under the name “foreign aid and transnational 
penetration,” and (Walt 1987: 46) argues that great powers may use lobbyists and propaganda to 
alter elite and mass attitudes and to influence public perception with the ultimate goal of affecting 
policy decisions regarding the potential ally. Walt (1987: 242) defines penetration as “the 
manipulation of the target state’s domestic political system [through propaganda, educational, 
cultural, and military assistance] to promote alignment.” His analysis concludes that these policies 
play “subordinate roles” in the decision of the regional states in its external alignment (Walt 1987: 
260-261). 
I argue that the utility of the instruments which Walt calls “foreign aid and penetration” has 
been growing due to the increasingly higher costs of direct military clashes between great powers 
28 
 
since the invention of nuclear weapons and the rapid advance of technological capabilities. It is a 
fact that since the invention of nuclear weapons, there have been no large-scale wars between great 
powers.  The enormous costs of military operations and the risks of nuclear involvement have 
made great powers avoid using them against each other.  In Waltz’s words, they have faced 
“absolute impotence” upon their seizure of “absolute power” (Waltz 1979: 184). Thus, the possibly 
catastrophic consequences of a nuclear escalation make the nuclear armed great powers develop 
instruments to pursue their interests and expand their spheres of influence without triggering major 
military clashes. Soft power is such an instrument.  
From this viewpoint, I put forward the hypothesis that if nuclear armed great powers compete 
amongst themselves to expand or sustain their sphere of influence over a populated region, they 
use soft power as a major expansive instrument while military power remains a tool with which to 
defend themselves and back up their foreign policies. It is important to note that this hypothesis 
refers to the initial phases of the competition. Sometimes, nuclear powers may enter into proxy 
wars when the conflict escalates or one of the sides completely fails in the non-military dimensions 
of the competition. In such cases, if the stakes are too high for one or both of the conflicting sides, 
the escalation of conflict may even reach a nuclear level.    
 
1.1.1.2. (Neoclassical) Realism on the Foreign Policy of Regional States amidst Great Power 
Rivalries  
 
There is a consensus amongst international relations scholars that neutrality 
(nonalignment) is the most optimal strategy for weak states that are stuck between great power 
rivalries (Labs 1992: 385). This allows regional states to maintain ties with rival great powers and 
increases their chances of preserving their independence and security (Fox 1959). However, most 
of the time, neutrality turns out impossible to be maintained, and regional states are forced to make 
a strategic choice.  The advocates of structural realism put an emphasis on the third image analysis 
of international relations and assert that as the margin of manoeuvres is increasingly limited for 
weak states, they have to adopt to the imperatives of the international distribution of power 
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between the great powers (Waltz 1979: 72-73; 194-195; Handel 1990: 3). This logic expects 
regional states to bandwagon with the stronger or the more threatening great power when neutrality 
can no longer be maintained (Waltz 1979: 127). The bandwagoning state joins regional 
organizations (including economic, political, and security institutions) supported by the 
threatening state, avoids deep engagement with rival great powers, and thus is forced to follow 
certain patterns of foreign policy considered acceptable by the predominant power.  
Stephan Walt (1987: 29) argues that “In general, the weaker the state, the more likely it is 
to bandwagon.” According to Walt (ibid.), this is how great powers build their spheres of influence: 
weaker states in the geographic proximity of a great power opt to bandwagon with it as there is no 
balancing possible.  Jack Levy (1989: 231) has also supported this reasoning: 
“The hypothesis regarding balancing behaviour refers to the great powers more than to 
other states. Great powers balance against potential hegemons, whereas weaker states in 
the proximity of stronger states do what is necessary to survive, which often involves 
bandwagoning with the strong instead of balancing against them.”   
Randall Schweller (1994), making an important contribution to this debate, points out that 
states may also bandwagon for opportunities. In this logic, aligning with the stronger state may be 
chosen also for economic or security benefits: “bandwagoning is not just a behaviour to avoid 
capitulation, but a strategy that states adopt in order to gain something without having survival at 
stake” (Cladi et al. 2016: 18).  
However, the history of international relations has, on many occasions, shown that weak 
states may also align against a stronger or more threatening power (Walt 1987: 148; Labs 1992; 
Van Evera 1990/91; Kaufman 1992; Gvalia et al. 2013). In reality, not only do weaker states 
sometimes seek to balance against a stronger or more threatening great power, but they may even 
choose to fight against it alone in some cases (Labs 1992; Gvalia et al. 2013).  
Scholars of international relations have offered various explanations to this inconsistency 
in the foreign policy alignment of weak states but most of them fall short of accuracy. The 
structural realist emphasis on the distribution of capabilities amongst great powers as the major 
driver in the strategic choices of weak states does not always apply in practice: the external 
environment and the global balance of power as an independent variable do not produce the same 
30 
 
actions in the foreign policies of weak states which are located in a similar international 
environment. For example, William Wohlforth (2004: 232) points out that structural realism “is of 
little utility in explaining much of the variation in local responses to Russia. Even when we add 
conditional variables to the theory to derive more hypotheses, it fails to add much to the 
explanation of…why Belarus has been such a faithful bandwagoner despite relative power and a 
geographical position similar to the Baltics.”  
Stephan Walt’s inclusion of factors other than distribution of capabilities that impact the 
formulation of foreign policy strategies cannot be applicable in many cases, either. For Walt 
(1987), besides aggregate power, external alignment strategies are affected by other important 
factors, such as: geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. For Walt, weak 
states tend to bandwagon when the threatening state is much more powerful, when other allies are 
unavailable or when the situation is about to transform into an armed conﬂict. He (1987: 25) points 
out that under these circumstances, attempting to balance might even be an “unwise” option. This 
approach fails in some cases, for instance, in the relations between Belarus and Ukraine on the one 
hand and Russia on the other. Although the two “common neighbourhood” states are located 
within the same geographic proximity of Russia, they have pursued opposite foreign policy 
strategies: Belarus bandwagons with Russia, while Ukraine seeks to align with Western powers 
against Russia. Similarly, James MacDougall’s (2009: 57) study on the South Caucasus states has 
revealed that the regional states pursue different alignment strategies although they share a 
common strategic environment: “Azerbaijan and Georgia, to varying degrees, have balanced 
against the threat from Russia, although at times they have attempted to bandwagon. Armenia has 
not balanced against Russia, but rather has bandwagoned with Russia.” Nor do the assumptions of 
the dependency theorists on the impact of economic dependence (Papayoanou 1997) provide a 
convincing explanation on the strategic choice of weak states in some cases. For example, the 
recent crisis between Ukraine and Russia took place despite economic interrelatedness between 
the two countries. 
Neoclassical realism appears better armed than other theories to provide analyses about the 
foreign policy strategy of weak states. Unlike structural realism, neoclassical realism is aimed at 
developing theories of foreign policy. This school of realism contributes to the above-mentioned 
debate by highlighting the intervening influence of state level variables (Schweller 1997). 
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Analysing domestic political processes as imperfect transmission belts between systemic pressure 
and foreign policy, the theory places an emphasis on the perceptions of the political elite, their 
ability to extract or mobilize societal resources to implement foreign policy and the interference 
of domestic actors (public, business and industrial sectors, labour unions, and other organized 
economic interest groups, media, legislature, ethnic and religious groups) in foreign policy making 
(Rose 1998: 147; Schweller 2004: 164).  
The analysis developed in this thesis is focused on the intervening influence of domestic non-
state actors (in particular, the general public and non-governmental organizations) on the 
formulation of foreign policy and external alignment.  Here the research goal is to explore the 
impact of general public and non-governmental organizations on the formation of the external 
orientation of regional states in the context of the soft power projection of great powers. The thesis 
argues that these internal non-state actors can, on occasion, be impactful enough to force their 
governments to make changes in foreign policy which might include even the re-making of the 
state’s external alignment strategy. In line with the expectations of realist scholars, the thesis finds 
such influence of non-state actors on foreign policy dangerous and potentially detrimental. 
 
The thesis draws on the hypothesis that if the leaders of a small state, which is in between the 
rivalries of great powers who use soft power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis 
society and other internal non-state actors, they can control the inflow of the soft power projection 
of foreign states and offset the intervening influence of domestic non-state actors on foreign policy 
making. Conversely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the external powers find a favourable 
environment in which to wield soft power; the domestic non-state actors can influence the external 
orientation of the state, and; the state may fail to offset their influence, and this may bring about 
suboptimal foreign policy decisions. The following two sections are to discuss this hypothesis 
analysing the nexus of public opinion, foreign policy and state autonomy across different variables.  
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Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, a broad agreement known as the “Almond-Lippmann 
consensus” was formed about the public opinion – foreign policy nexus. According to the 
propositions developed by Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond about this nexus: 
(1) … [public opinion] is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable and 
effective foreign policies, (2) …lacks coherence or structure, but (3) in the final analysis, it 
has little if any impact on foreign policy (Holsti 1992: 439).  
Realism, however, recognizes that public opinion can sometimes intervene in foreign policy. 
However, neoclassical realism, like previous generations of the realist school, supports the 
reasoning of the Almond-Lippmann consensus about the consequences of this intervention: public 
pressure on foreign policy is likely to bring about negative consequences for the whole country 
(Christensen 1996: 17; Lobell 2009: 61). From this point of view, public perceptions of 
international threats and the subtleties of balance-of-power politics are mostly inaccurate because 
of a lack of proper expertise and complete knowledge. This view of public opinion is widely shared 
by other branches of realism. As stated above, Morgenthau (1965a: 567) warns diplomats that “the 
rational requirements of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count on the support of a public 
opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational.” The neorealist school of realism 
maintains similar approach to the public opinion – foreign policy nexus. Mearsheimer (1990: 41) 
observes that “Public opinion on national security issues is notoriously fickle and responsive to 
elite manipulation and world events.”  Realist scholars posit that the vulnerability of state leaders 
to public opinion prevents them from responding to systemic incentives in a rational manner in the 
self-help environment of international anarchy.  
Realist scholars are sceptical of the public’s contribution to foreign policy. Despite the fact 
that in some cases the demands of the general public concerning foreign policy might be more in 
line with national interests than the policies of state leaders, in general this interference prevents 
state leaders from pursuing a thoughtful and coherent foreign policy. Unlike issues which are 
directly linked with daily life, in the realm of foreign policy the public is neither sufficiently 
33 
 
informed nor interested. The world of foreign affairs is, for the public, a remote issue and seeking 
detailed information on the topic is usually a secondary priority when compared to more pressing 
daily issues. Hence, the interference of the public threatens the quality and success of diplomacy 
which otherwise needs to uphold principles such as secrecy and flexibility.5   
On the other hand, the public is not a singular body, and mostly does not speak with one 
voice.  The public is the amalgamation of different ethnic, religious, cultural, business and other 
groups. Among these groups, civil society, which is defined as “the portion of society, outside 
those groups and individuals contesting directly for political power, that exercises some voice in 
public debate on issues of broad concern” (Foley 2010: 164), may exert more pressure on foreign 
policy making. Civil society include unions, religious groups, independent and cultural 
institutions, charitable organizations, professional and trade associations, women’s groups, 
neighbourhood associations, NGOs, etc. As these groups usually pursue parochial interests, their 
influence on the realm of foreign policy may be contradictory to the national interests that state 
leaders are supposed to uphold.6 
                                                 
5 The theoretical approaches that locate the major sources of foreign policy in domestic politics- innenpolitik theories 
- assume the internal factors (e.g. political and economic ideology, national character, socioeconomic structure) as the 
chief determinants of states’ behaviours in the international system. These theories (e.g. liberal or democratic peace 
theories) treat foreign policy as the product of the domestic socio-political and economic environment (Doyle 1983; 
Russett 1993; 2009; Owen 1994; Elman 1997; Gelpi et al. 2001; Mansfield et al. 2005). They differentiate 
democracies and non-democracies and argue that states avoid wars as a political tool as they become more democratic. 
The liberal political theory of international relations starkly differs from realism in its approach to public opinion. 
Liberals argue that public opinion on foreign affairs is stable, rationally structured, consistent, and influences foreign 
policy making in a way that is eventually favourable to the country (Katz 1997). They suggest that public opinion 
should exert substantive influence on foreign policy. Public pressure on foreign policy formulation limits extreme 
elite tendencies and elite adventurism. As policy makers depend on the public to maintain their offices, they refrain 
from policies which are dangerously risky (Foyle 1999: 5-6). Disregarding the systemic factors in their analyses of 
interstate relations, these theories maintain several problematic assumptions, and often face “difficulty accounting for 
why states with similar domestic systems often act differently in the foreign policy sphere and why dissimilar states 
in similar situations often act alike” (Rose 1998: 148).  
6 It might be wrong to assume that the intervention of domestic actors is invariably harmful to national interests. In 
some specific cases, state leaders might seek to maximize their parochial interests at the expense of national interests 
or they might be incapable of enacting correct decisions. In those instances, the intervention of the public could be 
more in line with national security. However, without having access to confidential data, it is difficult to judge the 
foreign policy decisions of state leaders. For instance, many domestic non-state actors in the United States, most 
scholars (amongst whom were many realists) opposed the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq 
(Fordham 2009: 257).  However, considering that the Middle East was to be subject to a more intense competition 
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Due to the democratization of some states, technological revolution and increasing 
globalization, public opinion is gaining more and more influence on both domestic and foreign 
policies. These developments, while empowering the general public in many countries, in parallel 
constrained the autonomy of the state leaders with respect to the surrounding society. Against this 
background, over the years since World War II, public opinion has gained a number of channels 
to exert influence on the management of foreign affairs. Ripsman (2009: 171) argues that “public 
opinion usually influences policy, when it does, indirectly through its representatives in the 
legislature, rather than directly through the foreign security policy executive.” However, in some 
cases, as it happened during the “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet countries, the public may 
also pose direct pressure on the government without the mediation of third actors. The domestic 
non-state actors find ample opportunity to directly influence the government when state leaders do 
not have strong autonomy with respect to society. The following section will analyse state 
autonomy vis-à-vis its surrounding society across different variables and defines the conditions 
which impact its level. 
 
State autonomy across different variables 
 
State autonomy is the ability of public officials to translate their preferences and interests 
into policy and authoritative actions (Nordlinger 1981: 74; Smith 1993b: 49). This can vary 
radically across different states and over time within states. There are a range of variables which 
affect the degree of influence of a society on foreign policy making, such as regime type, the 
economic and political situation in the internal and external environment, socio-political 
composition, etc.  Below, some of these factors are briefly discussed.  
                                                 
with increasingly more powerful rivals (e.g. China and Russia) in the near future, it could have been necessary for the 
United States to make this intervention from the perspective of its own national interests. 
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Regime type: In states where there is no unity amongst the governing elite, or between 
society and political circles, and the probability of a sudden coup d’état is high, domestic pressure 
on state leaders becomes more impactful. Neoclassical realists argue that as the likelihood of the 
domestic actors to remove state leaders from office through legal (elections or votes of no-
confidence) or illegal ways (coups d’état) increases, the state’s autonomy from its surrounding 
society and its political authority for the implementations of certain foreign policy decision 
decreases (Ripsman 2009). In some states, the possibly grave costs of a controversy with important 
domestic political groups compel the state leader to seek a consensus among those political actors 
whose pressure threatens the state leader’s continued presence in office (Hagan 1987: 348-349). 
Compared to non-democratic regimes, in democracies state leaders’ autonomy from society is 
usually more constrained (Tomz et al. 2017). As the public has the legal means to remove the state 
leader from office through ballot boxes in the latter group of states, a state’s autonomy is more 
considerably constrained in those states. In semi-democracies, although ballot boxes might not 
work out in the way they do in full democracies, non-state actors are, in general, still more capable 
of bringing about fundamental change than those in non-democracies.  
Non-democratic leaders who have more autonomy from the society hold more political 
authority to conduct an autonomous foreign policy free of domestic influence. But sometimes the 
level of autonomy that state leaders may possess may be lower in non-democracies than in 
democratic states. Ripsman (2009: 189) compares the level of autonomy of state leaders of 
democratic and non-democratic states, and notes that a structurally constrained non-democratic 
leader (for example, Soviet Leader Khrushchev) might possess even less autonomy to conduct 
policy than a highly autonomous democratic leader (for example, the US Presidents during the 
early Cold War).  
Domestic socio-economic and political conditions: In states (both democratic and non-
democratic), which enjoy relatively high socio-economic standards and political stability, the 
influence of public opinion on foreign policy tends to be less significant. In such states, a successful 
domestic policy gives leeway to the political elite to pursue an autonomous foreign policy. On the 
contrary, domestic constraints become more influential in states which are not classic nation-states, 
and/or are a battlefield of different subnational groups competing (and sometimes fighting) on 
ethnic, religious, political and other grounds (Lobell 2009: 50).  The subnational groups in such 
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states disregard national interests at large and seek to protect their own parochial interests, estimate 
external threats and opportunities from their standpoint, and try to force state leaders to make 
foreign policy shifts in their favour. The pressure that accumulates from these internal variables 
might inhibit state leaders from adapting strategies the likes of which the “balance of power” or 
“balance of threat” theories might predict and can result in suboptimal outcomes to the detriment 
of the nation in the short or long run (Lobell 2009: 63). Neoclassical realism maintains that the 
state holds the highest potential to achieve optimal outcomes when “the constraints and 
inducements that emanate from the systemic, sub-systemic, and domestic levels” converge (Lobell 
2009: 64).  The policy responses of state leaders to systemic pressure emerge in a coordinated 
paradigm of state-society relations. The internal composition of states, the government’s autonomy 
from its surrounding society, and the consensus amongst the elite about the nature of international 
threats vary across different states, and over time within states, and can significantly influence 
governments’ manoeuvers in interstate relations (Ripsman 2009: 189).  
External conditions: The situation in the external environment also affects the level of 
autonomy of a state leader from domestic non-state groups. During stable periods when the 
international environment does not pose any high-level threats to the state’s national security, 
public opinion is expected to have greater pressure on the state’s national security policy. In this 
period the pressure of powerful interest groups, which could potentially either assist the state leader 
in maintaining its hold on power or contribute to the opposition against the state leader, become 
more influential (Ripsman 2009: 186). However, when the international environment threatens the 
state’s national security and its survival, or when the probability of violent confrontation with 
foreign powers increases, state leaders tend to ignore domestic political interests, and focus on 
strategies of securing national interests and the state’s survival. In these periods, the possibly high 
costs of the interference of domestic actors into national security policy compel state leaders to 
ignore internal pressure on foreign policy making (Ripsman 2009: 186). A turbulent external 
environment gives rise to the necessity for the state leader to mobilize the public, to make it accept 
the decisions of the government, and in times of military confrontation - to persuade it to fight and 
sacrifice devotedly. 
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1.1.2. Soft Power  
 
Power over the minds and feelings of people has long been a concept discussed by scholars 
of international relations and practiced by politicians. Yet it was Joseph Nye who made the first 
major attempts at systematizing the resources and techniques which allow states to wield favour 
in the eyes of foreign publics, and to influence their opinions and feelings.  With this intent, he 
coined the term “soft power” in his Bound to Lead, a book published in 1990. According to Nye 
(2004: x), soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments.” Nye (2004: 11) highlights three sources of soft power: culture (in places where it is 
attractive to others), political values (when the state lives up to them at home and abroad) and 
foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).  
Soft power, which, according to Nye (2010: 219), is an “analytical concept” (not a theory), 
describes the requirements of attractive image building and successful foreign policy making. The 
concept explores the nature of the relationship with foreign publics and emphasizes the necessity 
of the inclusion of soft power elements into a foreign policy arsenal. These elements are mostly 
intangible resources – culture, political values, institutions and legitimate foreign policy. However, 
it is often stated that tangible resources (military and economic might) can generate soft power, as 
well (Nye 2011: 86). For example, the deployment of military resources for earthquake relief in 
foreign countries can produce an attractive image. It is the reason why the Chinese scholar 
Mingjiang Li (2009b) prefers the term “soft use of power” to “soft power.”  
Nye (2004: 5) considers soft power as “the ability to shape the preferences of others.” 
According to him (2004: 31; 2011: 90), attraction, persuasion and agenda-setting are the three most 
important ways to build soft power. The concept treats attraction as “the currency of soft power” 
and defines it in terms of the behaviours and resources of a state (Nye 2004: 63). Nye (2004: 6) 
uses poll outcomes to measure attractiveness. According to Craig Hayden (2012: 44), attraction 
can play multiple roles in a soft power relationship—it is a behaviour in the active approach to soft 
power and a resource to be leveraged to achieve an outcome. Unlike Nye (2011: 93), who considers 
attraction as a requirement to be persuasive, Hayden (2012: 44) maintains that attraction “could be 
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the outcome of active persuasion or advocacy to make resources compelling in some symbolic 
way, such as the result of a public diplomacy campaign designed to promote a political value or 
cultural asset.” Alexander Vuving (2009) identifies three qualities of the agent and action which 
can make a state attractive: benignity, brilliance (competence) and beauty (charisma). He argues 
that a state that is perceived as benign can more easily generate sympathy, trust, and credibility. 
“Brilliance” is characterized as a quality of state policies that are admired, respected, and emulated.  
“Beauty” refers to ideals, values, and vision which inspire others to pursue them. Nye (2011: 129) 
finds these three qualities “crucial for converting resources (such as culture, values, and policies) 
into power behaviour.” 
Agenda-setting is presented as another source of soft power. It describes a situation in 
which certain grievances are not spoken of because “mobilization of bias” (Bachrach et al. 1962: 
949) prevents these issues from becoming an issue by keeping them off the agenda.  To put it 
bluntly, the people, aware of their powerlessness in the face of a hegemonic agenda, simply refuse 
to speak up and raise their concerns.  According to Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 641), an agenda 
can be restricted with “the instruments of force, singly or in combination.” However, Gallarotti 
(2011: 15) observes that “soft power generally eschews a strict conflict of interests…”  Nye (2011: 
13) argues that agenda-setting can be characterized as an element of soft power only if the agenda 
of action is changed through acquiescence without the deployment of threats of coercion or 
promises of payment. 
Moreover, Nye also often mentions “persuasion” as an important constitutive of soft power. 
He (2004: 6) defines “persuasion” as “the ability to move people by argument,” and argues that 
“soft power is more than just persuasion.” However, Nye does not dwell on the thorough 
clarification of “persuasion” and its role in soft power making. In his major book on soft power 
titled Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics (2004), the word “persuasion” is used only 
on three occasions, and on one of them, which is a quote from an interwar period British official, 
persuasion is presented as a product of propaganda (Nye 2004: 101), which Nye otherwise does 
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not incorporate into his concept.7 Nye (2011: 93) states that persuasion involves some degree of 
manipulation and fraud. However, he does not assert that manipulation and deception are part of 
strategies to wield soft power. In fact, Nye’s attempt to include these two strategies into persuasion 
is at odds with many other scholars, who exclude manipulation from the set of strategies that 
persuasion contains (Mattern 2007; Walsh 2005: 3).    
The concept of soft power treats public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, 
development assistance, disaster relief, even military-to-military contacts as essential instruments 
for soft power cultivation (Nye 2008b).  Nye argues that in the modern world, in which, unlike 
earlier times, information is not scant, broadcasting information to the world does not suffice to 
wield influence on popular opinion. States, in the competitive nature of the international 
environment, often disseminate (dis)information damaging one another’s image. Under these 
circumstances, credibility is more important than mere information broadcasting. Public 
diplomacy is presented as a tool to win credibility in the eyes of others (2008a).  
According to Joseph Nye, hard power is the combination of military and economic power. 
He (2004: 7-8) holds a relational approach to power and maintains that hard power generally rests 
on coercion and inducement. For him, while coercion is based mostly on force or sanctions, bribes 
and payments are the most likely resources of inducement. States build their hard power on the 
basis of their “population, territory, natural resources, the size of the economy, armed forces [and] 
technological development” (Zahran et al. 2010: 17).     
 
1.1.2.1. Historical Review on Soft Power 
 
Nye (2004: 150; 2007: 162) often claims that he introduced the concept of soft power.  
However, as Baldwin (2013: 289) states, “there is a difference between coining a phrase and 
                                                 
7 Below, in the part called the “State-managed projection,” the theoretical debate on propaganda and public diplomacy 
will be introduced.  
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inventing a concept.” Nye’s contribution to the studies of international relations in terms of soft 
power was not “introducing the concept,” but systematizing and synthesizing the tools and 
resources which are used to influence opinions, attitudes and values of the publics of foreign 
countries, and to shape their preferences. Elsewhere Nye (2011: 81) himself acknowledges that 
“though the concept of soft power is recent, the behaviour it denotes is as old as human history.” 
In fact, not only “the behaviour it denotes,” but also the ideas the concept of soft power contains 
have a long historical background. The historical roots of the concept of soft power date back to 
the political philosophy of ancient Greece. Throughout history both scholars and politicians paid 
significant attention to power over popular opinion along with more tangible power (i.e. military 
and economic might).   
 
Soft power in theoretical writings 
 
Thucydides, who is considered a founder of classical realism makes clear in his History of 
the Peloponnesian War that hegemony solely based on coercion is doomed to fail and therefore is 
a dangerous strategy. This forces the hegemon to further strengthen its military and economic 
power, as it fears that it would face dangerous resistance if it were to be perceived as weak or 
irresolute. It leads the hegemon to pursue an expansionist foreign policy to demonstrate its power, 
a strategy which is quite risky and threatens serious military loses, and ultimately brings about the 
collapse of the entire empire. Thucydides states that initially, Athens’ allies admired the city’s 
courage and quality of leadership, which substantially reduced the costs of governance and 
leadership, as well as the maintenance of the hegemonia. The allies acquiesced with Athens’ 
hegemony as long as they perceived it as benevolent and beneficial for their own states as well. 
When the hegemon abandoned this policy, and sought benefits solely for its own, then it became 
a tyrant, giving rise to its own ultimate end. Lebow and Kelly (2001: 605-606), comparing 
Thucydides’ narrative with Nye’s soft power approach, point out that unlike the latter, the former 
advises states to deliver tangible rewards for others in order to gain their acquiescence.  
Roman political theorists also discussed the promotion of a favourable image in the eyes 
of foreign publics as a crucial policy tool. Cicero (107 BC – 47 BC), a Roman politician and 
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political scientist pointed out that no power is strong enough to last if it relies solely upon inspiring 
fear (Korab-Karpowicz 2010: 107-108). According to Cicero, a hegemonic leadership cannot long 
last unless it strives to earn others’ affection, confidence, admiration, and esteem through moral 
values and justice (ibid.).  
A similar approach can be observed in Thomas Hobbes’ political writings as well. 
Gallarotti (2010: 96), after carefully analysing Hobbes’ The Leviathan, comes to the conclusion 
that according to Hobbes’ vision of anarchy, “hard power resources are necessary, but soft power 
is just as crucial to optimize influence and achieve security in an environment without any common 
power to keep all actors in awe.”  Following these ideas, Italian communist Antonio Gramsci 
(1971) highlights the importance of consent along with coercion as the two pillars of hegemony. 
In the Gramscian sense, hegemony is established on the basis of not only economic or political 
spheres, but also in the ideational (cultural and moral) sphere.  Gramsci argues that consent and 
coercion are complementary, and the latter is mobilized when consent fails to sustain the order 
controlled by hegemonic power.   
Prominent realist scholars have also underscored the importance of image cultivation and 
public opinion in foreign policy management. For example, Edward Carr (1951) introduced a 
threefold classification of power: military power, economic power and power over opinion. He 
asserts that “power over opinion” is “not less essential for political purposes than military and 
economic power and has always been closely associated with them” (Carr 1951: 132). Noting the 
Catholic Church as the first totalitarian state, Carr (1951: 133) stated that the Church pioneered an 
understanding of and developed the potentialities of power over the masses’ opinions and 
established the first propaganda organization.  
The significance of power over opinion was acknowledged by Morgenthau as well. He 
distinguishes three methods of imperialism: military, economic and cultural imperialism. For him 
(1965a: 61-61) while the first two aim at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic 
life, the latter strives for the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument for 
changing power relations. Morgenthau (1965a: 62) states that “the use of cultural sympathy and 
political affinities as weapons of imperialism is almost as old as imperialism itself.” He emphasizes 
the significance of religion as a way of influencing the minds and feelings of foreign publics. 
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Morgenthau (1965a: 61) asserts that public sympathy and an attractive image play a subsidiary 
role in foreign policy supporting military and economic methods. This coaxes the enemy and 
prepares the ground for military conquest or economic penetration. Like Thucydides, Cicero and 
Hobbes, Morgenthau (1965a: 63) recognizes the potential of military methods to conquer foreign 
territories without the support of non-military means, but he singles out its possibility to endure: 
“no dominion can last which is founded upon nothing but military force.” 
 
Soft power in practice 
 
Throughout history the achievements of states in international politics was significantly 
associated with their military and economic power, as Friedrich Engels once stated, “without force 
and iron ruthlessness nothing is achieved in history” (quoted in Carr 1951: 102). Since the 
beginning of the history of civilizations, military power has been the decisive element of states’ 
strength and existence. Likewise, as “the most obvious, the most ancient, and also the crudest form 
of imperialism,” military assets have long been the major component of states’ power (Morgenthau 
1965a: 58). However, during the late Middle Ages, significant developments took place in 
technological, scientific and cultural spheres, including in social life and political governance. The 
industrial revolution, major technological advances, the increase of publishing houses, 
newspapers, broadcasting agencies, etc. impacted all spheres of human life. Under these 
circumstances, the nature of international relations did not go unchanged, and stepped into 
overwhelming transformations. The revolutionary changes in the character of international 
relations in the middle ages intensified with the French Revolution (1789). The revolution 
empowered the general public and granted them crucial influence on political issues. The rational-
critical process of debating and weighing political issues in newspapers, speeches, meetings and 
other institutions of public sphere became part of the political discourse.  
The importance of public opinion did not end with conferring legitimacy and influencing 
domestic political discourse, but also gradually gained significant leverage to impact foreign 
policy. This was a revolutionary change in the political nature of states and resulted in the struggle 
for favourable public opinion in international politics. States started to deploy instruments to 
43 
 
influence popular opinion in other countries. For example, Simon Burrows (1997: 29), writing 
about the British-French confrontation in the Napoleonic era, states that the war between Britain 
and France “was waged at both a military and economic level, but also at the level of international 
propaganda.” British foreign policy makers at the time payed serious attention to the production 
and dissemination of propaganda written in the French language by writers in Britain and aimed 
at “turn[ing] the French general public against the Napoleonic regime” (Burrows 1997: 29).  
David Welch (2003: xvi) points out that propaganda, as a foreign policy tool historically 
associated with periods of wars and serious confrontation, was rarely used from the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The massive use of propaganda during 
the first total war in history, opened a path in the practice of international politics which is still 
being followed. The war brought the efforts of influencing public opinion as an indispensable part 
into the formulation of government policies. This factor played an enormous role during the war, 
and even some consider the weakness of Germany as a propaganda power one of the determining 
factors of its defeat (Welch 2003: xvii).   
Prior to World War II, efforts to wield soft power reached an historical peak. Propaganda 
provoked a remarkable interest both among scholars and politicians. A wide array of studies were 
carried out to examine the ways of moulding the minds and controlling the feelings of both 
domestic and foreign publics. Meanwhile, special government institutions were created to project 
power abroad aimed at shaping perceptions of foreign publics: for example, the Ministry of 
Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in Germany, the Propaganda Committee of the 
Communist Party in the USSR, the Ministry of Information of the United Kingdom and the Office 
of War Information in the USA.  Nye (2008c: xiii) also points out that “Hitler, Stalin, and Mao all 
possessed a great deal of soft power in their heydays...”  
Although historically propaganda was “regarded by almost everyone as a weapon 
specifically appropriate to a period of hostilities” (Carr 1951: 137), during the Cold War it 
gradually transformed into a foreign policy tool actively utilized in peace time as well. The 
changing nature of the system of international relations, the invention of weapons of mass 
destruction, and the increasing cost of war made great powers conduct latent wars through 
economic measures and propaganda tools. The world became a battlefield of a struggle for power 
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over opinion.  While since the end of World War II, a full-scale clash between the great powers 
has not taken place (largely because of the fear of nuclear weapons), the world has been 
experiencing rivalries between them in other ways: economically and ideologically.  
 
1.1.2.2. Reconceptualization of Soft Power  
 
This section will present a model of soft power which differentiates two sources of soft 
power: self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed projection (Figure 1). Following Nye’s 
logic, this model deals with attractiveness as a currency of soft power. The model uses the word 
attractiveness interchangeably with the term “self-projection.” It defines self-projection as the 
projection of a state’s cultural, political, economic, educational, military etc. accomplishments to 
foreign countries without the involvement of its government. Attractiveness is built on two general 
sources: natural endowments and human-constructed qualities. While the former denotes the 
natural qualities of the country, i.e. its territories, population, climate, etc., the latter characterizes 
policies, political values, economic standards, foreign aid, military power, technological and 
scientific advances, music, movies, TV channels, popular culture, ideas and customs, etc. 
Attractiveness empowers the state’s narratives and provides arsenal against the contending 
narratives.   
A well-endowed country acquires favourable material conditions to build strong power (both 
hard power and soft power). Natural endowments can allow the state to build a strong military and 
economic power, but do not suffice to be attractive. It is likewise important for states to have 
attractive human-made qualities. While natural endowments are a crucial, but neither sufficient 
nor necessary, condition for states to acquire attractiveness, human-constructed qualities are both 
a necessary and sufficient condition to be attractive. The difference in the soft power achievements 
of Turkey and Singapore is a telling example. In terms of natural endowments, the latter is far 
behind the former: Turkey with its area (783,562 sq. km) and population (78.67 million) is a far 
bigger country than Singapore (area: 719.1 sq. km; population: 5.535 million). Nevertheless, 
Singapore has been more successful than Turkey in soft power production all over the world. For 
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example, a ranking by Monocle Magazine in 2015, considering the performances of states in 
business and innovation, culture, government, diplomacy and education, rated Turkey 25th and 
Singapore 23rd.8 
 
Figure 1. Soft Power9 
 
A state’s attractive endowments and qualities can project an attractive image through 
informal communications, grassroots cultural exchanges, non-state actors, non-governmental 
organizations, (international) media, internet etc. without any state support in a way that can be 
                                                 
8 Monocle Soft Power Survey (2015), available at: http://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2015-16/, 
(accessed 14 October 2016).   
9 Unlike Nye’s model of soft power, this model does not take agenda-setting, which is defined as “raising issues to 
salience among the relevant community of actor” (Livingston 1992: 313), on par with attractiveness. It does not treat 
agenda-setting as a source of soft power, but as a possible outcome of it. This model treats soft power as power over 
the minds and feelings of foreign publics that can be cultivated through the international appeal of a nation’s culture, 
values, social-political system, economic model, foreign policies, and its state-managed propaganda/public diplomacy 
policies. A state’s soft power in a foreign country could be used for different goals by the representing country. 
Agenda-setting could be one of these goals, but not a source of building soft power.   
Soft Power
Self-
projection 
(Attraction)
Natural 
Endowments
Human 
constructed 
assets
State-
Managed 
Projection
Public 
diplomacy Propaganda
46 
 
theorized as “self-projection.” Though self-projection does happen independently, sometimes it 
can reach and deliver messages to foreign publics more effectively than the state-managed 
projection of many countries does. Nye (2011: 17) supports this belief:    
“[A] country can try to attract others through actions such as public diplomacy, but it may 
also attract others through the structural effects of its example or what can be called the 
“shining city on the hill” effect.” 
If the people of state A lives in desperate poverty or chaos while its neighbour state B 
experiences economic prosperity and political stability, then naturally B’s economic model and 
policies will produce attractiveness for the people of A. In such cases, country B’s values, 
supposedly such as democracy, freedom, better living standards, and human rights may attract the 
people in state A, because these values “address their individual and collective desires and needs” 
(Roselle et al. 2014: 76). This attractiveness may also generate incentives among the people of 
state A to follow the model of the country B. Thus, self-projection, as an extension of successful 
human-constructed qualities, provides a favourable basis for the success of state-managed 
projection.   
 
State-Managed Projection 
 
The mounting influence of domestic non-state actors on the formation of both domestic 
and foreign policies encourages states to devote significant energy and resources to programmes 
that are designed to work with foreign publics, to inform them about the “projected” country, its 
values and traditions. The eventual goal of these state initiatives is to realize national interests 
through non-military means by exerting influence on foreign publics, moulding their opinions, and 
influencing the policies of their respective governments. In 1960s, the Director of US Information 
Agency, Edward Murrow (quoted in Waller 2007: 25) backed this belief by stating that “any 
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program supported by government funds can only be justified to the extent that it assists in the 
achievement of national objectives.” 
This is why the soft power projection of external powers sometimes generates a strong 
backlash in target countries. If a state develops a strong amount of power over popular opinion in 
a foreign state with ultimately hostile intentions, it might make that state feel threatened and seek 
counter-measures.  Pointing to this possibility, Stephan Walt (1987: 260) writes that “penetration 
is usually counterproductive when a state tries to alter the target’s preferred alignment in an 
especially significant way.” In some cases, the threatened state may even seek a coalition with 
states that share similar concerns. This approach differs from Nye’s, who argues that “if a country 
can also increase its soft power, its neighbors feel less need to seek balancing alliances” (Nye 
2012). In reality, the growing soft power of hostile states might urge the threatened state to seek a 
balancing coalition. The case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an excellent example.  
The GCC, founded in 1981, is a regional, intergovernmental union of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The Iranian regime that came to 
power following the Shiite Revolution in 1979 had begun to project its ideology into neighboring 
countries. Iran, by using a range of communicative strategies, sought to provoke the Shiite 
minorities in the Gulf countries to revolt against their respective states and demand transformation 
into a more Islamic state. The Arabian monarchies who had a considerable amount of Shiite 
minorities felt threatened by Iran’s growing soft power, its propaganda and other subversive 
actions. Scott Cooper (2003) writes that poor economic and social conditions amongst Shiite 
minorities created a favorable environment for Iran’s propaganda and facilitated domestic 
discontent. In response to Iran’s soft power projection, Gulf countries converged their counter 
strategies and founded the GCC to coordinate their policies. Cooper underlines that there were not 
any economic interests behind the formation of the Council. Nor were there military institutions 
within the Council to integrate military forces against a common external threat.  
In reality the GCC members cooperated against the interference of Iranian soft power into 
their internal circles. Considering the state “as the intermediary between domestic society and the 
international system,” Cooper (2003: 309) suggests that internal threats to the state can be “as 
serious as external threats—and may, in some circumstances, be more serious.” Cooperation over 
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the exchange of information on political dissidents, bilateral agreements involving sharing 
sensitive intelligence, border control, extradition of criminals served to counter domestic 
subversion instigated by Iran (Cooper 2003: 313-314). In this respect, some scholars and experts 
consider non-military interference in state’s internal affairs by foreign countries through 
subversion, terrorism, espionage, political propaganda, or related interventions as a form of 
offensive power which might be as dangerous as – or sometimes even more dangerous than – 
conventional military actions (Walt 1987: 165, fn. 38; Priess 1996; Cooper 2003: 324).  
States make use of a diverse set of strategies (persuasion, seduction, manipulation, etc.) to 
get their narratives through contending ones. Narratives constitute the central element of the state-
managed projection, and its role in the formation of soft power is so crucial that some scholars 
even argue that international affairs has become a matter of “whose story wins” (Nye, 2013b) or 
“strategic narrative is soft power in 21st century” (Roselle et al. 2014: 71). The concept of “strategic 
narratives” developed by Roselle et al. (2014: 74) argues that such narratives “directly address the 
formation, projection and diffusion, and reception of ideas in the international system.” Roselle et 
al. define strategic narratives as “a communicative tool through which political actors … attempt 
to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives” 
(2014: 3) and differentiate its three, inter-related levels – international system narratives, national 
narratives, and issue narratives10 (2014: 76). While international system narratives are narratives 
about the structure of the international system, the players and rules in this system, national 
narratives set out “what the story of the state or nation is, what values and goals it has” (ibid.). 
Finally, issue narratives are about a state’s policies, values, objectives in response to a certain 
national or international issue. For example, in Russia’s case these three levels of narratives can 
be clearly identified: Russia’s calls for a multipolar world and its objections to the predominance 
of the USA in the international system are an example for international system narratives. 
Moscow’s national narratives present Russia as a peace-loving country struggling to restore justice 
in the world which is allegedly dominated by the USA. These two levels of Moscow’s narratives 
                                                 
10 Feklyunina (2016: 777) adds “collective identity narratives” to this list as the fourth type of strategic narratives. As 
narratives on collective identity resonate closely with national narratives, in this thesis the former will be discussed 
within the frame of the latter.    
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are complemented by its issue narratives. As in the case of the former two narratives, the issue 
narratives also address both domestic and foreign publics on the legitimacy of its policies and 
explain why a certain state action is good or just. 
States employ various strategies and instruments to deliver their narratives to targeted 
people in foreign countries and to influence their minds and feelings: such as non-governmental 
organizations, international broadcasting, academic exchange programs, supporting foreign 
political parties and politically-active groups, etc. The strategies and instruments mentioned below 
are to be discussed in more detail.  Carr (1951: 134) has written that, “the same economic and 
social conditions which have made mass opinion supremely important in politics have also created 
instruments of unparalleled range and efficiency for moulding and directing it.” Public diplomacy 
and propaganda are two catch-all terms under whose umbrellas all the instruments and strategies 
utilized to wield power over popular opinion abroad can be located (Table 1).   
Joseph Nye does not separately discuss propaganda as an instrument of soft power 
cultivation. In his concept, the policies some of which were historically considered propaganda 
(such as international broadcasting) are introduced under the label of “public diplomacy” (Nye 
2004: 107-108). Although when talking about the policies of western governments (including the 
Woodrow Wilson administration) during World War I, Nye (2008a: 96-97) names the initiatives 
of these governments to influence domestic and foreign public opinion “propaganda,” he (2004, 
2008a, 2011) uses the term “public diplomacy” when talking about the similar policies of the 
United States in the modern period. Nonetheless, a deeper analysis of these two concepts indicates 
that although the term propaganda is disregarded in Nye’s concept of soft power, in fact this is still 
an integral part of policies to wield power over opinion.  
The term “public diplomacy,” which emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, 
does not have a single definition all scholars subscribe to. Paul Sharp (2005: 106) defines it as “the 
process by which direct relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests and 
extend the values of those being represented.” According to Nye (2008a: 95), it is an instrument 
that governments use to mobilize its soft power arsenal to communicate with and attract the publics 
of other countries.  Nevertheless, according to Edmund Gullion, who allegedly coined the term 
“public diplomacy” in the mid-1960s, the new term was coined as a result of their attempts to 
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avoid the word “propaganda” about the policies of the United States. He (quoted in Vincent 2007: 
237) pointed out that although the activities in question could be called “propaganda,” because of 
its pejorative connotation a new term “public diplomacy” was favourable to “to describe the whole 
range of communications, information, and propaganda.” 
Propaganda is mostly defined as “the dissemination of ideas intended to convince people 
to think and act in a particular way and for a particular persuasive purpose” (Welch 2003: xix). 
Propaganda is historically associated with the Latin term propagate (propagare) denoting the 
activities of religious circles spreading the Christian faith during the Middle Ages (Sussman 2010: 
14; Vincent 2007: 234).  Historically a neutral connotation, the term was not at all suggestive of 
the dissemination of disinformation aimed at goals which were to the detriment of the original 
interests of the receivers.  However, currently it is mostly conceived as a tool used to mislead 
people about the nature of contemporary problems and their solutions (Miller et al. 2010: 4). Welch 
(2003: xix) points out that propaganda functions through the transmission of ideas and values for 
a specific purpose which serve the interests of the propagandist directly or indirectly. Propaganda 
denotes the dissemination of not only misleading, but also true information in the form of speech, 
text or audio/visual message which does not simply intend to inform the receivers, but to direct 
their minds and feelings into a specific direction pre-determined by the propagandist (Sussman 
2010: 12). For example, contrary to the assumptions of propaganda as mere lies, and the conviction 
that the dissemination of true information cannot be propaganda, French philosopher Jacques Ellul 
(1973: 53) asserts that the best propaganda operates with some degree of truth on the basis of 
which it gives the greatest results. He rightly states that propaganda does not only aim to change 
opinions, but much more importantly, it seeks to reinforce existing beliefs and attitudes. A few 
decades before Ellul, writing in 1936, Aldous Huxley (quoted in Taylor: 1979: 22) also pointed 
out that “The propagandist is a man [who] canalizes an already existing stream; in a land where 
there is no water, he digs in vain.”  
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                  Propaganda                 vs.              Public Diplomacy 
                                                            Commonality   
 
 
Strategies 
Use of deception 
Persuasion 
Manipulation 
Seduction, etc. 
 
Objectives 
To influence the opinions and feelings of the people in other countries 
To reinforce or change their attitudes 
                                                   Dissimilarities 
                        Propaganda  Public Diplomacy 
       Mostly a wartime weapon      Mostly a peacetime strategy  
       Pejorative connotations      Less objectionable  
       Mostly no direct engagement      Deeper engagement 
Instruments (international broadcasting) Instruments (non-governmental 
organizations, academic exchange 
programs, cultural diplomacy, 
supporting civil society actors) 
Table 1. Public diplomacy vs. propaganda 
 
In retrospect, propaganda was a policy tool of states in times when the current technology 
and policy techniques were yet to be obtained. The activities which were called “propaganda” were 
included initial and unsophisticated (compared to modern standards) techniques. It was conducted 
mostly through broadcasting via radios, televisions, newspapers and films to entire nations. 
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Although these instruments are still being used extensively, public diplomacy brought substantial 
changes to this concept. Preserving the same ultimate goals, public diplomacy included elements 
into its range of activities which look much less objectionable, and even altruistic. For example, 
educational initiatives and student exchange programs are usually well appreciated by most people 
in the beneficiary countries. These programs accompanying the major policy guide which seeks to 
influence thoughts and feelings of the receivers proved to be more engaging and at the same time 
more effective.  
The public diplomacy tools generate the possibility of communicating with foreign publics 
face-to-face which is arguably “the most effective” communication method (Nye 2004: 111). 
Unlike propaganda, it allows for deeper engagement with foreign publics. As Nye notes, “the best 
propaganda is not propaganda” (Nye 2014). Non-governmental and civil society institutions are 
of paramount importance for the success of soft power policies. Hence, as Jan Melissen (2005: 4) 
names soft power a “postmodern variant of power over opinion,” we can assuredly call public 
diplomacy a “postmodern variant of propaganda.” In a similar vein, for the definition of public 
diplomacy Geoff Berridge and Alan James write that it “is a late-twentieth-century term for 
propaganda conducted by diplomats” (Berridge et al. 2001: 197).   
 
International broadcasting 
 
International broadcasting, which is aimed at a foreign audience through radio, satellite 
and the internet, has gradually evolved to be the primary means of propagating for states since 
World War I. Seeking to promote its foreign policy interests, each great power since then has 
launched international broadcasting services to propagate to foreign audiences. During the Cold 
War, the most popular government-managed and government-funded broadcasters were the Voice 
of America, the BBC World Service, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the Soviet 
Union’s Radio Moscow (now the Voice of Russia) and China’s Radio Peking (now China Radio 
International). Nowadays the technological revolution has massively expanded the scope of 
international broadcasting to unprecedented levels. Not only great powers but also medium and 
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small powers invest large sums of money in international broadcasting. BBC World News, CNN, 
France24, TV Globo (Brazil), Deutsche Welle (Germany), TRT (Turkey), Russia Today (Russia), 
Press TV (Iran) are a few of these international services.  Through these channels, states pursue 
their ideological and business (such as tourism) interests, portray their nations in a positive and 
non-threatening light, and combat negative images produced by foreign powers or internal groups.  
The huge rise in the quantity of information broadcast to global audiences has obliged 
broadcasters to develop strategies and techniques to gain credibility in the eyes of viewers, to 
expand their audiences and to win over foreign publics. James Wood (2000: 27) in History of 
International Broadcasting indicates some of these methods which are employed in broadcasting 
for propaganda purposes. According to him, propagandists (1) seek to gain the trust of the people, 
and project total credibility in their claims, (2) promote a warm and pleasant feeling of belonging 
and ideas, thoughts or opinions that seem reasonable through brevity, the repetition of key words, 
simplicity and the liberal use of symbols or slogans, (3) and may suggest a course of action that 
seems justified. International broadcasting has proved to be a highly effective means of interfering 
into domestic circles of other countries. Since its inception these services have played essential 
roles in international affairs, particularly between rival or warring powers.  The efforts of great 
powers for these purposes have been outstanding. For instance, despite economic backwardness 
and huge military costs, by the 1950s Radio Moscow, the major international broadcasting service 
of the USSR, was broadcasting in 80 different languages, and the Soviets dominated the rest of the 
world’s international broadcasters (Wood 2000: 110). 
 
Cultural Diplomacy and Educational Exchanges 
 
While there are many tools available at the disposal of governments to communicate with 
foreign publics, educational exchange programmes as a public diplomacy instrument are of a 
special significance. These programmes cover a wide range of cultural, social, and military 
educational exchanges between nations. Liping Bu (1999: 393) points out that “the term 
‘educational exchanges’” used to be regarded by some scholars as a synonym for “cultural 
relations.” The alumni of these programs become more informed and return home mostly with a 
54 
 
more positive view of the country they have studied in (Wang 1991; Richmond 2003; Miller 2006; 
Altbach et al. 2008). This is an important contribution to states’ efforts to wield power over popular 
opinion in foreign countries. The importance of this contribution increases further when the alumni 
of these programs get involved in the socio-economic and political processes of their countries. 
Mostly, these people sympathize with the cultural and political values of the countries with which 
they have the links through this kind of exchange programs.  
For example, through its own exchange programs the Soviet Union brought students from 
different parts of the world to study at its universities. The Soviets’ Peoples’ Friendship University, 
which was later called Patrice Lumumba University after the Congolese independence leader 
Patrice Lumumba, hosted thousands of students from all over the world, in particular from Asia, 
Africa and South America. This was a crucial instrument for the Soviets to spread communist 
thought around the world. The change in the name of the university in 1961 after Lumumba had 
been executed with the involvement of the USA and Belgium was also of particular importance 
for the Soviet government to create emotional ties with the countries of the Third World which 
had long suffered under colonial rule. It includes also military educational exchange programs 
which some studies have concluded can be more successful in cultivating positive attitudes in 
foreign countries. For example, Miller (2006), conducting extensive interviews with participants 
of several US government-sponsored person-to-person contact programs in Georgia, Ukraine, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kazakhstan, found that one military educational exchange program, 
International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) produced more pro-Western 
attitudes than many other public diplomacy projects.  
 
Non-governmental Organizations  
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are of great importance in the conduct of public 
diplomacy, and in recent years the significance of these organizations in the overall foreign policy 
of the great powers has evolved substantially. As governments in most cases do not enjoy the full 
trust of the publics of the other countries, they pursue their policies with the help of NGOs, which 
are mostly designed to look independent of the governments of their origin. The obligation of 
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states not to meddle in the internal affairs of other countries - which is reinforced by the resolutions 
of various international organizations, including the United Nations - makes great powers deploy 
these organizations to fulfill tasks in foreign countries which cannot be done directly. Financing 
and supporting political opposition groups in other countries through non-governmental 
institutions is an infamous example.  
For example, in the last decade of the Cold War, US non-governmental institutions, such 
as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), and the American Federation of Labour and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were actively involved in the promotion of nationalism and 
separatism in countries under the communist rule. These institutions supported opposition groups 
politically and monetarily both in Soviet countries and in the countries of the Eastern European 
allies of the USSR (Domber 2014). Goldgeier and McFaul write that: 
“If Bush and the top officials in his administration did not speak about or actively promote 
democracy in the Soviet Union, other U.S. actors did. Less constrained by the international 
regime respecting state sovereignty, American nongovernmental organizations were more 
aggressive in recognizing and supporting Russia’s opposition movement… And while 
President Bush issued warnings about the dangers of nationalism, the NED was offering 
assistance to national democratic movements in the Baltics, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
and Georgia… The International Republican Institute---called the National Republican 
Institute at the time-- became deeply engaged in party building programs with Russian 
counterparts well before the Soviet Union collapsed… At the time, all of these 
nongovernmental organizations received the bulk of their funding from government 
sources. Indirectly, therefore, one could argue that the U.S. government was using a dual-
track strategy to promote democratization within the Soviet Union and Russia indirectly…” 
(Goldgeier et al. 2003: 29-30). 
After the end of the Cold War, Western NGOs continued their activities in the region 
promoting liberal democratic values and changing or reinforcing regional peoples’ attitudes 
towards the West. These institutions played a key role in helping to oust some of the authoritarian 
regimes in Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries.  
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For a number of states, particularly for the great powers, working with political parties and 
civil society actors in foreign countries is one of the major ways of delivering messages to the 
people of those countries and influencing their minds and feelings. Political parties and civil 
society actors that are engaged in political and public affairs play a key role in all states, especially 
in democracies. They are best positioned to talk directly to the general public, aggregate and 
represent their interests, formulate policy agendas that respond to those interests, and form 
governments and opposition groups.11 Establishing linkage with political parties and the civil 
societies of a foreign country constitutes an important part of the policies to get what a state wants 
to achieve in that country without employing hard power directly (Way et al. 2007: 38).  
While propaganda and public diplomacy seek to influence the minds and feelings of the 
people, attracting political parties and civil society members provides the external power with 
effective tools. Such a connection allows the external power to get its messages delivered by the 
people who are from the target countries themselves. As these people are accepted by the general 
population as part of their own societies, their narratives have a higher probability of attracting 
attention and of changing or reinforcing their opinions. State A wields strong soft power in state 
B when it manages to wield power over the minds and feelings of a significant portion of its public 
and establish favourable connections with its political parties and/or civil society actors.  
Since the Cold War, great powers have invested a large sum of resources on developing ties 
with political parties and civil societies in foreign countries. The USSR’s support to communist 
parties over the world accompanied its propaganda efforts to spread its ideology abroad. In a 
similar vein, the US has been supporting pro-Western political parties and civil society actors as 
part of its commitment to promote democracy. The importance of this cooperation in the pursuit 
of foreign policy goals cannot be underestimated. Western support to political parties in formerly 
communist countries has played a major role in the transition period of these countries. For 
example, US non-governmental organizations, such as the International Republican Institute (IRI), 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the United States Agency for International 
                                                 
11 Overseas Development Institute (2010), “Support to political parties: A missing piece of the governance puzzle,” 
available at: http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6321.pdf (accessed: 28 
January 2016).  
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Development (USAID) have been very actively involved in the promotion of democracy in Serbia, 
Georgia, and Ukraine. The Western strategy to overthrow Milosevic was particularly focused on 
strengthening opposition political parties, civil society, independent media and fostering public 
belief in the desirability and possibility of political change (Carothers 2001: 2). Serbian civic 
education organizations, NGO advocacy groups, student groups, labour unions, community 
associations, policy institutes, and other civic associations received US and European funding 
which in a single year amounted to around $80 million (Carothers 2001: 5).  
 
Soft power vs. Hard Power  
 
 The distinction and relationship between hard power and soft power is one of the most 
debatable questions in the concept of soft power. While a group of scholars, including Nye, 
consider soft power independent of hard power, there are others that claim the opposite. According 
to Nye (2004: 9), “soft power does not depend on hard power.” In his defence of this statement, 
Nye gives the Vatican as an example claiming that it has soft power even though it has no hard 
power.  Afterwards, Nye defends this view with the consequences of the Soviet invasions of 
Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) to its soft power, stating that these invasions led the 
USSR to lose much of its soft power despite its growing economic and military capability. In 
contrast, Colin Gray (2011: 46) states that “soft power flows to the owner of hard power.” In a 
similar vein Christopher Layne (2010: 57) argues that Nye’s concept wrongly assumes that foreign 
policy is controlled by public opinion. In general, vagueness regarding the hard power - soft power 
nexus is often mentioned as one of the flaws of Nye’s concept of soft power (Zheng et al. 2012: 
22). 
Another contradiction regarding soft power and hard power in Nye’s concept is about the 
nature of their sources. Nye (2003: 10) is well-aware of the fact that military and economic power 
can generate soft power as well. However, as Zheng and Zhang (2012: 24) write, he does not 
“provide a clear, logical and persuasive explanation to this contradiction in his soft power theory.” 
Zheng and Zhang (ibid.) argue that Nye prefers a simple partitioning of the policies and behaviours 
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of two types of power: “For instance, the policies and actions of military power include coercive 
diplomacy, war and alliance; those of economic power include aid, bribes and sanctions; and those 
of soft power include public diplomacy and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.” 
As an attempt to sort out this contradiction I propose an analysis of the soft power – hard 
power nexus as based on the following four assumptions (Figure 2):  
(1) The possession of hard power (i.e. economic and military power) is a precondition to develop 
strong soft power;  
(2) Diminishing utility of military power in international politics compels great powers to develop 
their soft power capacity in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals;  
(3) Soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need and must pay adequate 
attention to the development of their hard power;  
(4) The possession of strong, hard power elements (e.g. economic power) does not automatically 
produce soft power; states need to take appropriate measures to wield soft power.  
Below these arguments are discussed in more detail. 
1. The possession of hard power (i.e. economic and military power) is a precondition to 
develop soft power: 
I want to begin with Nye’s above-mentioned description of the negative consequences of 
the Hungary and Czechoslovakia invasions to Soviet soft power. As a matter of fact, a similar 
image crisis - which the USSR underwent in the aftermath of these invasions - happened also to 
the USA following the Vietnam invasion (1960s). However, both the USSR and the USA managed 
to recover their soft power by the virtue of their growing economic and military resources. 
Otherwise they would have failed to regain attractiveness if they had lost their military and 
economic power. Elsewhere Nye (2004: 14) himself acknowledges this fact: “When the policy 
changed and the memories of the war receded, the United States recovered much of its lost soft 
power” during the Vietnam war.   
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Strong hard power backing creates a favourable basis for international soft power 
projection to be effective and successful. Edward Carr in Twenty Years Crisis asserts that military 
and economic strength makes the success of international propaganda possible. He (1951: 139) 
observes that “The Third or Communist International enjoyed little influence until the power of 
the Russian state was placed behind it.” On the contrary, Trotskyism, which theoretically was not 
less influential, remained without influence, as it was not supported by the power of any state.  
 
 
Figure 2. Hard power vs. soft power 
 
The importance of hard power for a soft power campaign is also acknowledged by many 
contemporary scholars. For example, Chinese scholar Hongyi Lai (2012: 12) portrays economic 
clout “as a bedrock for a nation’s soft power.” Lai (2012: 9) observes that Germany, Canada, and 
Japan, the countries that emerged as the top three most respected nations in polls which were 
conducted by GlobeScan for BBC World Services in 21 countries in different parts of the world 
between 30 November 2009 and 16 February 2010, are also among the most economically 
developed nations and among the top benefactors of foreign aid in total and especially in terms of 
the ratio of aid to GDP. He (2012: 11) rightfully concludes that the importance of economic 
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resources, foreign aid, and technological and scientific capacity for soft power cannot be 
underestimated.  
2. Diminishing utility of military power compels great powers to develop their soft power 
capacity: 
The evolution of soft power in the policies of great powers is also a result of the diminishing 
utility of military power (Huseynov 2016). It is a fact that since the invention of nuclear weapons, 
the international political environment has not experienced any large-scale war between great 
powers. The enormous costs of military operations and the risks of nuclear involvement have made 
great powers avoid using them against each other.  They have faced “absolute impotence” upon 
their catch of “absolute power” (Waltz 1979: 184).   
The decline in the utility of military power and, against this background, the rise of soft 
power, has also been affected by a series of other developments in recent decades. On the one 
hand, the information revolution which has rendered worldwide communication cheap and easy, 
is a crucial factor thanks to which soft power has gained more importance in foreign policy. For 
some, even the rapid developments in technology and communications are the most central driving 
force in this process (Mattern, 2007: 101-102; Nye 2014). On the other hand, even though the 
world community has not managed to establish an international Leviathan that can oversee and 
control international affairs, the world has gone a long way in this direction since World War II. 
The establishment of numerous international organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
conventions, international courts, etc. has dramatically affected the modus operandi of 
international relations.  
Thus, information technology, the relatively more effective role of international 
organizations and law in the management of interstate relations, but arguably most importantly, 
the growing destructive capability of military power, have contracted its efficiency while 
increasing the costs of its usage. Its diminishing utility makes great powers import soft power into 
their primary foreign policy toolkit. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the utility of military 
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power has disappeared; on the contrary, military power still plays the primary role in international 
politics as ultimo ratio.  
3. Soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need and must pay 
adequate attention to the development of their hard power: 
One must state clearly that the shrinking utility of military power between great powers 
does not necessarily give grounds to perceive soft power as a substitute for hard power. First, a 
state’s soft power cannot guarantee its independence and sovereignty unless the state secures its 
economic and military security. Hence, states cannot and should not rely on soft power resources 
for national security. Strong military power or, in the case of smaller states, participation in a 
military bloc (i.e. bandwagoning) is a more serious and prudent security measure both in regard to 
non-state threats and rival great powers. Therefore, military capability will long remain an essential 
part of states’ power (Gray 2011).   
Second, nobody would admire a country which sinks in economic problems or shakes 
under the weight of threats of others. A state needs an economic and military basis to a certain 
extent in order to be able to pursue further foreign policy goals which would include cultivating 
an attractive image abroad. Nye (2003: 10) himself contends that “a country that suffers economic 
and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its 
attractiveness.” For instance, Russia enjoyed attractiveness in the first decade of this century by 
the virtue of its growing economy, strengthening military power and increasing influence in 
international affairs. In late 2014, following the Ukraine crisis Moscow faced an economic and 
financial crisis (Metreveli 2015). This badly affected Russia’s attractiveness (ibid.). Although, 
Russia’s aggressive foreign policies and anti-Russian narratives of Western institutions have also 
played a role in it, economic and financial downturn was ultimately not less influential. In fact, 
Russia experienced a similar situation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union when Moscow had 
lost a considerable part of the military and socio-economic capacity it once enjoyed. The 1990s 
were a period during which Russia suffered military and economic backwardness, and under these 
circumstances the production of soft power was out of the question (Shubin 2004: 110). On the 
contrary, the country enjoyed rising soft power between these two periods- from the beginning of 
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2000s until 2014 (Rutland et al. 2016). Thus, states tend to lose their soft power when they fail to 
successfully handle their economic and political challenges. Conversely, they develop soft power 
when they are exemplarily successful in these spheres. 
4. The possession of strong hard power elements (e.g. economic power) does not 
automatically produce soft power; states need to take appropriate measures to wield soft power: 
It is, nevertheless, incorrect to consider soft power to be completely dependent on hard 
power. Soft power is not a given power. States (including great powers) do not enjoy a favourable 
image abroad immediately after they achieve strong military or economic capability. This 
dimension of power can be produced on the basis of given cultural resources (such as popular 
traditions, literature, music, unique architecture and so on.) and political values through well-
prepared and accordingly implemented soft power doctrine. For instance, until the late 1990s 
China was devoid of strong soft power despite its growing economy and military might. In the 
beginning of the new millennium, after having achieved dazzling economic growth, Chinese 
officials started thinking about broadening their influence internationally. Beijing became able to 
invest a huge amount of money on various projects which have been projecting Chinese soft power 
globally. For example, the number of Confucius institutes, of which the first one was established 
in 2004, rose up at an impressive speed to 440 institutes 646 classrooms serving 850,000 registered 
students worldwide by the end of 201312. Around $278m13 was spent on the institutes which serve 
to project Chinese cultural values worldwide along with providing Chinese-language courses. 
Additionally, a long range of other projects, such as hosting the Olympic Games in 2008 and the 
Shanghai Expo in 2009, were initiated, and millions were spent on expanding China Central TV’s 
broadcasts in English and other languages etc. Arguably, China would not have been able to 
                                                 
12Economist (2014), “Soft power: Confucius says,” available at: http://www.economist.com/news/china/21616988-
decade-ago-china-began-opening-centres-abroad-promote-its-culture-some-people-are-pushing (accessed: 21 May 
2017).  
13Ibid.   
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achieve its current popularity14 around the world without these efforts. Most Chinese scholars and 
politicians find soft power and hard power mutually complementary within the correlation in 
which soft power can facilitate the growth of hard power, whereas hard power can demonstrate 
and support the increase of soft power (Li 2009b: 27-28).  Therefore, the acquisition of strong hard 
power does not lead automatically to strong soft power. It demands efforts to build power over 
hearts and minds across the globe.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the hypotheses that will be tested in the case of the Russia – 
West rivalries over the post-Soviet states located between the EU and Russia. It has examined the 
realist assumptions on great power rivalries and the external alignment of regional states which 
are in between these rivalries. The chapter has also explored the concept of soft power which 
outlines the strategies and instruments states employ to interact with the people of foreign 
countries. The hypotheses were built on the basis of the combination of these two theoretical 
approaches.  
This study has found that international relations scholars have not thoroughly examined the 
policies of the rival nuclear-armed great powers to reach out to the domestic non-state actors of 
the targeted regional states in order to affect their external alignment.  The realist scholars (e.g. 
Walt 1987: 218-261) who have paid attention to these policies have underestimated their potential 
to be effective and focused more on the distribution of material capabilities. In contrast to them, 
this chapter put forward the hypothesis that if nuclear armed great powers compete to expand or 
sustain their sphere of influence, they attempt to affect the external orientation of the regional 
states by affecting their domestic political system through influencing the attitude of the masses 
and the perceptions of the elite. In this process, great powers make use of various instruments 
                                                 
14 BBC (2012), “Europe Less, China More Popular in Global BBC Poll,” available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-18038304 (accessed: 25 January 2016). 
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which I have analysed under the umbrella of soft power. In this context, they use soft power as a 
major expansive instrument while military power remains a tool of defence and a method of 
backing up their foreign policies.    
The chapter has also explored factors which impact the decision of the regional states in their 
external orientation when neutrality (non-alignment) turns out impossible to be maintained and the 
international system forces them to make a choice between bandwagoning and balancing. It has 
analysed the assumptions of many scholars from various theoretical backgrounds. The chapter 
concluded that approaches emphasizing the role of the distribution of material capabilities in 
international relations, geographic proximity, aggressive intensions, offensive power, and 
economic dependence fail in many cases. It was argued that the analytical toolkit of neoclassical 
realism, recognizing the causal influence of systemic pressure and including the intervening 
influence of state-level variables, provides more convincing assumptions to explain the foreign 
policy strategy of weak states. The chapter narrowed down its focus on public opinion and state 
autonomy as the intervening variable in its analysis. It explored the theoretical foundations of the 
great powers policies to affect the external alignment of weak states through influencing their 
publics. It formed the hypothesis that if the leaders of a weak state, which is in between the rivalries 
of great powers who use soft power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis the society 
and other internal non-state actors, they can control the inflow of the soft power projection of 
foreign states, offset the intervening influence of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy 
making, and augment their chances to more prudently and independently follow the imperatives 
of the international political system. Conversely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the external 
powers find a favourable environment in which to wield soft power, the domestic non-state actors 
can influence the external orientation of the state, the state fails to offset their influence, which 
may result in suboptimal foreign policy decisions.  
In the next section, the chapter aimed at exploring the concept of soft power, its fundamental 
assumptions and shortcomings. After having reviewed the works of a series of scholars, the chapter 
presented its reconceptualization of soft power. The model it presented differentiated two sources 
of soft power: self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed projection. It argued that a state’s 
attractive self-projection is built on the superiority of its natural endowments and human-
constructed assets. However, this is not a sufficient condition on which to build strong soft power 
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in the target states. For that, great powers need to develop a complex set of strategies which the 
chapter called “state-managed projection.” Public diplomacy and propaganda have been analysed 
as the two terms that include the instruments (e.g. international broadcasting, scholarly exchanges, 
etc.) used in this process. The chapter has also re-visited the distinction and relationship between 
soft power and hard power. It formed four assumptions on this basis: (1) The possession of hard 
power (i.e. economic and military power)  is a precondition to develop strong soft power; (2) 
Diminishing utility of military power in international politics compels great powers to develop 
their soft power capacity in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals; (3) Soft power is not a 
substitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need and must pay adequate attention to the 
development of their hard power; (4) The possession of strong hard power elements (e.g. economic 
power) does not automatically produce soft power; states need to take appropriate measures to 
wield soft power.  
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Chapter 1.2. Methodology & Case Selection 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the selected cases and methodology which will be used to examine 
the following hypotheses that have been developed in the preceding chapter: 
H1. If nuclear armed great powers compete against the same type of powers to expand 
or sustain their sphere of influence over a populated region, they use soft power as a major 
expansive instrument while military power remains a tool to defend themselves and back up their 
foreign policies. 
H2. If the leaders of a weak state, which is in between the rivalries of great powers who 
use soft power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis the society and other internal 
non-state actors, they can control the inflow of the soft power projection of the foreign states, offset 
the intervening influence of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy making, and augment 
their chances to more prudently and independently follow the imperatives of the international 
political system. Conversely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the external powers find a 
favourable environment in which to wield soft power, the domestic non-state actors can influence 
the external orientation of the state, the state fails to offset their influence, and this might bring 
about suboptimal foreign policy decisions.  
 
1.2.1. Case Selection  
 
This thesis studies the rationale behind the formation of dissimilar external alignment 
strategies of the post-Soviet states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 
Georgia) despite their location in the similar geo-strategic environment of the West – Russia 
rivalry. It found that the existing theories of political realism do not provide convincing tools to 
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explain this divergence in the foreign policy strategies of the regional states and the policies of 
conflicting great powers to affect their foreign policy choices. The rest of this thesis will explore 
this case in the light of the theoretical assumptions presented in the previous sections. Two of the 
regional states – Belarus and Ukraine – are going to be more deeply analysed in order to test the 
hypothesis about the foreign policies of weak states which are caught in between the great power 
rivalries. The empirical analysis here is particularly focused on the timeframe spanning from 2004 
till 2016. This period has been chosen because the rivalries between Russia and the Western 
powers, unlike the expectations of many observers (e.g. Bremmer et al. 2004), evolved to a very 
critical level during this period. The Georgia war of 2008 and the international crisis over Ukraine 
of 2014 have affected international relations in the region and across the globe. Following 
Crimea’s annexation, Russia – West relations reached such a critical state that many observers 
warned against an all-out war between the two sides (Shlapak et al. 2016; Brewster 2016). 
However, the confrontation remained limited to non-military means and none of the sides dared to 
attack the other side.  
A number of other existing and past international rivalries between great powers in various 
regions across the world, such as the Cold War rivalries between Western powers and the Soviet 
Union over the Third World countries, the slowly growing Russia – Chinese competition over the 
Central Asian countries and the Chinese – American confrontation over the Pacific countries can 
serve as relevant case studies to test the hypotheses of this research. As delineated in Hypothesis 
1, the rival sides in these examples are nuclear-armed great powers seeking to expand or secure 
their influence over the mentioned territories. Although they are (or “were” as in the case of the 
Cold War) highly keen to expand their sphere of influence over the contested regions and prevent 
the advance of the rival power’s influence, they do (did) not dare to make a direct military attack. 
Although US – Soviet tensions rose to dangerous levels on a number of occasions because 
of their rivalries over the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, they had to look for ways 
to pursue their interests through methods which did not include a head-on superpower 
confrontation. Their projection of non-military, ideological power produced different results 
across different countries and regions. While in some cases they managed to push desired changes 
in the external orientation of the target states, they also failed in other cases and had to engage in 
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proxy wars at times. The outcome of their policies was not only affected by the international 
distribution of military capabilities, but also by ideological/cultural components of their power, as 
well as by the internal processes in the regional states. 
Similarly, the slowly growing Russia – China competition over the Central Asian countries 
includes elements that may be analysed from the perspectives of the soft power concept and 
neoclassical realism. Russia’s longstanding military presence in the region and its historical 
cultural dominance do not suffice to avert the increasing Chinese influence, which includes both 
economic and cultural expansion (Pantucci 2015: 275-276; Huseynov 2017). While, as expected 
by realist scholars, neutrality between Russia and China could benefit the regional countries more 
both in terms of security and economic dividends, the competition between the rival great powers 
makes the neutrality challenging to be maintained. This thesis intends to provide tools which can 
also be employed to look into the nature of the confrontation between Russia and China in Central 
Asia, analyse how the internal structures of the regional states would affect their alignment 
strategies between the two surrounding great powers and predict the outcomes of this 
confrontation.  
 
1.2.1.1. The Russia – West Confrontation over the “Common Neighbourhood” 
 
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the states located between the EU 
and Russia, the region which is often called the “common neighbourhood,” found themselves in 
an international context that was entirely different from the Cold War years. The Kremlin lost its 
control over these territories that had been under Moscow’s rule for a significant part of recent 
history. Russia was unwilling to reconcile with the loss of its former vassals and tried to reinstate 
its supremacy over these territories through various channels including economic and political 
reintegration. Russian leaders were adamantly against any economic or political rapprochement 
between regional states and the rival great powers (in particular, Western powers). They warned 
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against the potentially grave consequences of any expansion of the Western military and political 
structures into the region which the Russians treated as their “near abroad.” 
The region remains a priority for Russia’s foreign policy a quarter of a century after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The establishment of unchallenged dominance in these territories is 
considered of existential importance for the Russian political elite and is regarded pivotal to its 
international standing and foreign policy perspectives (Jackson 2003: 69-70; Light 2005). 
According to the Kremlin’s geopolitical outlook, Russia cannot compete globally with other great 
powers unless it secures its hegemony over its immediate neighbourhood. Russia’s approach to 
this region is often noted as “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine” that has remained unchanged since the 
early years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (Smith 1993a; Skak 2010: 139; Ponsard 2007: 17). Russia 
sees the region as its periphery and grants herself the right to limit the sovereignty of regional 
countries and their geopolitical manoeuvres (Igumnova 2014: 48). Russia’s leaders, on many 
occasions, have not shied away from openly saying that Russia would do everything possible to 
prevent geopolitical shifts in this region that pose threats to Russia’s national security.15  During 
the Georgia war of 2008 and the Ukraine crisis of 2014 the Kremlin demonstrated that it was ready 
to take military actions towards this end.   
Western powers are also interested in this region, especially in preventing Russia’s plans to 
re-integrate the regional countries under its hegemony. Many analysts consider former Soviet 
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus as “the most important neighboring region of the European 
Union” (Fischer 2011). The region as a transport corridor between the EU and China and as a 
transit route for European energy supplies bears geostrategic importance. Above all, for the EU, 
the central question of its policy toward this region is the security of its eastern frontiers 
(Moravcsik 1998; Skålnes 2005; Dannreuther 2004). The Union’s foreign policy approach with 
regard to its eastern neighbourhood is a prominent example of its policies which are often 
                                                 
15 Reuters (2015), “Russia Army Vows Steps if Georgia and Ukraine Join NATO,” available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/11/us-russia-nato-steps-idUSL1143027920080411 (Accessed: 21 August 
2015). 
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characterized as “far more Machiavellian than Kantian” (Smith 2016: 43). Zimmermann (2007: 
815), in similar vein, has written that:  
“The European Union is often seen as the very antithesis of realism and the extent of co-
operation achieved among its Member States is frequently cited as one of the strongest real-
world cases refuting realism. However, this interpretation refers to the integration process 
itself. It is not necessarily a given that this would be also reflected in EU external behaviour.”  
The EU seeks to establish Western-controlled stability in its eastern neighbourhood. It is 
believed that the maximum possible economic, political, and normative convergence with the 
neighbouring countries would contribute to the stability of the region (Missiroli 2004; Lavenex et 
al. 2009; Hagemann 2013; Smith 2015: 6). It is therefore not a coincidence that NATO’s eastward 
enlargement was also first proposed by German policy-makers in 1993, and later supported by the 
United States and other NATO members (Skålnes 2005: 231). For example, German Defence 
Minister Volker Rühe was convinced that “if we do not export stability, we will import instability” 
(quoted in Brown 1995: 37). 
The endurance of “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Eastern Europe and South 
Caucasus is also one of the most serious security challenges to European security. In recent years, 
these conflicts have erupted into bloody clashes that have killed thousands of people in Ukraine 
and the South Caucasus and displaced more than a million people. Thus, economic and political 
stability in the eastern neighbourhood is a particular concern for the EU, as instability, chaos, and 
abandonment of reform in those countries would ultimately constitute various threats, for instance 
illegal immigration, smuggling, organized crime, and terrorism. On the other hand, Eastern 
European and Baltic members of the European Union are pushing for the deeper integration of 
former Soviet members into the Euro-Atlantic military and political structures to “constitute a 
buffer zone (“our backyard”) against the unfriendly Big Other” (Makarychev 2013: 5).  Against 
this background, in its foreign policy the EU is focused on two particular goals with regard to the 
countries of former Soviet Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus:   
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(1) Extending the EU’s influence over the regional countries through transferring 
acquis communautaire to the regional countries, a process which is often characterized as “external 
governance” (Missiroli 2004; Raik 2006a; Lavenex et al.  2009; Hagemann 2013; Smith 2015: 6).   
(2) Preventing rival powers (first and foremost, Russia) from (re)establishing 
supremacy over the countries situated in this region (Smith 2015);  
Despite the fact that the United States is not geographically related to the post-Soviet 
countries located between the European Union and Russia, it has also been heavily involved in the 
geopolitical mapping of the region since the very beginning of the post-Cold War years and sought 
to establish its influence in the region (Haas 2007; Larrabee 2009: 312). The interests of the United 
States with respect to former Soviet Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus overlap partly with 
the interests of the European Union: like its European allies, the USA seeks to avert the re-
integration policies of Russia, whom some American politicians consider the “number one 
geopolitical foe” (Willis 2012) of the United States. The emergence of Russia as a regional 
hegemon in Eurasia could entail dramatic geopolitical consequences which would threaten the 
interests of the USA. Thus, the United States tries to prevent the revival of Russia’s influence over 
the former Soviet countries and Moscow’s regional re-integration policies (Sakwa 2015: 30). 
Washington is interested in distancing the countries of the post-Soviet region from Russia’s orbit 
economically, politically, and culturally. US leaders also openly oppose and criticize the 
integration projects of the Kremlin as imperialist moves akin to the Soviet invasion of the region. 
For example, in 2012 then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Russia’s push for a Eurasian 
Customs Union “a move to re-Sovietize the region,” and warned, “we are trying to figure out 
effective ways to slow down or prevent it.”16   
Thus, while the maintenance of its dominant role in the region is for Russia a matter of 
survival as a great power, for Western powers the expansion of their influence over the common 
neighbourhood is a measure to ensure the security of eastern borders and prevent re-emergence of 
                                                 
16 RFE/RL (2012), “Clinton Calls Eurasian Integration an Effort to ‘Re-Sovietize’,” available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/a/clinton-calls-eurasian-integration-effort-to-resovietize/24791921.html (accessed: 17 May 
2017). 
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a strong regional hegemon (Lavenex et al. 2009; Hagemann 2013; Smith 2015: 6). As Leonid 
Kuchma, Ukraine’s second president (1994–2005) later wrote in his memories, “The loss of former 
influence, particularly in the borders of the former Soviet Union. is a catastrophe” for Russia and 
a “life-and-death matter” for its leadership (quoted in Trenin 2011: 88). By deploying military 
power in the conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has shown that it would risk even a 
military escalation with the West to prevent the expansion of the Western military and political 
institutions into its backyard. The reserved reaction of the Western powers to Russia’s military 
interventions in the regional countries indicated that the region was of a greater importance for 
Russia, and its leaders were ready to take more risks for it. These circumstances define the nature 
of the great power rivalries as the independent variable in this study. From the perspective of the 
regional states, Russia is closer, stronger, more determined, and a more threatening power than the 
EU and the United States.  The confrontation between these two geopolitical centres exerts 
pressure on the foreign policy making of the “common neighbourhood” states and pushes them to 
the either/or choice between the two.  
 
1.2.1.2. The “Common Neighbourhood” States 
 
In the early years of the post-Soviet period, the states located in the “common 
neighbourhood” sought to minimize Russia’s influence and strengthen their newly gained 
independence. Towards this end, they either prioritized neutrality as their foreign policy strategy 
or tried to align with the Western bloc against Russia (Wolczuk 2002; Makili-Aliyev 2013; 
Bordachev et al. 2014; Szeptycki 2014: 37, Fesenko 2015: 134-135; Huseynov 2015). However, 
the international context presented in the preceding section, in particular Russia’s persistence to 
preserve its influence over these states at all costs, made balancing impossible for the regional 
states. Consequently, the regional states tried to either maintain neutrality or align with the stronger 
and more threatening power (i.e. Russia).    
73 
 
Two of the regional states, Armenia and Belarus, as expected by structural realism, 
bandwagoned with Russia, which complicated their relations with Western powers and gradually 
pushed the two to deeper economic and military dependence on Moscow (Minassian 2008; Nixey 
2012; Socor 2013; Arakelyan 2014: 150-151; Firsava 2013; Filipau 2016; Van der Togt 2017: 10; 
Bosse 2009). Although according to the state constitution (adopted in 1994), Belarus is supposed 
to be a neutral state (Nice 2012; Isaev et al. 2016), this was not possible to uphold in practice. The 
isolationist policies of the Western leaders with respect to the Belarusian leader Aleksander 
Lukashenko, whose authoritarian leadership has made him known as “the last dictator in Europe” 
(Marples 2005; Rausing 2012; Makhovsky 2015), have further complicated Belarus’s international 
position (Bosse 2009). The country regularly participated in Russia’s regional integration projects, 
including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Customs Union (CU) as a 
founding member, while its cooperation with Western military and political organizations 
remained very limited or non-existent.    
Up until the outbreak of the “colour revolutions” in the region, the other four regional states 
(Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) tried to keep neutrality between the two surrounding 
great powers and maintain economic and political relations with each of them. Moldova’s 
constitution (adopted in 1994), in a similar vein with Belarus’s constitution, declared the country 
“neutral.” Although these states, together with Uzbekistan, founded an organization (GUUAM) 
that was widely seen as “pro-NATO” and “anti-Russian” (Kuzio 2000; Splidsboel‐Hansen 2000), 
they avoided making real steps towards NATO membership. In this period (i.e. up until the 
occurrence of the “colour revolutions”), GUUAM dealt mainly with economic cooperation, and 
geopolitical issues were largely downplayed in the agenda (Landry 2011: 22). Similarly, although 
the leaders of Georgia and Ukraine publicly declared membership in the EU and NATO as their 
priority in foreign policy, neither President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine nor President Eduard 
Shevardnadze of Georgia made tangible steps towards this end (Rondeli 2001: 197-203; Wolczuk 
2002; Szeptycki 2014: 37, Fesenko 2015: 134-135; Huseynov 2015: 120-121). At the same time, 
all of these four “common neighbourhood” states cooperated with Russia within regional 
integration projects (e.g. the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)) initiated by the Kremlin.     
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This international status-quo in the region began to partially change after the popular 
uprisings known as “colour revolutions” in the beginning of the XXI century. However, this 
change was not in line with the expectations of structural realist scholars: Georgia and Ukraine, 
departing from neutrality, sought to align themselves with Western powers against an increasingly 
stronger and more threatening Russia, while Moldova, although it did not depart from its 
constitutional neutrality, began to deepen its economic and political cooperation with the EU 
notwithstanding the threats from the Kremlin (Kuzio 2011; Samokhvalov 2015; Huseynov 2015: 
126-230). The pro-Western shifts in external orientation in the early 2000s turned out costly for 
these states, particularly for Georgia. In the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, relations between 
Tbilisi and Moscow gradually deteriorated and eventually resulted in a war over the breakaway 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the small South Caucasian republic. The five-day 
Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 ended disastrously for Georgia. On the contrary to Tbilisi’s 
expectations, the West did not declare a war against Russia to protect Georgia (Huseynov 2015). 
Russia established its unequivocal control over Georgia’s breakaway regions, recognised the 
independence of the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and underlined the irreversibility of 
this decision.    
The rivalries between Russia and the West challenged the external orientation of the 
“common neighbourhood” states again after the announcement of regional integration projects by 
the EU and Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme (EaP) and Russia’s Custom Union 
project complicated geopolitical affairs in the region. The integration calls by these great powers 
came to the table of regional state leaders as an either/or issue. In the face of such a geopolitical 
dilemma, they behaved differently. One group of states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus) did 
not risk a confrontation with Russia. The second group of states (Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia) 
that had already experienced successful “colour revolutions” eventually signed or initialized the 
AA with the EU. One of these states, Ukraine, in which the state leader brought to power by the 
“colour revolution” left office in 2010 and the new administration chose non-alignment as the 
guiding strategy in foreign policy, initially found the deal with the EU not “in the national interest” 
(Traynor et al. 2013) and refused to sign it. However, another “colour revolution” took place and 
again changed the course of the state. The 2014 protests brought to power the political elite who 
opted to balance with the West against Russia and thus signed the AA and DCFTA. 
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Building its analysis on the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, this thesis will 
look into the role of domestic non-state actors in the formation of the external orientation of these 
states. The foreign policy choices of these states and the role of the internal non-state actors in this 
process against the backdrop of the Russian and Western soft power projection will be analysed 
exclusively in the last part of the thesis. The fact that the region hosts both democratic and non- or 
semi- democratic states increases its significance as the case study in this research. The democracy 
level of the regional countries is identified by considering the political processes that took place in 
these countries over the period under study (2004-2016) and the evaluations of international 
organizations (e.g. Freedom House). The existence of a different level of democratic development 
allows the study to identify variations in the autonomy of state leaders in these countries vis-à-vis 
their respective societies. With this purpose, the thesis has categorized them into two groups: (1) 
countries with relatively strong state autonomy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus) and (2) 
countries with relatively weak state autonomy (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).    
 
Countries with relatively strong state autonomy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus) 
 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus are the “common neighbourhood” states where the state 
leaders have relatively more autonomy vis-à-vis their respective society. This has been possible by 
minimizing the influence of internal non-state groups on the management of foreign policy in a 
consistent and decisive manner. Unlike the leaders of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, the political 
elites in these three states have been able to offset the calls for political changes and demonstrated 
a resilience to protect the political systems established in early 1990s.  For example, in the wake 
of massive anti-government protests the Georgian President Shevardnadze stepped down in 2003 
and the Ukrainian President Yanukovych stepped down in 2014 without deploying force against 
protestors. Similar anti-government protests in Moldova have never encountered systemic 
violence and repression organized by the government. On the contrary, the political elites in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus have proved themselves more unwavering in the face of similar 
acts.  
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The above discussed similarities between these states allow the study to categorize them in 
the same group and focus on only one state to test the hypothesis concerning the foreign policy of 
the states whose leaders obtain stronger autonomy vis-à-vis internal non-state players. In this 
thesis, only the case of Belarus is going to be discussed in detail which is meant to provide helpful 
insights to make inferences about the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well. The particular 
reason for my choice of Belarus as the case study is that the location of Belarus is strategically 
more important for both the West and Russia than the relatively faraway South Caucasian 
countries. Together with Ukraine, Belarus forms the critical buffer zone between Russia and 
Western powers.  The fact that the country borders the EU of countries Poland, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, who feel most threatened by Russia, makes Belarus supremely important for the West. 
Any instability in Belarus could pose grave threats to the European Union. This is why both Russia 
and the West seek to possess control over this landlocked former Soviet state. 
 
Countries with relatively weak state autonomy (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) 
 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are the three most democratic countries in the “common 
neighbourhood”.  The three countries, having made successful revolutions and numerous popular 
uprisings over the last two decades, are home to the most revolutionary nations in this region. They 
differ from the other three states that have been discussed in the previous section in terms of both 
their internal political structure and foreign policy priorities. The higher democratic standards of 
these three countries have entailed unavoidable implications for their foreign policy, too. Their 
leaders have been structurally more restricted than their counterparts in Belarus, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan. This internal pressure has limited their ability to independently deal with the 
imperatives of the international political system. When they have attempted to disregard public 
opinion in making fateful decisions in the past, they have faced, on many occasions, overwhelming 
domestic discontent and popular upheaval.  
 The similarities discussed above make it possible to focus on Ukraine alone to test the 
hypothesis concerning the foreign policy of the states whose leaders are weakly autonomous vis-
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à-vis internal non-state players. The particular reason for my choice of Ukraine as the case study 
is similar to the one I declared in the previous section: Like Belarus, Ukraine’s geopolitical 
importance for Russia is immeasurable: “it is an existential imperative” (Bogomolov et al. 2012). 
Ukraine has been invariably the primary target of Russia’s integration projects. It is a country 
without which Russia’s plans to re-integrate the post-Soviet states under the Eurasian Union would 
lose most of its value. This is why it is also of a great geostrategic importance for Western powers.  
 
1.2.2. Methodology 
 
The research is built on the following causal mechanism which is built on the neoclassical 
realist understanding of international relations. The systemic pressure derived from the 
confrontation between great powers is considered the independent variable. This confrontation 
exerts pressure on the foreign policy and external alignment of smaller states, makes neutrality 
difficult - if not impossible to be maintained - and forces them to make a choice in their external 
alignment. The research analyses the foreign policies of the regional states which are in between 
these rivalries as the dependent variable. The influence of domestic non-state actors on the 
formation of the external orientation of the regional states constitutes the intervening variable of 
the research. The potential of the domestic non-state actors to impose crucial influence on foreign 
policy encourages the external great powers to reach out to them and mould their attitude towards 
foreign powers through the policies which this thesis conceptualized under the notion of “soft 
power.”  
The research includes the “most similar, different outcome system” design in its analysis 
(Berg-Schlosser 2012). This implies that variance in the intervening variable (i.e. the intervention 
of domestic non-state groups on foreign policy under the influence of the external great powers) 
could affect the choice regional states make in their external alignment: they might align with 
different external powers although they are similar in many crucial aspects – more importantly in 
terms of systemic conditions. The thesis conducts its analysis in the cases of Belarus and Ukraine 
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(Table 2). The two represent “common neighbourhood” countries with relatively strong state 
autonomy and those with relatively weak state autonomy, respectively.  
 
Belarus Ukraine 
Similar Conditions 
Geostrategic environment (including aggressive intentions by the Russian side) 
Geo-economic characteristics  
External Alignment 
Alignment with Russia (2016) Alignment with the West (2016) 
Table 2. The cases Belarus and Ukraine in the “Most Similar Different Outcomes System” design  
The previous section demonstrated that Ukraine and Belarus, along with other “common 
neighbourhood” states, receive similar pressure from the Russian side to refrain from Euro-
Atlantic integration. Simultaneously, Western powers seek to tear these countries away from 
Russia’s sphere of influence. These conditions make their geostrategic environment largely 
similar. The recent historical background of the two states is also amongst the conditions which 
make them comparable: both of the countries were part of the Soviet Union being amongst its 
official founders and disintegrators. They declared themselves independent after the collapse of 
the Union in 1991. Existence under Soviet control for long years has had a series of implications 
for these countries. For example, it has made their economies inherently tied with the Russian 
economy. In 2016, the exports to Russia accounted for 46,5% of Belarus’s total exports, while 
imports from Russia were more than 55% of its total imports.17 Russia was also the major trade 
partner of Ukraine until relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution 
                                                 
17 National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (2017), “Foreign Trade of the Republic of Belarus, 2017,” 
available at: http://www.belstat.gov.by/en/ofitsialnaya-statistika/publications/statistical-publications-data-books-
bulletins/public_compilation/index_8010/ (accessed: 10 October 2017).  
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(2014).18 In 2013, Ukraine’s exports of goods to Russia amounted to 50,6% of its overall exports 
of goods, while its imports from Russia were below 40%.19 In spite of these similarities, they opted 
for different strategies in their external alignment over the period under study (2004-2016). The 
research aims to explain this variation in their foreign policy choices by putting an emphasis on 
the (non)intervention of domestic non-state groups in foreign policy. 
The research employs the qualitative method of analysis to examine its hypotheses. It has 
explored a long range of academic works, publications of various research institutes, news media 
articles, official documents, public statements, reports of non-governmental organizations, etc. 
The materials which used in this process are largely in four languages: English, Russian, German, 
and Ukrainian. However, the absolute majority of the materials are in the English language. The 
research has used a series of public opinion surveys conducted by authoritative poll-taking 
institutes as an empirical basis for measurements of Russian and Western soft power in the 
“common neighbourhood.” As conducting nationwide surveys in the case study countries is 
beyond the scope of this research, the results of the surveys conducted by institutes specialised in 
poll taking have been frequently used during the study. For instance, the results of public opinion 
polls carried out between 2004 – 2016 in Belarus by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic 
and Political Studies (IISEPS), a public institution based in Lithuania, were the primary 
measurements used to examine the attitudes of Belarusians towards Russia and West. Likewise, 
the public opinion surveys conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Ukraine 
played the similar role in my research concerning Ukraine. 
The research uses the case study method to structure its analysis. This approach 
differentiates three phases in the research process. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett 
differentiate these phases as follow: 
                                                 
18 Following Crime’s annexation there was a radical fall (around 80%) in trade relations between the two countries. 
See, Tass (2015), Russia-Ukraine trade turnover down 80% in 2015 — official,” available at: 
http://tass.com/economy/847889 (accessed: 10 October 2017).   
19 State Statistics Service of Ukraine (2013), “External Economic Activity”, available at: 
http://ukrstat.org/en/druk/publicat/kat_e/publ6_e.htm (accessed: 10 October 2017). 
80 
 
“In phase one, the objectives, design, and structure of the research are formulated. In phase 
two, each case study is carried out in accordance with the design. In phase three, the 
researcher draws upon the findings of the case studies and assesses their contribution to 
achieve the research objective of the study” (George et al. 2004: 73). 
The research sticks to this methodological framework. Firstly, the theoretical 
underpinnings, hypotheses and goals of the research are presented. This first phase defines the 
research design and lays the ground for the examination of the selected cases in the following 
phase. The second phase is going to cover the second and third parts of the thesis. These two parts 
explore the guiding hypotheses of the research, separately but interrelatedly. The second part 
focuses on testing the hypothesis about the great power rivalries and their use of soft power as an 
expansive instrument. In this part, the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and Western 
powers is analysed and their use of soft power as a tool to influence non-state actors is presented. 
The third part tests the hypothesis on the role of the general public in determining the external 
alignment of regional states. This part divides the “common neighbourhood” countries into two 
groups – countries with relatively strong state autonomy and countries with relatively weak state 
autonomy – and selects Belarus and Ukraine as the two cases that represent these groups, 
respectively. The final concluding section will form the third phase of the research; its purpose is 
to review the findings of the case studies in the light of the research goals and theoretical 
framework.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has introduced the cases and methodology which the thesis will use to test its 
hypotheses. It opted for the Russia – West competition between 2004 – 2016 over the states which 
are located between the EU and Russia – the region which is known as the “common (or shared) 
neighbourhood.” It categorized the regional states into two groups in accordance with the reports 
of international organizations and some of the political events that took place in these states in the 
target period: states with relatively strong state autonomy (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus) and 
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states with relatively weak state autonomy (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). One state from each 
group will be subject to more thorough analysis of the thesis: Belarus and Ukraine. 
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PART 2. SOFT POWER IN RUSSIA – WEST GEOPOLITICAL 
RIVALRIES (2004 – 2016) 
 
Chapter 2.1. Soft Power in Western Foreign Policies 
 
Introduction 
  
As outlined in part one, the hypothesis on rivalries between nuclear armed great powers 
predicts that if these great powers compete to expand or sustain their sphere of influence, they use 
soft power as a major expansive instrument while military power remains a tool with which to 
defend themselves and back up their foreign policies. This chapter tests this hypothesis along with 
some of the assumptions developed by the soft power model of this thesis in the case of the policies 
of Western powers (i.e. the EU and the United States). It analyzes their rationale of using soft 
power and hard power in the policies concerning the post-Soviet region. The chapter particularly 
explores how Western powers make use of the instruments which I have analysed under the notion 
“soft power” to communicate with and influence domestic non-state players in the “common 
neighbourhood” states. 
The chapter’s discussion on Western soft power policies is based on the analytical 
framework of the soft power model presented in part one. This model differentiated two sources 
of soft power as self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed projection. Self-projection is 
built on the basis of natural endowments and human-constructed assets, while state-managed 
projection is conducted through propaganda and public diplomacy. The model presented 
propaganda as a one-way communication strategy (e.g. international broadcasting). On the 
contrary, public diplomacy is considered as a two-way communication strategy that includes face-
to-face interactions with the people of the target states. Some of the most important instruments 
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utilized by public diplomacy have been listed as cultural diplomacy, exchange programmes, non-
governmental organizations, foreign aid, etc. The model also presented a reconceptualization of 
the distinction and relationship between hard power and soft power based on four assumptions: (1) 
the diminishing utility of military power in international politics forces great powers to develop 
their soft power capacity in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals; (2) Soft power is not a 
substitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need and must pay adequate attention to the 
development of their hard power; (3) the possession of hard power (i.e. economic and military 
power) is a precondition to develop strong soft power; (4) The possession of strong hard power 
elements (e.g. economic power) does not automatically produce soft power; states need to take 
appropriate measures to wield soft power.  
The chapter consists of two major sections. The first section that follows this introduction 
briefly examines the policies of Western powers to draw the “common neighbourhood” states into 
their orbit. It will be followed by a larger section on the soft power policies of the West with respect 
to this region. The section explores elements of both self-projection and state-managed soft power 
projection of Western powers in the regional states. A short conclusion in the end briefly reviews 
the findings of the chapter. 
 
2.1.1. Soft Power vs. Hard Power in Policies of Western Powers 
 
 The previous chapter’s analysis of the interests of Western powers with regard to the 
“common neighbourhood” states concluded that the region is of lesser importance to the West than 
it is for Russia. However, the fact that the subordination of the regional states to Russia’s control 
could have entailed a range of geopolitical implications forced Western powers to think about 
drawing them into their own orbit and preventing Russia’s plans to pursue regional re-integration. 
Below, three main directions of Western policies which are aimed at this end are discussed: (1) 
European integration; (2) Transatlantic integration; (3) the reinforcement of the defensive 
capabilities of the Alliance along its eastern borders. 
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European Integration: A few years after the dissolution of the USSR, the EU started to 
make inroads into Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, which had until then been under Soviet 
control. In a relatively short period of time three members of the former Soviet Union (Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia) and most of the other formerly communist Eastern European states (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria) were admitted to the EU 
and NATO. This process went rapidly, largely thanks to the impressive attractiveness of these 
organizations for the regional states. Prior to the EU’s 2004 enlargement, this fact was specifically 
stressed by Romano Prodi, the then chairman of the European Commission: “The EU looks certain 
to remain a pole of attraction for its neighbours. For many of the countries in our future ‘backyard’ 
the EU is the only prospect.”20 Prodi also underlined the importance of “attractiveness” as the 
fundamental pillar of the new proximity policy of the EU with its new neighbours in the Eastern 
neighbourhood.     
In 2002, Prodi announced that a “ring of friends” would be formed around the borders of 
the EU in the aftermath of the enlargement of 2004-2007.  He pointed out that this policy “must 
unlock new prospects and create an open and dynamic framework,” and “it must motivate… [the 
EU’s] partners to cooperate more closely with the EU.”21 Outlining the future perspectives of the 
proximity policy, Prodi fleshed out that the EU should neither promise nor exclude eventual 
membership to the countries involved in this policy. These ideas were encapsulated in the 
“European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP), which was announced in 2004 and viewed all periphery 
countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Southern Caucasus as external 
partners. As an attempt towards differentiation between Southern and Eastern neighbours within 
the ENP, in 2009, at the initiative of foreign ministers Radoslaw Sikorski of Poland and Carl Bildt 
of Sweden, the EU and six post-Soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, 
                                                 
20 European Commission (2002), “Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission: A Wider Europe - A 
Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability,” available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm 
(accessed: 16 June 2017). 
21 European Commission (2002), “SPEECH/02/619 by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, ‘A 
Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’,” available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm (accessed: 18 May 2017). 
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and Ukraine) launched the Eastern Partnership Programme (EaP), based on a commitment to 
fundamental values (including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms), a market economy, sustainable development, and good governance. The 
programme sought to reproduce the internal model of the EU in the target countries without 
granting membership (Cadier 2014: 77), bring them under the normative influence of the EU, and 
ensure stability of the eastern boundaries of the EU.  
The EaP envisioned two primary integration targets with the partner countries: (1) the 
signing of an Association Agreement (AA), an integral part of which would be accords on a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), and (2) full visa liberalization, meaning a 
visa-free travel regime with the EU. Initially, some of the former Soviet states opposed this project. 
For example, the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin characterized the initiative as “a ring 
around Russia”, and questioned the need for a new, anti-Russian CIS under the leadership of the 
EU.22 However, eventually they all joined it. The EaP reached some successful results in the 
ensuing years: Above all, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, and Georgia signed AAs, including 
DCFTAs. The agreements comprise four general chapters: Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
Justice and Home Affairs, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), and a fourth 
chapter covering a range of issues including the environment, science, transportation, and 
education. They create mechanisms for reform in a variety of fields in the respective countries, cut 
import tariffs, open EU markets to them and vice versa, and thus strengthen cooperation between 
the sides. Likewise, the DCFTAs deal with principles on environment, transportation, science and 
education that are not typical to classic trade agreements. They also seek to harmonize the trade-
related legislation of these countries with EU standards and the acquis communautaire. The 
countries that sign these agreements commit themselves to adopting some 350 EU laws within a 
ten-year timeframe. The three countries have also gained visa-free access to the Schengen zone. 
They also joined the Energy Community that was created by the EU in 2006 for the Western 
                                                 
22 Sputniknews (2009), “‘Eastern Partnership’: EU Trying to Split CIS,” available at: 
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2009/02/27/245157.html (accessed: 15 April 2016). 
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Balkans countries – “for the purpose of incorporating them into the EU’s electricity and gas 
markets” (Gromadzki 2015).  
Transatlantic Integration: The end of the Cold War generated a cooperative international 
environment between NATO and Russia. Particularly, the 1997 Russia–NATO Founding Act and 
the 2002 NATO – Russia Council formalised relations between former Cold War foes and created 
a basis for cooperation. The Alliance underscored that it had “no intention, no plan and no reason 
to deploy nuclear weapons to the territory of new members” and the integration of new members 
into NATO would not follow with “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” 
on their territory.23 In the following years, the Alliance expanded its borders eastward and 
integrated the Baltic States and most Central and Eastern European states. It also declared the door 
of the Alliance open to all European democracies, including the post-Soviet states in Eastern 
Europe and South Caucasus, that meet the standards of membership. Thus, the US demonstrated 
that it was unwilling to stop the enlargement of NATO’s sphere of influence at the border of the 
former Soviet Union, despite the fact that it was clear that these policies might be confronted with 
Russia’s military counteractions. The US leaders made clear that they would not recognize the 
right of any external power to impose limitations on the external alignment choices of regional 
states. For example, in June 2008, in a Congressional hearing on the South Caucasus, Daniel Fried, 
Assistant Secretary of State declared that: 
“The policy of the United States in this region is unambiguous: we want to help the nations 
of this region travel along the same path toward freedom, democracy and market-based 
economies that so many of their neighbours to the West have travelled. ….no outside power 
should be able to threaten, pressure, or block the sovereign choice of these nations to join 
                                                 
23 NATO (1997), “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian 
Federation signed in Paris, France,” available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm 
(accessed: 18 May 2017). 
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with the institutions of Europe and the transatlantic family if they so choose and we so 
choose…”24    
Encouraged by such declarative support, two of the regional states, Georgia and Ukraine, 
decided to knock at the door of the Alliance. Their leaders, Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor 
Yushchenko respectively, who had been brought to power by “colour revolutions,” asked the 
Alliance for the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a program designed to help aspiring countries 
prepare for eventual membership. The Alliance debated the MAP issue for the first time at the 
NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania (2–4 April 2008). Due to French and German opposition, 
the Alliance refused to launch the MAP process. The final declaration of the summit indicated in 
an obscure manner that Georgia and Ukraine would, one day, become members of NATO.  
The discussion of the membership of the neighbouring post-Soviet states at this high level 
outraged the Russian leadership. However, it failed to deter the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the 
regional states, in particular of the Georgian leadership.25 President Saakashvili erroneously 
believed that the EU and the US would stand by Georgia in a military clash with Russia over the 
tiny breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ronald Asmus in his A Little War That 
Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West aptly characterizes Saakashvili’s 
pre-war foreign policy as what Richard Nixon once called the ‘madman theory’ of foreign policy 
– threatening to act irrationally in order to get someone’s attention (Asmus 2010: 10).  
The reluctance of the Alliance members to militarily support the regional states against 
Russia’s military operations, despite their regular declarative support, happened again in the 
aftermath of Crimea’s annexation. Although Western powers imposed economic sanctions on 
Russia and provided support to Ukraine, they did not militarily stand against Russia. The threat of 
the escalation of the conflict and its transformation into a nuclear war again determined the fate of 
                                                 
24 U.S. Department of State (2008), “The Caucasus: Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders,” available at: http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/106019.htm, (accessed: 14 October 2016).  
25 Reuters (2015), “Russia army vows steps if Georgia and Ukraine join NATO,” available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/11/us-russia-nato-steps-idUSL1143027920080411 (accessed: 21 August 
2015). 
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the region. Under the existing circumstances, the West cannot benefit from its military superiority 
and does not seem willing to militarily intervene to avert Russia’s efforts to allegedly “re-Sovietise 
the region.”26  Although both the EU and United States support some of the regional groups who 
try to make pro-Western changes in their respective countries, none of them has shown a serious 
determination to put all their resources at stake to materialize those changes in the region. Thus, 
this observation allows us to argue that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary goal 
for the West has not been to draw post-Soviet countries into their orbit and to get them to join the 
EU and NATO which would lead to an all-out military clash with Russia; rather the goal has been 
to minimize Russian influence in the region and to impede upon the Kremlin’s re-integration 
efforts at relatively little cost.   
Reinforcement of Defence: Although Western powers did not deploy military force against 
Russia’s military intervention in the “common neighbourhood,” they strictly reinforced their 
defensive capabilities along the eastern borders. In the aftermath of the Georgia – Russia war of 
2008 and the Ukraine crisis of 2014, NATO members reinforced the Alliance’s military presence 
along the Eastern borders. This was principally remarkable because up until those events, the role 
of NATO in European security was gradually declining as Europe was becoming increasingly 
more capable of providing regional security on its own (Dannreuther 2004: 2). Some analysts also 
claimed that “NATO [was] destined for a greatly reduced role in Europe’s security architecture” 
(Hyde-Price 2007: 4). On the contrary to those expectations, as Richard Sakwa (2015: 4) aptly 
points out, “NATO’s existence became justified by the need to manage the security threats 
provoked by its enlargement.” The wars between Russia and its former allies were used by the 
Alliance as a reason for further reinforcement in the region, as the regional NATO members 
appealed for a stronger NATO presence in their lands as a security guarantee against potential 
Russian aggression. Thus, although Western powers deployed non-military power to expand their 
                                                 
26 RFE/RL (2012), “Clinton Calls Eurasian Integration an Effort To ‘Re-Sovietize’,” available at: 
https://www.rferl.org/a/clinton-calls-eurasian-integration-effort-to-resovietize/24791921.html (accessed: 4 June 
2017).  
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influence inwards in the post-Soviet region, they reinforced their military force in order to counter 
any backlash of this expansion. 
The Ukraine crisis entailed the “the most significant reinforcement of NATO’s collective 
defence since the end of the Cold War.”27  At the 2014 Wales Summit, the member countries came 
to terms with the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to strengthen the capacity of the Alliance to 
respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges in an increasingly hostile environment. The 
RAP considers “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and military activity in the eastern 
part of the Alliance (...) on a rotational basis”28, deployment of increased weaponry, including 
fighter jets and multinational maritime forces, and the reinforcement of the NATO Response Force 
(NRF). The personnel of the NRF were increased to 40,000 in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis 
from 13,000; moreover, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) of around 20,000 
troops, of which about 5,000 are ground troops, has been founded. Even though Russia’s military 
budget (nearly $69 billion in 2014) is far lower than those of NATO members ($852 billion in 
2014), the Alliance leaders also called for increasing the defence budget to counter Russia’s 
growing military budget (Bendavid 2015). All in all, Moscow’s reaction to NATO’s enlargement 
initiatives has led to more efforts on the part of the Alliance to strengthen its defencive capabilities 
along its borders with Russia.     
In June 2014, the White House proposed a European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) with the 
declared goal of “reassuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners of the 
U.S. commitment to their security and territorial integrity.”29 The ERI funds the exercises, 
trainings, and rotational presence in Europe, particularly Central and Eastern Europe. It seeks to 
                                                 
27 NATO (2017), “Readiness Action Plan,” available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm# 
(accessed: 18 May 2017). 
28 NATO (2014), “Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (accessed: 18 May 2017). 
29 Department of Defence of the United States of America (2016), “European Reassurance Initiative: Department of 
Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2017,” available at: 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_ERI_J-Book.pdf (accessed: 18 
May 2017). 
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increase the capability and readiness of US allies within NATO and its partners (Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine), to show “a quick joint response against any threats made by aggressive 
actors in the region.”30 The Telegraph reported that the initiative was aimed at “deter[ring] Russia 
from carrying out additional land grabs after its 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.”31  The 
spending through ERI amounted to $985 million in 2015 and $789,3 million in 2016. For the fiscal 
year (FY) 2017, this amount quadrupled to $3,4 billion.  The FY 2017 ERI funding is expected to 
support projects of the Department of Defense (DoD) seeking “to reinforce the defences of NATO 
members and non-NATO partners in the region that feel most threatened by Russian aggression.” 
32  
Additionally, the Pentagon confirmed that it plans to deploy fully manned combat brigades 
to Europe in response to “an aggressive Russia,” in addition to the presence of more than 60 
thousand US troops in Europe.33 In June 2015, the US announced to pre-position 250 armoured 
vehicles (M1 Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and M109 howitzers) and their associated 
equipment in Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish Institute of International Affairs reports that 
“For the first time in NATO’s history, such equipment will be stored on territories of “new” 
members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria” (Kacprzyk 2015: 7). In 
2016, the alliance organized its biggest ever joint military exercises in Poland where some 31,000 
Polish, US and other troops participated in land, sea and air exercises.34 Despite Russia’s consistent 
                                                 
30 Ibid.  
31 Telegraph (2016), “US to Station Armoured Brigade in Eastern Europe from 2017,” available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/30/us-to-station-armoured-brigade-in-eastern-europe-from-2017/ 
(accessed: 18 May 2017). 
32 Department of Defence of the United States of America (2016), “European Reassurance Initiative: Department of 
Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2017,” available at: 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_ERI_J-Book.pdf (accessed: 18 
May 2017).  
33Telegraph (2016), “US to Station Armoured Brigade in Eastern Europe from 2017,” available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/30/us-to-station-armoured-brigade-in-eastern-europe-from-2017/ 
(accessed: 18 May 2017).  
34 BBC (2016), “Nato Troops Begin Huge Military Exercise in Poland,” available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36465268 (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
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warnings, NATO is set to strengthen its eastern flank with new multinational battalions in Poland 
and the Baltics and open communication centres in Bulgaria and Romania (Sharkov 2016).  
 
2.1.2. Soft Power as the Western Foreign Policy Tool 
 
The importance of reaching out to foreign publics as a way of ultimately influencing the 
foreign policy actions of their respective governments was recognized by the US foreign policy 
makers at the very beginning of the Cold War. In the late 1950s, a report prepared by the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) mentioned the changing character of foreign policy 
making. The report noted that unlike previous times, now diplomacy did not only target foreign 
policy elites and professional diplomats but sought to reach out to the general public as well. The 
report explained that “Convincing a foreign official is often less important than carrying an issue 
over his head to his people, to public opinion in the country he represents… The people will 
influence the official’s action more than he will influence theirs” (Osgood 2002: 89). With these 
intentions in mind, the USA set up a number of institutions to connect with the people of the Soviet 
Union and its satellite countries.   
Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), Voice of America (VOA), United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), numerous cultural and academic exchange 
programs, scholarships, etc. played a crucial role as an alternative source of information for 
millions of people behind the Iron Curtain. RFE and RL, which were founded in 1949 and 1951 
respectively and were financed by the CIA for a long time, served as a primary instrument of US 
foreign policy to inform and influence the public of the rival bloc.  Michael Nelson (1997: 163) 
reports that VOA reached 14–18 percent of the Soviet adult population during an average week 
prior to 1985, followed by Radio Liberty with 8–12 percent, the BBC with 7–10 percent, and the 
German broadcaster Deutsche Welle with 3–6 percent. The remarkable aspect of these 
broadcasters was that they were mostly broadcasting in the local languages of the countries they 
targeted. For example, in 1980s RFE/RL broadcasted in 21 languages to the Soviet Union and 
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Eastern Europe (Mickelson 1983: 3). They were trying to inform people living under communist 
regimes about the high living standards in the West and make them rebellious against the material 
deficiencies and political repression of the communist governments.  David Reisman, in his 
satirical novella entitled “The Nylon War” likened this attack of the Western camp against the 
socialist bloc to a bombing campaign over the skies of the Soviet Union involving consumer 
products, rather than explosive devices (Riesman 1964: 65-77).  
Cultural diplomacy and educational exchanges have also long been an essential tool for 
Western governments to project favourable images into foreign countries. Exchange programs 
played an essential role in combating communism at the height of the Cold War. Some scholars 
have also underlined the Soviet threat as a primary motivation behind those exchange programs of 
the United States (Bu 1999). Unlike the Soviet Union, Western countries were not reluctant to 
send their own nationals and to bring the nationals of communist countries through these 
exchanges. The West was eager to project a tempting and attractive image of abundance of material 
wealth, consumer culture, technological know-how, individual freedom, and political democracy 
to both communist and non-communist countries. For example, in response to the offers of the US 
government to accept a hundred students each year from the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, for a 
long-time the Soviets agreed to send only 20 students and mostly over the age of 30 who had 
already advanced in their career (Richmond 2003: 22).35 In later years, the number of Soviet 
students who studied in Western universities gradually increased.   
The exchanges in culture, education, information, science, and technology between the 
Soviet Union and the West over the thirty-five years that followed the death of Joseph Stalin in 
1953, are often analysed as one of the important factors that brought down communism (Richmond 
2003). Writing about the significance of scholarly exchange in the collapse of communism, former 
executive director of the International Research and Exchanges (IREX) Allen Kossof (1995: 263) 
states that:  
                                                 
35 As a matter of fact, initially President Eisenhower suggested that that ten thousand Soviet students would be invited 
to the United States, all expenses covered. However, Eisenhower’s proposal was not made public, as the State 
Department warned that this would alarm the Soviet officials and delay the negotiations. Therefore, eventually only a 
hundred students were offered to the Soviet Union to be sent to the United States (Richmond 2003: 22). 
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“Even during the years when the rapid spread of Soviet influence to Europe, Asia, Africa 
and Latin America made Moscow look all but invincible, seeds of change that would later 
blossom into the democratic revolutions of 1989-90 were being sown by scholars from East 
and West.”  
This assessment of the role of educational exchanges in the fall of the Soviet Union has 
been confirmed by many Soviet participants of exchange programs in the United States. For 
example, Oleg Kalugin, one of the very first Soviet exchanges who studied in the USA and later 
became a KGB General likened the exchanges to “a Trojan Horse in the Soviet Union… that 
played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system” (Richmond 2003: 32).  
The information war between the West and Russia did not come to an end with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The gradual deterioration of relations between the sides in geopolitical affairs 
also found its way into the information space.  In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the focus of US broadcasters shifted gradually towards countries that were still under Russia-
supported governments. RFE/RL completed its mission in and terminated its broadcasting to 
Hungary in 1993, Poland in 1997, and Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, 
and Romania in 2004. However, it continued and enlarged its broadcasting to the post-Soviet 
world. Unlike the Cold War years, in the new era the European countries also actively participated 
and assumed a major role in the soft power competition with Russia over the “common 
neighbourhood” countries. A long range of non-governmental institutions, exchange programs, 
international broadcasters, think-tanks, etc. were deployed in the fight to win approval amongst 
the peoples of the post-Soviet regional states.    
 
2.1.2.1. Self-Projection 
 
Western powers (i.e. the European Union and the United States), being some of the most 
developed states in the world, have acquired wide-ranging capabilities to develop effective self-
projection. The USA and the EU are the world’s first and second largest economies, respectively. 
94 
 
They together ($34,176 trillion) produce more than 45% of the global gross domestic product 
($73,502 trillion).36 The countries look like paradise for millions of people across the world with 
a GDP per-capita $38,442 and $54,629, respectively.37 Besides, this economic basis also allows 
the West to be militarily second to none: NATO’s total budget is over $904 billion.38  Around 32% 
of this budget is covered by the European members of the alliance.39 A 2015 ranking by Monocle 
Magazine, considering the performances of states in business and innovation, culture, government, 
diplomacy and education, ranked 13 EU Member States in the top 25 globally in terms of soft 
power, with Germany ranking number one and the United States ranking number two.40   
The enormous economic advance has been possible thanks to their natural endowments 
(e.g. geographic location and climate) but more importantly thanks to the brilliant policies these 
countries have historically developed. This is why the socio-political and economic model of the 
West has been admired by millions of people across the world and in the countries of the Former 
Soviet Union (Portnov 2014: 13; Ostrovs‘kyj 2014: 21; Onuch 2014: 48). Although the image of 
the liberal democracy model of the Western community was tarnished by the rise of right-wing 
populism towards the end of 2016, until then (in the period under study – 2004-2016) this model 
had been a major soft power asset of the EU and the USA in their policies with regard to the 
“shared neighbourhood.” The ideals that are attached to the West –  freedom of speech, human 
rights, the rule of law, accountability – have been a major motivation for the post-communist 
countries in aspiring to join the European Union.  
                                                 
36 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU-US-1W (accessed: 16 June 
2017). 
37 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/region/EUU, (accessed 16 June 2017).  
38 Military Expenditure Database, SIPRI, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database, (accessed: 
14 April 2016).  
39 Ibid. 
40 Monocle Soft Power Survey (2015), available at: http://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2015-16/, 
(accessed: 14 October 2016).    
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It is due to these ideals that many observers consider the EU’s soft power as “unrivaled” 
(Dempsey 2012), although, according to others, US soft power surpasses that of Europe (Kirpalani 
2010). The latter refers particularly to the worldwide fame of American cultural products. A 
leading French specialist, Frederic Martel (2010), on the basis of his research in 30 countries, 
concluded that American cultural exports (movies, music, books, broadcasting, etc.) has captured 
a leading position in the formation of global entertainment, shaping tastes and views over the 
world. Criticizing the European cultural industry, which he argued fails in producing equally 
attractive cultural goods, Martel fleshed out that this strength gives America “a capacity to 
influence other cultures and societies” (in an interview to Basil Maudave (2010)). But, in this 
research, no differentiation is made between the EU and the USA, and their soft power projection 
is treated as a unified unit in competition against Russia in the “shared neighbourhood.”  
 
2.1.2.2. Narratives   
 
In their policies to wield power over the minds and feelings of the people of the “common 
neighbourhood”, Western powers do not build their narratives on the basis of religious affinity, 
historical past or ethnic bonds. The narratives which they arm their soft power policies with have 
been overwhelmingly future-oriented projecting “an attractive vision of the future.”41 They 
address the existing socio-economic and political problems the people in “common 
neighbourhood” countries struggle with. European integration has been presented by pro-Western 
forces and seen by many local people as “a promise of wealth and development as well as better 
governance and public sector reform” (Lang 2015: 37; Fesenko 2015: 132-133).  For example, the 
former communist member states of the EU formulated their narratives within the framework of 
their post-communist journeys. Referring to their own experience following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, they argued that European integration was the proven way of success to overcome 
                                                 
41 Chatham House (2011), “Soft Power? The Means and Ends of Russian Influence,” available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/310311summa
ry.pdf (accessed: 11 May 2017), p. 10.  
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dictatorships and to embark on political and economic development based on liberal and free 
market principles (Sadowksi 2015: 66).   
For the most part of the period under study (2004-2016), democracy promotion, which was 
defined by the European Council of Ministers as “the full range of external relation and 
development cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation of 
democracy in third countries” (quoted in Burnell 2007: 1) was a buzzword for Western policies 
with regard to post-Soviet countries. The EU and United States called upon regional states to foster 
democracy and promote the right of citizens to choose their own leaders in a free and fair process. 
Western powers also criticized leaders who built up dictatorial rule through corruption and 
clampdown on independent voices. However, this criticism was applied selectively depending on 
its relevance from the perspective of the regional geopolitical and economic interests of the 
Western powers. For example, although the “service record” of most other post-Soviet leaders was 
not better – if not worse – than that of President Lukashenko, the approaches of the EU and the 
USA to them were very much different (Ioffe 2004: 96). While Lukashenko and his entourage 
were personae non-grata in the USA and EU, the leaders of the other authoritarian post-Soviet 
states (e.g. Kazakhstan) never experienced a similar fate. While anti-Lukashenko popular uprisings 
and their organisers were provided by the West with financial and logistics support on significant 
scales, Western powers demonstrated disinterest towards those oppositional forces that fought 
against the leaders of oil rich Kazakhstan (Landry 2011: 21).   
On the other hand, the EU and the USA criticised Russia’s regional integration projects 
and accused of it harbouring new imperial ambitions. From this point of view, Russia’s Eurasian 
Union was a mere reconstruction of the Soviet Union in a new form which Hillary Clinton 
famously described as “a move to re-Sovietize the region.”42  They condemned Russia’s policies 
of obstructing access to the Euro-Atlantic path of regional countries by deploying military force 
in a strictly asymmetric manner. Western leaders repeatedly stressed that no external power could 
                                                 
42 RFE/RL (2012), “Clinton Calls Eurasian Integration an Effort To ‘Re-Sovietize’,” available at: 
https://www.rferl.org/a/clinton-calls-eurasian-integration-effort-to-resovietize/24791921.html (accessed: 4 June 
2017). 
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veto the foreign policy choices of the regional countries or undermine their right to chart their own 
future path. Declaring that “We may not give in to external pressure, not the least from Russia” or 
“the times for limited sovereignty are over in Europe,” they opposed Russia’s attempts to maintain 
control over the external alignment options of the regional states (Marszal 2013).  
 
2.1.2.3. International broadcasting 
 
The renewed confrontation between the West and Russia brought back rivalries between 
the former foes in the information space as well. Many Western politicians, academicians, and 
experts sounded the alarm about Russia’s information war. The EU then reinforced its support for 
the development of “free” and “independent” media in “common neighbourhood” states.  The EU 
Commission states that between 2011 and 2015 it invested €15.5 million for (i) journalist training 
and networking, (ii) information and communication campaigns, (iii) opinion polling and media 
monitoring in the regional countries of the Regional Communication Programme.43  In 2011, then 
US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton warned that “We are in an information war and we are losing 
that war” (Warrick 2011). Similarly, in 2013, in her testimony before Congress, she criticized the 
performance of the Broadcasting Board of Governors – which oversees several international 
broadcasting institutions, including the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – 
as “practically defunct” (Schadler 2013). 
These concerns even grew in the wake of the breakout of the Ukraine crisis. Enders 
Wimbush, a former Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) governor and director of Radio 
Liberty, asserted that the Ukraine crisis was “the most serious challenge U.S. international 
broadcasting has faced since the fall of the Soviet Union” (Strobel 2015). Western leaders feared 
that their counter-arguments were poorly focused and unconvincing (Moris 2015). These 
                                                 
43 European Parliament (2014), “Parliamentary Questions: “Answer Given by Mr Füle on Behalf of the Commission,” 
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2014-006394&language=EN 
(accessed: 16 June 2017). 
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developments urged the EU and NATO to take a series of measures to combat Russian propaganda 
in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In March 2015, the European Council stressed the necessity to 
challenge Russian propaganda in neighbouring post-Soviet regions, to persuade the people of the 
region that deeper engagement with and implementation of reforms backed by the EU could 
improve their lives over time.44  The Council also initiated the establishment of the East StratCom 
Task Force that is functional within the EU’s diplomatic corps, the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). The institution was tasked with developing communication products and 
campaigns focused on explaining EU policies and promoting European values in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. In June 2015, the East StratCom Task Force, in cooperation with other EU 
institutions and EU member states, developed an action plan that drew the contours of effective 
communication and the promotion of EU policies and values in the Eastern Partnership countries, 
as well as in Russia.45 The EU also began debating the possibility of broadcasting in local 
languages in these countries.  
A similar institution, named the “Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,” was 
founded by NATO in Latvia’s capital, which Russian media described as a “propaganda centre.”46  
“Supporting the development of a NATO Military Committee Strategic Communications policy 
and Doctrine” and “Studying Russia’s Information Campaign against Ukraine” are mentioned 
amongst the main activities of the centre.47 In 2015, the EU, with the support of NATO, launched 
a Russian language TV channel named ETV+ in Estonia. The channel focuses mostly on Estonia’s 
Russian-speaking minorities and is the first Russian-language TV channel in the country where 
                                                 
44 European Council (2015), available at: http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/european-council-conclusions-
19-20-march-2015-en.pdf (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
45 European Union External Action (2017), “Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force,” available 
at; https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-the-east-
stratcom-task-force_en (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
46Pravda.ru (2015), “NATO Propaganda Centre is Opened in Riga,” available at: 
http://www.pravdareport.com/news/world/20-08-2015/131696-riga-0/ (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
47 European Parliament (2016), “EU Strategic Communications: With a View to Counteracting Propaganda,” available 
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578008/EXPO_IDA(2016)578008_EN.pdf 
(accessed: 16 June 2017).  
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more than a quarter of the population speaks Russian as their native language. The channel’s 
Deputy Director noted the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s impressive capabilities of spreading 
disinformation across the region among the factors that necessitated the establishment of the 
Russian-language broadcasting service.48  It is financed by the Estonian government, but its 
regional office in Narva, a city close to the Russian border where Russian speakers constitute 97% 
of the population, is technically supported by the NATO. But the channel reports that the Alliance 
does not have any influence on the content of the programmes.  Similar channels have been 
planned to be opened in the other two Baltic States, as well.  
One of the primary goals of the establishment of the channel was mentioned as 
“counterbalancing Russian propaganda.”49 German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
stated that the channel was not meant to be a counter-propaganda tool arguing that “You cannot 
combat propaganda with counter-propaganda in a democratic society.”50  Thus, in a similar vein 
with other international broadcasters, Western communication channels broadcasting to the post-
Soviet region strictly reject the word “propaganda” to describe their own activities. For example, 
Peter Limbourg, the Director General of German broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW), responding 
to questions about DW’s involvement in EU’s policies to counter Russia’s narratives in the post-
Soviet region, argued that “We do not see ourselves in the role of creating counter-propaganda. 
We do journalism on the foundation of democratic values” (Luther et al. 2015). 
Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany’s government-financed international broadcaster, is also 
actively involved in the establishment of media outlets to counter Russian narratives in the Eastern 
Partnership countries. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, DW built up its Russian and Ukrainian 
editorial office providing 24-hour service. DW also cooperates with Estonia’s Russian language 
TV channel ETV+, supporting them in technical issues, building the content of the programs, and 
                                                 
48 Tagesschau.de (2015), Russischsprachiges TV-Programm in Estland: ‘Wichtiger als Panzer’’’, available at: 
https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/estland-russland-101.html (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
49Err.ee (2015), “Deutsche Welle and ERR Sign Cooperation Agreement,” available at: 
http://news.err.ee/v/politics/society/819e9864-8012-471f-a602-3a796fe91d53/deutsche-welle-and-err-sign-
cooperation-agreement (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
50 Ibid. 
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offering trainings for its workers. The other EU member states are also contributing to international 
broadcasting in the “shared neighbourhood.” For example, Poland provides financial (€4 million 
annually) and technical support (with equipment and trainings) to the Poland-based Belarusian 
language TV satellite station “TV Belsat” (Sadowski 2015: 72). There are also two Poland-based 
radio stations (“Radio Ratsya” and “Euroradio”) and a series of information websites that reach 
out to Belarusians (ibid.). The Polish government also provides ample support to TV stations, 
information agencies and journalists in other common neighbourhood countries, particularly in 
Ukraine and Moldova.  
The US’s BBG reported in early 2016 that the agency had created or expanded 35 
programs, mostly in the Russian and Ukrainian languages, since Russia moved into Crimea in 
February 2014.51  Additionally the agency asked Congress for additional funding, arguing that 
while Russia spends $400 million to $500 million a year on foreign information efforts, the United 
States only spends about $20 million annually on the broadcasting services in the Russian language 
(Strobel 2015). $15.4 million from the 2016 budget of the BBG was allocated “to Russian-
language TV programming” alone.52 In October 2014, the BBG started a daily, 30-minute Russian 
language television news program called Current Time that has since then been broadcasting in 
the post-Soviet countries bordering Russia. In Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Lithuania the 
program is broadcasted on domestic television stations, while in Russia it is available on a video-
based news site. The BBG fights against Russia on social media as well: in 2015, Radio Liberty 
opened a Digital Media Department (DIGIM). It was reported that the department would serve the 
main purpose of “using social and digital tools to enhance RFE/RL overall digital presence with a 
focus on the Russian language sphere.”53 
                                                 
51 BBG (2016), “BBG Research Series: Assessing Russia’s influence in its periphery,” available at: 
https://www.bbg.gov/2016/02/04/assessing-russias-influence-in-its-periphery-is-russia-really-winning-an-
information-war/ (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
52 BBG (2015), “BBG 2016 Budget Request Calls for Expansion in Key Markets and Technologies,” available at: 
https://www.bbg.gov/2015/03/10/bbg-2016-budget-request-calls-for-expansion-in-key-markets-and-technologies/ 
(accessed: 16 June 2017). 
53 RFE/RL (2016), available at: http://www.rferl.org/jobs/detail/Dig1843-1501.html (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
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In June 2016, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Victoria Nuland, 
reported before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the work the USA had done to 
combat what she described as “Russian propaganda” since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. She 
said that: 
“Since 2014, the total appropriation now, the State Department, USAID [US Agency for 
International Development], BBG (Broadcast Board of Governors) on the US side is about 
$100 million to counter Russian propaganda. The money goes… from clean honest Russian 
language programming that BBG is now putting out every day, the expansion of Radio 
Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, VOA [Voice of America] to about $88 million that we use in 
State Department and AID to support civil society, independent media, journalists training, 
including outside Russia for those Russian journalists who have fled.”54 
In her speech, Nuland compared the budget of Russia’s RT channel and the US spending 
on information warfare with Russia. Despite the fact that the budget of BBG for international 
broadcasting operations in 2016 was over $749 million55, she complained that: 
 
“[Our spending of $100 million to counter Russian propaganda] … pales in comparison to 
the $400 million at least that Russia spends and frankly to the levels that we spent during 
the Cold War on such activities, which was over $1 billion a year.”5657 
 
                                                 
54Sputnik (2016), “Nuland: US Spends $100Mln to Counter Russian Propaganda Since 2014,” available at: 
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201606081040963385-us-russian-propaganda-nuland/ (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
Available also at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDjW4Sgh28o (accessed: 16 June 2017).  
55 BBG (2017), “Budget Submissions,” available at: https://www.bbg.gov/strategy-and-performance/budget-
submissions/ (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
56 Sputnik (2016), “Nuland: US Spends $100Mln to Counter Russian Propaganda Since 2014,” available at: 
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201606081040963385-us-russian-propaganda-nuland/ (accessed: 16 June 2017); 
Available also at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDjW4Sgh28o (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
57 On the other hand, Nuland’s comparison ignores the fact that the USA is not the only Western country that fights 
against Russia’s international broadcasting.  
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In addition to already existing media channels, new legislation has been adopted since the 
start of the Ukraine crisis in both the EU and the USA, which called for more measures to combat 
Russian propaganda. For example, an act adopted by the US House of Representatives in 
September 2016 called on the Secretary of State to “develop and implement a strategy to respond 
to Russian Federation-supported disinformation and propaganda efforts directed toward persons 
in countries bordering the Russian Federation.”58 The strategy which is going to be developed in 
the upcoming months is required also to establish a partnership with governmental and private-
sector entities “to provide Russian-language entertainment and news content to broadcasters in 
Russian-speaking communities bordering the Russian Federation.”59  
    
2.1.2.4. Cultural Diplomacy and Exchange Programmes  
 
With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union the Western community 
accomplished a fateful victory. The disappearance of the Soviet Union also marked the decline in 
Western soft power projects addressing the former Soviet region. In the 1990s the United States 
began to cut expenses on cultural and educational exchanges with the regional countries. 
Nevertheless, Western powers still have a multitude of exchange programs that bring students from 
these countries to study at Western universities. Particularly, the USA remains the pole of 
attraction in academic and research spheres, and many students worldwide, including from the 
former Soviet countries, see the United States as an attractive destination for academia.  
The United States Department of State offers a number of exchange programs for nationals 
of the former Soviet states. This includes most prominently the Fulbright Program, Humphrey 
Fellowships, the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) Program, Global Undergraduate Exchange 
                                                 
58 The official Website of the US Congress (2016), “114th Congress; H.R.5094 - STAND for Ukraine Act,” available 
at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5094/text#toc-
H62A026388BEB4523B38DE26290186DC1 (accessed: 1 October 2016).  
59 Ibid.  
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Program (known also known as the Global UGRAD Program), the Benjamin Franklin Program, 
Title VIII Grant, etc. These programs are quite popular in the “common neighbourhood” states. 
For example, the FLEX Program that reaches secondary school students from former communist 
countries has supported one-year undergraduate exchange studies of over 24,000 high school 
students (including nearly 8,000 from Russia) at United States universities since its inception in 
1993. During the 2012-2013 academic year, the selection rate of the program in Russia was 1.4 
percent: Only 239 out of over 17,000 applicants were admitted (Koshkin 2014). In comparison, 
Harvard’s selection rate was 5.9 percent in 2012 (ibid.). Another popular US exchange program 
that is exclusively focused on the post-Soviet region is the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship 
Program. Established by Congress in 1992, the program supports one to two years of graduate 
studies of emerging leaders from the former Soviet countries at the universities of the United 
States. Nearly 5,000 Muskie fellows have participated in the program since its inception in 1992. 
The program’s publication celebrating its 20 years of service in Eurasia claims that 75% of its 
alumni are in a professional leadership position.60   
In the framework of the Eastern Partnership, the EU also pursues cultural diplomacy to 
facilitate durable cultural exchanges, people-to-people activities, and cross-cultural 
communications. These goals are encapsulated in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Culture 
Programme. The first phase of the programme ran between 2011 and 2015. In this period, the 
programme invested €12 million in grants and technical assistance to help build the capacities of 
public administration and non-governmental cultural operators. The second phase of the program, 
which is to run until 2018, continues similar projects with a budget of €5 million. In early 2016, 
the EU also launched a Cultural Diplomacy Platform to enhance its engagement with third 
countries and their citizens. Several prominent public diplomacy institutes of the member 
countries, including the Goethe-Institute, British Council, the Centre for Fine Arts Brussels 
(Bozar), the European Cultural Foundation, EUNIC Global, and Institut Français, have been 
involved in the project. A scholarship programme of the EU called Erasmus Mundus (EM), starting 
                                                 
60 Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program (2013), “Celebrating 20 Years of Supporting Eurasia’s Emerging 
Leaders”, available at: https://issuu.com/irex-dc/docs/muskieprogram (accessed: 07 April 2018). 
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in 2004, has selected hundreds of students from Eastern Partnership countries to study in exchange 
programs (master’s and doctoral degrees). The programme opens up opportunities for young 
people to study, train, volunteer and do youth work abroad. It also supports staff exchanges and 
cooperation with universities in third countries to create lasting academic and cultural ties.  
Educational exchanges constitute an important part of the policies of the German 
government to maintain and reinforce its image abroad.  Germany invests in exchanges more than 
any other country and is seen as a place for plentiful opportunities for students, both during the 
study period and after graduation. The exchange programs offered by the German Academic 
Exchange Service (DAAD) are particularly popular in the post-Soviet countries. Each year 
thousands of students apply for different degree programs offered by the DAAD. Its budget of 
over €400 million is derived mainly from federal funding for various ministries, primarily the 
German Federal Foreign Office, but also from the European Union and a number of enterprises, 
organisations and foreign governments.61 The Institution regards the “Central- and Eastern-
Europe, Community of Independent States” as a priority in its activities: For example, in 2013 it 
supported the education of 16,000 people from this region (Lang 2015: 51).  
 
2.1.2.5. Western NGOs and Support for Civil Society  
 
Civil society has long been recognized in Europe as “as a crucial component for change 
and democratization” (Lada 2011) and has been at the front lines of the anti-government protests 
in the post-Soviet countries. Prior to the “colour revolutions,” the US and the EU began to pour a 
significant amount of financial resources into the pro-democracy activists in the regional countries.  
Western NGOs became a channel to deliver the allocated money in forms of grants and various 
projects to local NGOs and social movements working for democracy and human rights 
(Beissinger 2007: 261). Western organizations also supported coordination between local non-
                                                 
61 DAAD (2017), “Internationalization Agency,” available at: https://www.daad.de/der-daad/ueber-den-
daad/portrait/en/29143-the-internationalisation-agency/ (accessed: 17 June 2017).  
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governmental organizations. The representatives of local NGOs came together in the framework 
of different international meetings and training projects which are mostly supported by Western 
foundations. These trips have been especially productive and significant at the time of “colour 
revolutions.” For example, the Centre for Non-Violent Resistance, founded by Serbia’s OTPOR, 
an NGO that played a key role in overthrowing Serbian Leader Slobodan Milosevic, organized 
trainings for activists from post-Soviet states and shared their experiences with them on how to 
charter a movement, recruit people, and develop mass actions (Beissinger: 2006: 20; Beissinger 
2007: 262). Thanks to this cooperation the NGOs in post-Soviet space were able to emulate the 
successful practices of their foreign colleagues. Analyzing the diffusion character of “colour 
revolutions,” Mark Beissinger (2007: 261) writes that it was NGOs and local social movements 
that emulated and spread democratic revolutions in the region.  Beissinger (ibid.) lists “foreign 
support for the development of local democratic movements” and “external diplomatic pressure” 
amongst the top six common elements of the “colour revolutions.”  
Thus, Western-supported NGOs have already proved themselves as effective instruments 
in the promotion of Western values in the former Soviet Union. Their role in the formation and 
spread of “colour revolutions” in the territories of the former Soviet Union has been well 
documented (Beissinger 2007; Brucker 2007; Lane 2009; Welt 2010; Wapinski 2014: 49). Over 
the years since the first wave of the “colour revolutions,” the European Union and United States 
have established various institutions and programmes to reach out to non-state actors in the region 
and strengthen and promote their role in reforms and democratic changes in their respective 
countries. The USA and the EU are present in post-Soviet countries with so many non-
governmental organizations and foundations that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide 
detailed information about all of them or their activities. The following section will talk about 
some of the largest of these organizations. However, the list of non-governmental organizations to 
be presented below is by no means exhaustive.    
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American Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
The “behind-the-scenes roles” of US non-governmental organizations (such as NDI, IRI, 
Freedom House, and Soros Foundation) in pro-Western political developments in the former 
Soviet region has been underlined by many Western observers and scholars (Carothers 2006a: 56; 
Beissinger 2006; Sussman 2010).  These non-governmental organizations usually portray 
themselves as “independent” and deny the influence of any government on their activities.  
The Eurasia Foundation: The organization was founded and incorporated as a non-profit 
organization in Washington, DC in early 1990s. Its declared mission is to empower people to take 
responsibility and affect change for social justice and economic prosperity through hands-on 
programs, helping them to improve their communities. The organization addresses every former 
Soviet state, including Russia. Over the last decade, the foundation has established separate 
branches for the sub-regions within the FSU: (1) The New Eurasia Foundation was launched in 
Russia as a joint Russian-American-European partnership in 2004; (2) The Eurasia Foundation of 
Central Asia was founded in Bishkek and Osh (Kyrgyz Republic), Almaty (Kazakhstan) and 
Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 2006; (3) The Eurasia Partnership Foundation, serving Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the East Europe Foundation, serving Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 
were launched in 2007. Between 1992 and 2005, the Eurasia Foundation invested nearly $275 
million through more than 7,700 grants and technical assistance projects in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union, including Central Asia.62  Its activities are supported by a range of donors, 
particularly the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office.  
In a similar vein to other Western organizations, the Eurasian Foundation also operates as 
a soft power agent of the West in the region and seeks to help Western narratives defeat contending 
                                                 
62 Eurasia Partnership Foundation (2017), “Organizational History,” available at: http://www.epfound.org/about-
us/organizational-history.html (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
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narratives. For example, during the Ukraine crisis, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation held a 
roundtable discussion on the topic of “Crisis in Ukraine and Its Influence on the Nagorno-
Karabakh Process: Perspective from the West” in Baku, Azerbaijan, on March 17, 2014. The event 
was attended by representatives from diplomatic missions, Azerbaijani government officials, 
members of parliament and local experts in the field. The report of the event, which is uploaded to 
the organization’s website, is full of statements condemning Russia’s aggression against Georgia 
and Ukraine, its annexation of Crimea, its massive use of propaganda both for internal and external 
purposes and calls for serious Western presence in the region and a stronger response to Russia’s 
actions.63 Some of them are worth reading: 
“The West needs to be serious about taking care of the Crimea case, otherwise the former 
Soviet States may lose confidence in them.” 
“Azerbaijan must make a choice in favour of the US and its European partners, as it is not 
the neighbours to the North or South who will support Azerbaijan.” 
The National Endowment for Democracy: the NED is active in the post-Soviet region with 
its four “core institutes” – the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the 
International Republican Institute, the American Centre for International Labour Solidarity and 
the Centre for International Private Enterprise – which represent the two major American political 
parties, the labour movement and the business community, respectively. Although it is mostly 
financed by governmental institutions, the NED claims to be “independent from the U.S. 
Government” and points out that this status “allows it to work with many groups abroad who would 
hesitate to take funds from the U.S. Government.”64 The spectrum of activities of these four 
institutes are so large that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover all of them. These activities 
include cooperation with civil society organizations, local election monitoring organizations, 
                                                 
63 Eurasia Partnership Foundation (2014), “Roundtable Discussion Held on Implication of Crisis in Ukraine on the 
Nagorno-Garabagh Process,” available at: http://www.epfound.org/news-events/announcements/roundtable-
discussion-held-on-implication-of-crisis-in-ukraine-on-the-nagorno-garabagh-process.html (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
64 NED (2016), “Frequently Asked Question,” available at: http://www.ned.org/about/faqs/ (accessed: 10 June 2016).  
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business associations, grassroots business communities, providing support to reforms of 
governmental institutions, programs for involving women and youth in political activities and 
conducting opinion surveys. 
 Since the early 1990s, the National Endowment for Democracy has also been engaged in 
providing assistance to political “democratic” parties in some post-Soviet countries through the 
International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs (NDI). The political party assistance of these institutes includes a wide range of activities, 
such as training seminars and conferences, targeting party leaders, elected representatives, and 
candidates who represent different political parties.  The political party assistance provided by 
these institutes is funded mostly by USAID and to a much lesser scale by the NED, the State 
Department, international organizations such as the World Bank and private institutions (Brader 
2010: 37; Sussman 2010: 87).  However, it has not been possible to access statistics about the 
expenses of these organizations on party assistance in the post-Soviet region. Nor was it possible 
to find this information for comparable European organizations. 
The Open Society Institution: The Open Society Institution (OSI) of George Soros has 
passed a noteworthy evolution process since it was founded in 1984 and become an important 
force with an annual budget of hundreds of millions of dollars, more than 30 separate foundations 
and sub-organizations (Melia 2005: 7; Sussman 2010: 102-103). Like many other non-
governmental organizations, the OSI also portrays itself as an independent agency. Regional 
authoritarian leaders have very often blamed the foundation (along with many other Western non-
governmental organizations) of supporting anti-government forces and interfering in the internal 
affairs in the region. For example, Georgia’s former President George Shevardnadze 
acknowledged the shortcomings of the elections that led to the Rose Revolution but protested the 
Soros Foundation’s involvement65 in the process asking “why are international forces getting 
involved? What does Soros want?” (Lane et al. 2010: 97). The contribution of the foundation to 
                                                 
65 Beissinger (2006: 20) reports that the local Georgian branch of the Soros Foundation helped support Kmara (the 
NGO that spearheaded the Rose Revolution) out of its $350,000 election support program.  
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the collapse of communism through supporting dissident activities and civil society groups across 
the Eastern Europe and the counter authoritarian movements and “colour revolutions” of recent 
years in the Former Soviet Union is also acknowledged by George Soros himself.66  
 
European Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
In the aftermath of the launch of the European Neighbourhood Programme, in 2006, the 
EU founded the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to work with 
non-state actors in non-EU countries. The EIDHR is focused particularly on civil society actors 
who make up 90% of the partners of the programs (the rest are international organizations) 
(Dobreva 2015). “Promotion of democracy and human rights,” “responding to dynamic and 
complex challenges to democracy and human rights” and “address[ing] sensitive political issues” 
are amongst the declared objectives of the programme.67 It is reported by a publication of the 
European Parliament that the EIDHR “does not require the consent of national authorities” to 
provide funding for civil society organizations (CSOs).68 The budget of the programme for the 
period 2007-2013 was €1,1 billion; although there was some rise for the next 6 years (2014-2020) 
but it did not make more than €1,3 billion. Nevertheless, this is “complementary” to other EU 
external assistance programmes.69  Support for civil society in the “common neighbourhood” 
countries has also been considered within broader assistance programmes. For example, 5% of the 
                                                 
66 CNN (2014), “Transcripts,” available at: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1405/25/fzgps.01.html 
(accessed: 17 June 2017). 
67 European Parliament (2015), “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights,” available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568332/EPRS_BRI(2015)568332_EN.pdf (accessed: 17 
June 2017). 
68 Ibid.   
69 EIDHR (2017), “What is EIDHR,” available at: http://www.eidhr.eu/whatis-eidhr (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
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€15.433 billion budget of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)70 is to support civil 
society in the ENP partner countries.  
EU support for civil society actors in the countries of the “common neighbourhood” 
gradually increased following the inception of the EaP in 2009. A Civil Society Forum was 
established for “promot[ing] contacts among civil society organisations and facilitat[ing] their 
dialogue with public authorities.”71 Afterwards the forum built National Platforms in each EaP 
country which its website designates as “stakeholders in the policy dialogue within their respective 
countries.”72 The platforms bring together almost all the pro-European civil society organizations 
in their respective countries and aim to defend democratic values and promote European reforms. 
The tools they utilize for this purpose are wide-ranging. For example, the Moldovan National 
Platform (MNP), which brings together at least 35 non-governmental organizations, reports that: 
“[Between October 2013 – October 2014] [a] considerable number of pro-European 
promotional materials were published and distributed, including more than 6,000 leaflets 
about the DCFTA and AA, 1,000 brochures about the EaP CSF, 800,000 postal cards about 
the benefits of the EU Association Agreement, 12 posters and 40,000 EU binders. 
Additionally, 8 editions of the ‘European Objective’ newspaper in Romanian and Russian 
with approximately 100,000 copies were published and distributed as supplements to many 
national and local newspapers and 10 informative filters were intensively broadcasted on 
TV stations with national coverage.”73 
                                                 
70 More detailed information about the ENI can be found in the following section titled “Foreign Aid” 
71 European Parliament (2011), “Action Fiche for Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 2011,” available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-financing-neighbourhood-spe-general-budget-af-
20110920_en.pdf (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
72 Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (2017), “National Platforms,” available at: http://eap-csf.eu/en/national-
platforms/national-platforms/ (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
73 Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (2014), “Moldovan National Platform Annual Report,” available at: 
http://eap-csf.eu/assets/files/moldova_annual%20report.pdf (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
111 
 
They also fight against Russia’s soft power projection. The promotion of national culture 
and values, local languages, narratives against the domination of Russia, etc. has been on the top 
of the agenda of these National Platforms. Coordinating civil society actors, the national platforms 
also take a leading role in protesting the misdeeds of the public authorities. They take the stage 
denouncing violations of human rights, the falsification of elections, political persecution by 
incumbent governments, even when the EU leaders avoid publicly confronting regional 
governments. 
The European Endowment for Democracy (EED): The EED, a brainchild of the Polish 
government that aims at supporting pro-democracy activities in the Eastern Neighborhood, was 
established in October 2012. Originally the geographic focus of the EED was exclusively on 
Eastern Partnership countries.74 Although in December 2014 the foundation began to support 
projects from Russia, the Arab world, and Central Asia, it is still mainly focused on the EaP region. 
With the motto “supporting the unsupported,” and with flexibility and minimal bureaucracy, the 
foundation provides support to civil society groups, pro-Western media, political parties, non-
registered NGOs, trade unions and other social groups. The organization is specifically focused on 
countering “Russia’s state machinery [that] is operating and meddling in those countries, through 
the media and through oligarchic corrupt economies,” and providing an alternative to Russian state 
media.75  It is reported that the fund provided by the European Commission to the EED has been 
doubled to €12 million for the period 2016-18 following the positive evaluation of the work the 
institution had done in previous years.76  
                                                 
74 In December 2014, the EED decided to enlarge the organization’s geographic scope, to reach out to countries and 
societies beyond the EU neighbourhood, including Russia, Middle East, Northern Africa, and Central Asia.   
75 The quote has been taken from an interview with Jerzy Pomianowski, the endowment’s executive director, made 
by Carnegie Europe in March 2015, available at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59377 (accessed: 08 
June 2016). 
76 European Parliament (2015), “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights,” available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568332/EPRS_BRI(2015)568332_EN.pdf (accessed: 17 
June 2017). 
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German Foundations: Germany, as the largest economy of the European Union, plays a 
principal role in the soft power projection and democracy promotion of the EU. Lapins (2007: 15-
6) writes that Germany’s democracy promotion efforts basically serve to create and stabilize 
regime types and market economies with which the West can build effective and reliable 
cooperation.  Key actors in Germany’s strategic communication in the post-Soviet world are party-
affiliated political foundations (Stiftungen). The internationally-active party-affiliated actors from 
other countries are usually smaller and represented abroad with non-permanent agencies. But the 
German party foundations are represented with permanent offices in many countries around the 
world, including in the former Soviet Union. Many scholars have pointed out that the work of 
these party institutes was part of the official foreign policy of their respective countries, despite 
the fact that they were autonomous in formal terms (Brader 2010; Carothers 2006b; Pogorelskaja 
2002; Sussman 2010).  
The largest Stiftungen operating in the region are the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung that are affiliated with the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian Social Union, respectively. 
The “non-governmental” status of the Stiftungen gives them more space to operate than diplomats 
are usually given. “Their informal face as an NGO-like organization” also allows them to establish 
contacts with groups and individuals who do not have contacts with diplomats (Lang 2015: 46; 
Brucker 2007: 304). The foundations, declaring democratization as their goal (Brucker 2007: 308), 
are particularly specialized in the promotion of European values, culture, policies and institutions. 
The foundations also award scholarships for Ph.D., bachelor’s and master’s degree students from 
regional countries.    
Some other Non-Governmental Organizations: In addition to the above mentioned non-
governmental organizations, some of the other EU member states are also actively involved in soft 
power projection into the EaP region through similar institutions.  For example, Dutch party 
institutes - Eduardo Frei Stichting (EFS), Alfred Mozer Stichting (AMS), and the International 
Bureau of VVD (Volkspartiy voor Vrijheid en Democratie or People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy) provide support to civil society organizations and liberal-minded political parties in 
the regional countries. These institutes are also engaged in political party assistance in the EaP 
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countries, albeit in a considerably more limited scale than the above-mentioned six actors. The 
three institutes together or in cooperation with other institutions organize trainings for political 
parties, “leadership academies” for youth from the most relevant parties. These activities are aimed 
at familiarizing local parties with the political platforms of Western countries, developing their 
media skills, providing platforms for reflecting on the problems and shortcomings of their 
respective parties, and involving young people and women in politics.  These party institutes are 
supported by the Matre programme of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The program was 
established in 1993 and aims “to support democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe” and “to 
contribute to EU enlargement policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).” 77 Through 
the Matre programme Nederland spent €44.3 million on various projects in the Eastern Partnership 
countries between 2008-2014.78 The programme also supports Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD), another Dutch non-governmental organization that works also in the FSU 
(particularly in South Caucasus). Established in 2000, NIMD has a regional office for the Eastern 
European Neighborhood which covers Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine and is one of 
the six organizations (the others are NDI, IRI, KAS, FES) that offer the largest assistance to 
political parties in the EaP countries.79  
 
2.1.2.6. Foreign Aid 
 
The civilian aid of the USA and the EU countries to the “common neighbourhood” states 
has played a pivotal role in the formation of pro-Western sentiments amongst many people across 
                                                 
77 IOB Evaluation, (2015), “Evaluation of the Matra programme in the Eastern Partnership countries 2008-2014,” No. 
409, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 13, available at: https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2016/01/11/iob-
evaluation-the-matra-programme-in-the-eastern-partnership-countries (accessed: 10 June 2016).  
78 Ibid, p. 61. 
79Max Bader (2010: 36) estimates that “these six organizations probably account for over ninety per cent of 
expenditures on party assistance worldwide.”  
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the region. Although the aid provided by the Western community might not always pursue 
geopolitical objectives, this has truly affected the image of the West in the regional countries and 
consequently boosted its soft power. Many Western governmental (such as USAID, the embassies 
of the USA and some EU members) and international non-governmental organizations (such as 
the Open Society Foundation, World Vision, and Oxfam) have been involved in this process at 
different times since the very beginning of the post-Cold War period. Below a quick review is 
given of the activities of these organizations and some reflections about the consequences of their 
work.  
 
American Assistance 
 
In 1992, the US Congress passed the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and the Open Market Support Act (FSA). A US Congress report states that between 
1992 and 2007 the United States provided more than $28 billion in assistance to the former Soviet 
states (excluding the Baltic States, including Russia and Central Asia) (Tarnoff 2007). The stated 
objectives of the assistance were (1) facilitating the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, 
(2) promoting the introduction and growth of free market economies, (3) fostering security by 
controlling the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and expertise, and more 
recently (4) supporting the war on terror (Tarnoff 2007). The US assistance to regional countries 
is largely assumed to have planted seeds of change for pro-democracy upheavals in Ukraine, 
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan (Tarnoff 2007). These three countries, prior to the “colour revolutions” 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, had received a substantial amount of US assistance, a part 
of which was earmarked to civil society and political party trainings. The above-mentioned report 
points out that before the “colour revolutions” the United States had sent $807 million in FSA 
account aid to Georgia, $2.1 billion to Ukraine, and $408 million to Kyrgyzstan (including $138 
million, $453 million, and $94 million respectively in democracy aid) (Tarnoff 2007).    
USAID is the leading American government agency that is responsible for administering 
civilian foreign aid. The organization began operating in the post-Soviet region after the collapse 
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of the Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s it has been involved in a very wide range of activities 
throughout regional countries with strong financial backing. It is involved in supporting various 
initiatives to stimulate economic growth, develop democratic institutions, enhance energy security, 
and improve health and education. It helps improve social services, ensures the integration of 
disadvantaged, vulnerable groups and women in social and political activities, amongst other 
activities. Initially this aid made an important contribution to the success of pro-Western anti-
government forces in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet region. It is reported that the US 
government spent $41 million on Serbian civil society groups that were in the forefront of the 
Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 (Bessinger 2006: 20).  
In 1990s, amidst economic decline, political instability, war and chaos, the aid provided by 
these donors was gratefully embraced by local people. Particularly the aid for people in war-torn 
zones and internally displaced persons (IDPs) was of immeasurable value for thousands of people 
in the region. As an IDP family in Azerbaijan, my family was one of the recipients of those aids 
after having fled our home in Kalbajar leaving behind everything we had in the wake of the 
Armenian occupation of the town in 1993. Living in desperate conditions in a yard of a hospital 
many of us looked forward to monthly aid (particularly food) brought to us by USAID. As a child 
in those years I first came to know about USAID when I read its name on the packages we were 
given.    
The agency also supports educational initiatives. For example, with a USAID grant, a 
master’s degree programme in property management with European-based course offerings was 
launched at Belarusian State Technological University, in partnership with Lithuania’s Vilnius 
Gediminas Technical University. Although the program is open to Belarusian, Lithuanian and 
foreign students, in the 2014-2015 academic year only Belarusian students were enrolled in the 
program.  The agency pays special attention to people-to-people contacts between regional 
countries and the USA. Such a program called “Community Connections” is in operation in 
Belarus. The website of USAID reports that since 2006 the program has provided over 340 
Belarusian professionals in business, education, law, civil society and government the opportunity 
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to gain practical experience in the United States from their American counterparts within their 
respective fields.80 
The aid provided by the organization is particularly important for empowering the civil 
society institutions in the regional countries. It helps civil society organizations increase civic 
engagement, supports the oversight of local governance and decentralization reform at central and 
local levels, supports independent media, helps targeted media outlets to improve their 
professional capacity to produce fact-based, quality content as well as act as effective media 
watchdogs, etc. The agency carries out more projects in Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia. 
Due to government-imposed restrictions it cannot operate at similar scales in Azerbaijan and 
Belarus. Although the two countries have not gone so far as to close down the offices of USAID 
like Russia did in 2012, through strict restrictions it has become very difficult for the agency to 
operate there.  
 
European Assistance 
 
Over the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU, the largest aid donor in the 
world81, has initiated three broad projects to coordinate its assistance to the former Soviet States 
in their transition to market economies and democratic political reforms: (1) The Technical 
Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in 1991-2006; (2) The European 
                                                 
80 USAID (2016), “Civil Society Development,” available at: https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/europe-and-
eurasia/belarus/civil-society-development (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
81 In 2013, the public aid or “official development assistance” of the EU and its Member States, €56.5 billion, 
amounted to more than half of the similar type of aid defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). For more details, see, Europe.eu (2015), “EU Development Aid,” available at: 
https://europa.eu/eyd2015/en/content/eu-development-aid (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
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Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007-2013; (3) The European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in 2014-2020 (Table 3). 
 
  The Assistance of the European Union to the “Common Neighbourhood” Countries 
The Programme 
Name 
Focus Countries Time 
Period 
The Programme 
Budget 
TACIS Former Soviet Countries (excluding 
the Baltic States, including Russia and 
Mongolia) 
1991-2007 € 7,3 billion 
ENPI ENP partner countries and Russia 2007-2013 €11.2 billion 
ENI ENP partner countries and Russia 2014-2020 €15.43 billion 
 
Table 3. The Assistance of the European Union to the “Common Neighbourhood” Countries 
 
TACIS was the first initiative of the EU to engage with the post-Soviet countries and 
deliver technical support to their political and economic transformation policies. A publication of 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) distinguishes two phases of the programme: 
demand-driven (1991-1999) and dialogue-driven (2000-2006). While in the former period the EU 
organized its assistance in accordance with the requests of the ministries of the partner countries, 
in the last seven years it began to uphold conditionality in its cooperation with those countries.82 
                                                 
82 Europe.eu (2007), “The European Commission’s Tacis Programme 1991 – 2006 - A Success Story,” available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/tacis_success_story_final_en.pdf (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
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During the second phase the EU expected the partner countries to demonstrate commitment to 
policy reforms in order to further the cooperation and allocate resources. 
In the next long-term assistance programme following TACIS, post-Soviet countries were 
merged with the Mediterranean countries which previously were addressed within the 
Mediterranean Economic Development Assistance (MEDA) programme – a twin initiative to 
TACIS. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) coordinated EU 
assistance with those countries between 2007-2013. In 2014, the third phase of EU assistance to 
the neighbourhood countries started with the announcement of the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI). The assistance to the partner countries is formed separately within 
comprehensive multi-annual single support framework agreements. The priority areas of the 
instrument are boosting small businesses, civil-society engagement, climate change action, easier 
mobility of people, energy cooperation, gender equality promotion, gradual economic integration, 
people-to-people contacts, transport connections, youth and employment.  
 Apart from these assistance programmes, the EU has allocated loans and aid to the 
“common neighbourhood” countries on a bilateral basis. For example, in the immediate aftermath 
of Yanukovych’s fall, the EU Commission announced a large support package for Ukraine. The 
package included overall support of €11 billion over the next seven years from the EU budget and 
international financial institutions, including up to €1.4 billion in grants from the member states.83 
EU member states themselves are also involved in development aid to many countries around the 
world. For example, Germany’s development aid in total amounted to €10.7 billion in 2013 and 
was delivered to many countries around the world primarily by the German Federal Enterprise for 
International Cooperation (GIZ). The GIZ is, with an annual turnover of €1.9 billion (2013) and 
more than 16,000 employees in 130 countries, the main public institution in implementing 
Germany’s development aid (Lang 2015: 47).  It has been operating in the “common 
                                                 
83 European Commission (2014), “Support Package for Ukraine,” available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2014/03/pdf/20140306-ukraine-
package_en.pdf (accessed: 17 June 2017). 
119 
 
neighbourhood” since the early 1990s. Besides Germany, other EU member states also provide 
development aid to countries in this region (Sadowski 2015).  
 
2.1.2.7. Limitations of the Western Soft Power Policies 
 
Western powers had to pursue these soft power policies in a regional and social context 
which had had historically few cultural and political links with the West. On the one hand, the 
historical ties, cultural and linguistic proximity between Russia and regional countries, the 
existence of Russian minorities in those countries, and on the other hand the restricted space for 
free and independent media in the countries governed by authoritarian regimes, have made it hard 
for Western soft power channels to effectively operate in the region and triumph over contending 
narratives. Although the appeal of European narratives and the desire for closer relations with the 
West are quite strong amongst the regional people, Russia is also considered by many as an 
indispensable and/or strategic partner (Lang 2015: 37). Due to this vagueness, the pro-European 
sentiments in the region, though widespread, are “shallow and confused” (Popescu et al. 2009a: 
324; Lang 2015: 37). Moreover, not everybody is enthusiastic about Western values. Although 
pro-Western liberal groups glorify the political and civil liberties the West promotes, traditional 
segments of societies oppose some of these liberties, for example LGBT rights. The observation 
of Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson (2009b: 4) concludes that:  
“The EU is comprehensively outplayed by Russia in the neighbourhood media. Few people 
in the neighbourhood read or watch EU media, and other than Ukraine, none of the six 
states has a free media market. Russian media both takes an active role in domestic politics 
in the neighbourhood and shapes the way citizens see international events.”  
Towards the end of 2016, the challenges the EU faced in its internal politics, particularly 
the disintegration crisis, financial crisis, growing right-wing populism among others shook the 
foundations of the liberal democratic model of the West (Young 2015; Wright 2016; Diez 2016; 
Buchanan 2016) and affected the perception of the EU and United States in the “shared 
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neighbourhood” (Qasimov 2016a; Dobbs et al. 2016: 39-40). A publication by European 
Parliament lamented that:  
“It is difficult to deny that the Union’s ‘soft power’ has suffered considerably in recent 
times: internal divisions, inadequate policy delivery, and mounting populism have all 
contributed to creating an environment (even inside the EU itself) significantly more 
receptive to their messaging – which, in turn, further undermines that ‘soft power’ and, 
more generally, EU influence.”84 
This observation is confirmed by a political analyst from the South Caucasus, who writes 
that: 
“… the increase of centrifugal tendencies within the EU have dealt a crushing blow to the 
reputation of the Union in the post-Soviet region and given ammunition to Kremlin 
propaganda; the internal challenges of the EU are used by Russian propagandists to portray 
Western integration projects as a perilous alternative to a Russia-led Eurasian Union... 
Russian-sponsored news outlets convincingly argue that an EU that is stuck in several 
crises and at the verge of collapse cannot be a worthy economic and political bloc to trust 
in” (Qasimov 2016a).   
Western self-projection has also been damaged by its failure to successfully handle the 
challenges the EU and the USA encountered in their policies concerning the post-Soviet region. 
This has been reflected in its policies with respect to the ethno-territorial conflicts in the region 
and in a number of shortcomings in the EU’s and the USA’s engagement with regional conflicts. 
The West appears to have limited leverage to seriously affect the ethno-territorial conflicts in the 
“shared neighbourhood” – a region which is embroiled in many such conflicts (only one country 
– Belarus – has not been inflicted with such a conflict). It is rather important for the West to be 
influential in its conflict resolution policies in order to overhaul its image. However, this has not 
happened yet. Particularly in the South Caucasus, neither the EU nor the USA can exert effective 
                                                 
84 European Parliament (2016), “EU Strategic Communications: With a View to Counteracting Propaganda,” available 
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578008/EXPO_IDA(2016)578008_EN.pdf 
(accessed: 16 June 2017). 
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influence on frozen conflicts. It is due to this fact that voices have recently started to be heard from 
the region questioning if “the West [in fact] recognizes the South Caucasus as a de-facto Russian 
sphere of influence” (Qasimov 2016b). This threatens to erode the credibility of European projects 
among the publics of the Eastern Neighbourhood. On the other hand, the fact that the West cannot 
back its soft power projection in the “common neighbourhood” states with equally strong hard 
power, damages its image in the region. In Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), the transatlantic 
alliance, in general, demonstrated its reluctance to confront Russia militarily. This makes the 
regional people reconsider their geopolitical strategies and refrain from provoking Russia into 
military action.  
The EU’s reluctance to promise membership perspective to the countries in the EaP has 
also been regularly criticized by pro-Western groups in the region (Nielsen et al. 2013). Many 
commentators rightfully argue that “the membership perspective is the EU’s biggest soft power 
asset and removing it reduces its leverage” (Nielsen et al. 2013: 16). Although for the countries 
(Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus) that are not enthusiastic or hopeful about this perspective this 
situation is not a serious concern, for the ones who have been traditionally seeking to join the 
Union it causes a depressive effect and disillusionment. It might be difficult to say how much 
positive difference the existence of this perspective would make in the policies of the governments 
(Nielsen et al. 2013: 16), but it would definitely be a great incentive for the people of those 
countries.  The lack of this incentive discourages regional countries to undertake “overly costly” 
political and economic reforms on their Euro-Atlantic integration path (ibid.). For example, while 
the EU allocated €120.4 million to Georgia between 2007-2010 within the ENPI, it was reported 
that the costs of the Georgian criminal law reform alone, which was one of the priorities of the 
EU-Georgia Action Plan, was estimated to be almost €130 million (Rinnert 2011: 8). 
The underfunding of Western soft power projects with regard to the “common 
neighbourhood” countries has been another shortcoming that is often criticized by political experts 
from the region (Nielsen et al. 2013). As the previous section (2.1.1) concluded, neither the EU 
nor the USA has ever demonstrated a serious and consistent interest to pull the “common 
neighbourhood” states into their military and political structures and as such has not invested 
significant resources in policies with regard to this region. Rather they have tried to block Russia’s 
policies to build EU or NATO-like organizations with those countries. This has been reflected in 
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the EU’s and the US’s regional soft power policies, as well. The projects that address the “shared 
neighbourhood” countries have been often underfunded. For example, the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership programme, which has been the major framework of relations between the EU and 
regional states since 2009, has been regularly criticized for its limited budget (Makarychev et al. 
2012) and for being “stingier… compared to the pre-accession aid” provided to the Central and 
Eastern European candidates following the end of the Cold War (Nielsen et al. 2013: 17).  
Despite this type of problems, public opinion polls conducted in the “common 
neighbourhood” have demonstrated that these problems have not strictly deteriorated the image of 
the West in this region. For example, 90% of the Georgian people supported the country’s joining 
the European Union in a March 2017 poll conducted by the International Republican Institute.85 
Although the other regional countries were not as enthusiastic about the EU, they still had a sizable 
number of EU supporters. For example, despite extensive anti-Western propaganda by pro-Russian 
groups (see, next chapter), in a late 2016 poll, more than half of the respondents (51%) in Ukraine 
supported admission to the EU which was significantly higher than the supporters for the Customs 
Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (19%).86   
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter explored the soft power – hard power nexus in the case of Western policies 
concerning the “common neighbourhood” in accordance with the principles of the soft power 
model presented in part one. It indicated that, as expected by the hypothesis about the use of soft 
power as an expansive instrument and the use of hard power as a defensive tool, the EU and the 
United States have sought to draw the regional countries to their orbit through the use of soft 
                                                 
85 IRI (2017), “Survey of Public Opinion in Georgia: February 22 – March 8, 2017,” available at: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_poll_presentation_georgia_2017.03-general.pdf (accessed: 3 June 2017).  
86 IRI (2016), “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine: September 28 – October 7, 2016,” available at: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_ukraine_poll_-_october_2016.pdf (accessed: 3 June 2017).  
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power. Although they have demonstrated strong declarative support for the Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations of the regional countries, they have not become militarily involved in the region when 
these aspirations encountered Russia’s military response. However, in spite of the reliance on soft 
power in regional intervention and the choice not to confront Russia militarily, the West has 
strengthened its military force along the Eastern borders, as predicted by the assumption of the 
model about hard power: Soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need 
and must pay adequate attention to the development of their hard power. 
The chapter also explored the soft power potential of Western powers (i.e. the EU and the 
United States) and their policies to wield power over popular opinion in the “common 
neighbourhood” countries. The chapter firstly focused on Western self-projection. It found that the 
attractive human-constructed assets of Western powers (i.e. economic prosperity, higher living 
standards, high ranking universities, culture, political values, etc.) effectively armed their state-
managed soft power projection to the post-Soviet space during the period under study (2004-2016). 
As expected by the soft power – hard power nexus of the model, the possession of strong hard 
power resources allowed the EU and United States to establish a long range of propaganda and 
public diplomacy instruments to communicate with the “common neighbourhood” countries. The 
chapter also concluded that the policies to reach out to the domestic non-state actors of the target 
countries with the intention of affecting the policies of their respective governments have been 
used by Western powers ever since the early years of the Cold War. Analysing Western 
propaganda and public diplomacy projects, it concluded that although the EU and United States 
sought to wield soft power in the “common neighbourhood,” their projects were usually 
underfunded. The chapter claimed that this could be because of their reluctance to accept these 
countries into the Western political and military structures as fully-fledged members. The EU and 
United States appeared more interested in preventing Russia’s regional integration projects rather 
than opening the door of the EU and NATO to the regional states which could have led to 
disastrous consequences in relations with Russia.   
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Chapter 2.2. Soft Power in Russia’s Practice 
 
Russian propaganda “may be more dangerous 
than any military, because no artillery can stop their 
lies from spreading and undermining US security 
interests in Europe” (Ed Royce, chairman of the US 
House of Representatives foreign affairs committee, 
quoted in McGreal 2015).  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter replicates the structure and goals of the preceding chapter and applies them in 
the analysis of Russian soft power policies with respect to six post-Soviet states (Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus). Its analysis aims to test the hypothesis that 
amidst the rivalries between nuclear armed great powers, soft power serves as an expansive 
instrument, while military power is used by the conflicting sides to defend themselves and back 
up their foreign policies. In its analysis of Russian soft power, the chapter follows the principles 
of the soft power model presented in part one. This model differentiates two primary sources of 
soft power as self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed projection. It describes self-
projection as based on the natural endowments and human-constructed assets a state possesses. 
The model points out that a state which is well-endowed with rich natural resources obtains 
favourable conditions in which to a build successful economy and attractive culture. These human-
constructed qualities have been designated as a necessary condition to build an attractive image to 
project to the foreign publics. Thus, the model argues that states need appropriate policies in order 
to deliver their narratives to foreign countries and wield power over the minds and feelings of their 
people. These policies have been categorized as propaganda and public diplomacy. While 
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propaganda is presented as a one-way communication strategy conducted through mostly 
international broadcasting (television, journals, newspapers, online media channels, etc.), public 
diplomacy has been conceptualized as a two-way communication strategy using instruments such 
as non-governmental organizations, scholarly exchange programs, cultural diplomacy, etc.  
The chapter also tests the soft power – hard power nexus of the model. The model contains 
four assumptions about this nexus: (1) the diminishing utility of military power in international 
politics forces great powers to develop their soft power capacity in the pursuit of their foreign 
policy goals; (2) Soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need and must 
pay adequate attention to the development of their hard power; (3) the possession of hard power 
(i.e. economic and military power) is a precondition to develop strong soft power; (4) the existence 
of strong hard power resources does not automatically produce soft power, and states need to take 
appropriate measures to wield soft power.  
The chapter proceeds as follow. The next section explores the soft power – hard power 
nexus in Russia’s policies concerning the “common neighbourhood”.  This is to be followed by a 
broader section on Russia’s soft power policies with respect to this region. The section analyses 
Russia’s self-projection, strategic narratives, international broadcasting, academic exchange 
programs, non-governmental organizations, economic ties and foreign aid. The chapter ends with 
a short conclusion. The chapter by no means provides an all-inclusive coverage of all dimensions 
of Russian soft power. Due to time and space limitations, it will only briefly review key elements 
of Russia’s soft power vis-à-vis the regional countries.  
 
2.2.1. Soft Power vs. Hard Power in Russia’s Policies  
 
Russia has developed a complicated strategy to keep the regional post-Soviet countries in 
its orbit and prevent “the perceived erosion of its ‘sphere of influence”’ due to EU and NATO 
expansion (March et al. 2006: 351–52). The Kremlin launched several integration projects to retain 
the regional countries under its control and prevent their drifting away from Russia’s orbit towards 
competing projects, particularly Western-led integration projects (Zagorski 2012). In the 1990s, 
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projects such as the Collective Security Treaty, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
the Economic Union Treaty (1993), the Free Trade Agreement (1994) failed to achieve most of 
their declared goals. Ukraine never signed the charter of the CIS, Turkmenistan declared itself 
neutral at the outset, and Georgia left the organization in the aftermath of the 2008 war. In the early 
2000s, Russian policymakers decided to establish a Common Economic Space that would integrate 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in a common economic union. It was supposed to be an 
EU-like institution and was predicted by the Kremlin to be formed by 2008-2010.87 However, the 
eruption of the “colour revolutions” in the region complicated these plans.  
Following the Orange revolution in Ukraine (2004-2005), the Kremlin sought to build a 
fundamentally new integration regime – the economic union of Eurasian independent states, or the 
Eurasian Economic Union. In January 2010, Russia, with Belarus and Kazakhstan, launched its 
Customs Union (CU), which was framed in a way that excluded the participation of its members 
in any other free-trade agreement which the EaP had declared as one of its objectives. In the 
following years, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Armenia announced that they would cooperate with the 
CU. In October 2011, two weeks before the second Eastern Partnership Summit was to be held in 
Warsaw, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin presented the plan to upgrade the CU into a Eurasian 
Union. In May 2014, in a move forward towards the Eurasian Union, Russia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan signed the treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which extended 
the provisions of the existing Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) and came into existence in 2015. 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became members of the ECU in 2015. The Union was envisioned by 
Moscow as a project which would enable the Kremlin to challenge the attractiveness of the EU in 
its neighbourhood and “to create an alternative power centre for integration to the EU’s normative 
power” (Vilpišauskas et al. 2012: 11).   
However, the underlying problem regarding Putin’s new initiative is that like previous 
generations of Russia’s regional integration projects, the ECU is first and foremost a political 
project with vague economic benefits for participating states. Although the declared goals of these 
                                                 
87 Ria Novosti (2003), “Yedinoye ekonomicheskoye prostranstvo v ramkakh ‘chetverki’ mozhet byt' sformirovano v 
period do 2008-2010 goda,” available at: https://ria.ru/economy/20030701/400903.html (accessed: 16 June 2017).  
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projects were economic, they were in fact pursuing predominantly political objectives. The 
countries that these projects target do not hold weighty shares in Russia’s overall trade. Thus, 
regional economic trade, which has steadily declined over the past twenty years, is of less 
significance for Russia. The share of CIS states in total Russian exports dropped from 22 per cent 
in 1994 to 14 percent in 2013. Their share in Russian imports dropped from 27 to 12 percent in the 
same period.88  The declining role of the neighbourhood countries in Russia’s foreign economic 
activities can also be seen in the share of the CIS countries in Russia’s external investments: these 
countries’ share in Russia’s total investment abroad was around 22 percent in 2003, but this figure 
went down to a mere 2.5 percent in 2013.89 
Alongside economic and political integration, Russia has also pushed NATO-style military 
integration in its neighbourhood. The Collective Security Treaty, which was signed back in early 
1990s by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, Georgia, and 
Azerbaijan, transformed into fully-fledged organization (the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO)) in 2002.90 The treaty aimed at providing a common defence system if one 
member were to fall under attack, and promoted cooperation among member states against 
terrorism, extremism, separatism, organized crime, drug trafficking and so forth. Although the 
principles remained the same, transformation into an organization strengthened its structure and 
enlarged the responsibilities and competence of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the 
Council of Ministers of Defence, and the Committee of Secretaries of the Security Councils. The 
CSTO created its Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) in February 2009, which, according to 
then Russian President Medvedev, would be on par with NATO (Oldberg 2011: 38). The CRRF 
was largely a response to NATO’s plans to consolidate its forces in Eastern Europe through 
                                                 
88 Statistical data is retrieved from the official website of the Russian State Committee for Statistics, 
http://www.gks.ru/ (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
89 Statistical date is retrieved from the official website of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 
http://www.cbr.ru/ (accessed: 16 June 2017). 
90 In 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan left the treaty. In 2006 Uzbekistan re-joined and in 2012 left again. 
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enlargement and the deployment of a missile defence system. It was formed based on Russia’s 
98th Airborne Division and the 31st Airborne Assault Brigade.  
Although Putin noted the European Union as a model to emulate in its regional integration 
projects, his methodology of integrating the neighbouring countries has been different from that 
of the EU. As opposed to the “soft power” approach of the EU, the Kremlin made use of economic 
power, military, and energy as political tools to discipline its neighbours (Hagemann 2013; 
Bugajski et al. 2016). The display of military force takes a central place in Russia’s policies against 
the EU and NATO enlargement. At the 43rd Munich Security Conference in 2007, President Putin 
made clear that Russia would no longer tolerate any further expansion of NATO towards Russia’s 
borders.91 He stated that in the territories of the former Soviet Union Russia’s opposition to 
NATO’s enlargement would not be limited only to verbal protests as it was in Eastern Europe and 
Baltic states, but would potentially cause a geopolitical crisis.   
Soon after the Munich Security Conference, in August 2008 Russia deployed military power 
against Georgia. Prior to the war, Georgia, under the leadership of President Mikheil Saakashvili, 
was advancing on the road to NATO membership and “Russia [was] gradually being forced to 
retreat from this region” (Haas 2007). Therefore, Moscow started to militarize the breakaway 
regions of Georgia in the hopes that Georgian leader Saakashvili would respond with a military 
attack that would provide a pretext for Russia to intervene (Van Herpen 2014). Svante Cornell 
(2009: 134) observed that “Russia ‘set a trap’ for Saakashvili, and… [he] stepped into it”. It is 
reported that Western leaders regularly warned the Georgian leadership against a military venture 
and called them to “avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia at all costs…” saying that 
“You cannot prevail. It simply is not possible.”92 Nevertheless, Saakashvili decided to counter 
Moscow’s heavy militarization of the breakaway regions with a sudden attack. The five-day 
Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 resulted in a devastating defeat for Georgia. Despite 
                                                 
91 The Official Website of the President of the Russian Federation (2007), “Speech and the Following Discussion at 
the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 
(accessed: 16 June 2017). 
92 Reuters (2008), “U.S. says warned Georgia against Russia fight,” available at: http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2008/08/19/us-georgia-ossetia-usa-idUSN1947796120080819 (accessed: 22 August 2015).  
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Saakashvili’s expectations, NATO did not launch a war against Russia to protect Georgia. 
Consequently, Russia established its control over Georgia’s breakaway regions, recognizing the 
independence of the so-called republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and underlining the 
irreversibility of this decision. As Washington’s envoy to the Caucasus, Matthew Bryza, reportedly 
warned Tbilisi before the war that a military clash with Russia would destroy any chance Georgia 
had of entering NATO.93 
 In Georgia, Russia demonstrated that it would not refrain from using military force if its 
control over the geopolitical posture of the countries in its sphere of influence is at stake. However, 
although the consequences of the war became a serious obstacle for Georgia’s pro-Western path 
and alarmed NATO states, it failed to completely kick out Western influence from the post-Soviet 
space. In 2009, the EU launched its Eastern Partnership programme and offered regional states 
deeper European integration. The constituents of the programme, particularly the agreements (i.e. 
Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Deal) it offered, outraged 
Russian officialdom. The establishment of the DCFTA process between the regional states and the 
EU would single out their participation in Russia’s Customs Union which was to form the basis of 
its Eurasian Union.  
Prior to the EaP summit in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius in late 2013, Russia threatened the 
countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia) that were preparing to sign or initialize the 
agreements with the EU. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin explicitly warned 
Moldova that the country’s pro-European choice might cause them “to freeze in winter” and to 
lose its control over the breakaway region of Transnistria.94  In a later move the Kremlin imposed 
some trade restrictions on Moldova and generated problems for the inflow of labour migrants 
(Calus 2014). Similarly, the Kremlin threatened Ukraine that signing the agreement would turn 
                                                 
93 Spiegel (2010), “Terrible losses overnight: cables track US diplomatic efforts to avert Russian-Georgian conflict,” 
available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/terrible-loses-overnightcables-track-us-diplomatic-efforts-to-
avert-russian-georgian-conflict-a-732294.html (accessed: 22 August 2015).  
94 The Moscow Times, (2013), “Rogozin Warns Moldova on Relations,” available at: 
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out to be catastrophic for the Ukrainian economy and generate political and social unrest 
mentioning specifically the possibility of separatist movements springing up in the Russian-
speaking east and south of Ukraine (Walker 2013). Like Armenian President Serzh Sarkysan, who 
abruptly opted for the Customs Union in return for lower prices in natural gas imports and a 
security guarantee against Azerbaijan and Turkey, in a surprising volte face the Ukrainian 
President Yanukovych made an abrupt about-turn in favour of the Customs Union under Russian 
pressure in return for $15 billion counteroffer and discount in gas prices (from $400 to $268 per 
1000 cubic meters) (Rutland 2015: 137). Although the Armenian president managed to fulfil the 
agreement, Yanukovych failed due to the sudden outbreak of massive popular upheaval, which 
became known as the “Euromaidan revolution” supported by the European and American leaders 
(Müllerson 2014).95 
In the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution, Russia’s leaders declared their readiness to 
intervene in post-Soviet countries when Western-backed anti-regime protestors threatened the 
existing regimes. For example, the head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Aleksandr 
Bortnikov, in a meeting with the representatives of CIS intelligence services, unequivocally stated 
that the FSB “considers that there can be in [the CIS] countries forces with definite intentions 
concerning the overthrow of the authorities.”96  Pointing to the Euromaidan revolution, he said 
that the attempts of the oppositional groups and foreign forces to “overthrow the authorities with 
the goal of changing the constitutional system” is unacceptable and “we will act harshly in the 
framework of the law not to give an opportunity to destructive forces to influence the situation in 
our countries.”97 Apparently, following the ousting of President Yanukovych, Russia has become 
more assertive in declaring the possibility of using military intervention to prevent anti-
government protests of a similar scale in territories of allies (Golts 2015; McDermott 2015). Such 
                                                 
95 The Euromaidan revolution, Russia’s reaction to its outcomes, and the consequences of the West – Russia 
confrontation over Ukraine will be discussed in the second chapter of part three.   
96 Newsru.com (2014), “Glava FSB Vnov' Rasskazal ob ‘Olimpiyskikh Teraktakh’ i Poobeshchal Zhestko Reagirovat' 
na Popytki Gosperevorotov v Stranakh SNG,” available at: http://www.newsru.com/russia/06jun2014/bortnikov.html 
(accessed: 6 June 2017). 
97 Ibid.  
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protests or “colour revolutions” were mentioned along with other security threats that Russia 
encountered in the recent Military Doctrine of December 2014 and National Security Strategy of 
December 2015. For Nicolas Bouchet (2016: 1) these developments signify Russia’s “[move] from 
securitizing the issue of anti-regime protests to militarizing it.”  
Likewise, in the other former Soviet countries in its shared neighbourhood with the EU, 
Russia exploits the existing interstate or intrastate territorial disputes or ethnic conflicts (e.g. the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Transnistria issue in 
Moldova) as a tool of influence. These conflicts have enabled the Kremlin to put obstacles on the 
Euro-Atlantic path of the parent states. The facts that neither the EU nor NATO would recruit a 
new member that cannot exercise full control over its territory, is involved in internal conflicts 
with breakaway regions, or has Russian troops on its soil incentivize the Russian officials to delay 
or avert the settlement of those conflicts (Siddi et al. 2012: 7). When the geopolitical situation of 
the regional states develops to the dislike of Russia, Moscow escalates those conflicts, and through 
this leverage has so far been able to reach its objectives. For example, many observers have 
concluded that “The ‘de-freezing’ and rapid escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia was mainly the consequence of US-Russian disputes in the international arena and the 
direct and indirect intervention of foreign powers in the conflicts” (Siddi et al. 2012: 7). Russia 
tries to make the countries that host these conflicts transform into a federation or confederation, a 
political structure that would give the autonomous entities “veto powers over the foreign and 
security policies of the central governments and indefinitely keep each country outside of NATO 
and the EU and keep the US at a distance” (Bugajski et al. 2016:166).   
To this end, the Russian policymakers invest a significant part of the country’s GDP on 
military reinforcements. Russia is also pursuing a comprehensive military reforms program that is 
aimed at rearming Russian military. According to the initial plan which was unveiled during 
Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, i.e. when oil prices were on the rise, Russia was planning to spend 
13 trillion roubles, or approximately $425 billion at the exchange rates of those years, on 
modernizing 70 percent of military equipment by 2020 (Gorenburg 2010: 1). In early 2016, the 
Russian Defence Ministry stated that the country was successfully implementing military reforms 
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at twice the expected speed, despite the economic decline that Russia found itself in.98 Since 2014 
Russia has been continuously carrying out military build-up in the territories along its European 
borders, particularly in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. 
NATO has warned that Moscow is deploying “thousands of troops, including mechanized and 
naval infantry brigades, military aircraft, modern long-range air defence units and hundreds of 
armoured vehicles in the territory” (Wesolowsky 2015). Particularly Russia’s stationing of 
nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles into the area is read as an “alarming threat” in the West. 
Moscow has also made a radical change in its commitments to the use of nuclear weapons. While 
the Soviet Union undertook not to use nuclear arms first, Putin’s Russia does not single out this 
possibility. On the other hand, with military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, Moscow, as 
NATO’s secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg observes, “has shown it can deploy forces at very short 
notice…above all, it has shown a willingness to use force.”99 
However, along with developing its military power, Russia has also started to rethink the 
role of soft power in the aftermath of the first wave of the “colour revolutions.” The geopolitical 
developments in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated that economic 
pressure, military force, energy, and other hard power elements failed to avert the growing 
influence of Western powers in the region which was based on non-hard power. Although Russia’s 
military power succeeded in preventing the path of Georgia and Ukraine into the EU and NATO, 
it did not suffice to pull these countries fully back into Russia’s orbit. Notwithstanding Russia’s 
military capabilities and its nuclear arsenal, three of the regional countries opted for alignment 
with Western powers signing the Association Agreements and free trade deals. The crucial role of 
the general public and non-governmental organizations in this process and the success of popular 
protests urged Russia to reconsider its foreign policy techniques in accordance with soft power 
principles. In 2008, a Russian political scientist, Gleb Pavlovsky, the then adviser to the Russian 
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Presidential Administration, described the Orange revolution as “a very useful catastrophe for 
Russia” and stated, “We learnt a lot” (quoted in Popescu et al. 2009b: 27). For Russian officials, 
it has become “impossible” to effectively defend national interests “without proper use of solid 
soft power resources.”100 The remaining sections of this chapter will examine Russia’s potential 
and its policies to develop power over popular opinion in the “common neighbourhood” countries.  
 
2.2.2. Soft Power as Russia’s Foreign Policy Tool 
 
Russia’s soft power has been one of the most debated political phenomena amongst 
scholars of international relations. In Western academic circles, a number of terms and expressions 
have been attributed to such policies of the Kremlin. Most Western experts argue that Russia’s 
perception of soft power is rather different from that of Western countries (Saari 2014; Drent et 
al. 2015; Walker 2016). For example, the experts of the Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations point out that unlike the Western understanding of soft power “as a means to attract other 
countries to its own community,” Russia perceives of soft power as a tool “to influence or 
destabilise countries through non-military actions” (Drent et al. 2015: 10). For them, the Russian 
term myagkaya sila can be better translated as “soft force,” rather than “soft power.” Similarly, 
Andrew Monaghan (2013: 7) of the Chatham House claims that as Russia sees soft power “as a 
means of promoting Russian culture and language and countering ‘soft’ attacks on the country,” a 
more appropriate term for Russia’s understanding of this concept would be “soft strength.” 
Another expert from the Chatham House proposed a new term to Russia’s perception of soft 
power: “soft coercion” (Sherr 2013). In a similar vein, the Annual Review (2012) of the Estonian 
Internal Security Service notes that “the new concepts and wordings” that Russia attributes to its 
policies to wield soft power “are nothing more than attempts to hide and legitimize Russia’s 
                                                 
100 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2011), “Vystupleniye Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii 
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traditional, KGB-style influence operations.”101 Thus, there is a tendency amongst Western 
scholars to focus on the coercive elements of Russia’s soft power while underestimating its 
potential to be loved and respected by people in the region. 
Historically, co-optation, along with coercion, has been an integral part of Russia’s strategy 
to expand its influence over foreign countries. Since the outset of imperial expansion, Russian 
leaders have paid significant attention to generate consent amongst the peoples of the lands where 
Russia was set to intervene. While during the Tsarist years these policies were guided largely by 
Christian ideals, which had a more local character, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution 
Moscow adopted communist ideology with universal objectives and significant appeal amongst 
many peoples over the world. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost most of this soft power 
along with its military and economic power. Notwithstanding the fact that Moscow declared itself 
a liberal-market economy and remained largely committed to international cooperation in a 
number of international crises, for instance in the first Gulf war, its attractiveness dramatically 
plummeted in those years.  
Throughout the 1990s, the Russian political elite mostly neglected policies of cultivating 
power over the public opinion abroad which once were one of the priorities of the Soviet 
government. Domestically, in those years Russia was experiencing political disorder, economic 
crises, internal wars, and the defeat of communist ideology, which had been the cornerstone of 
Soviet soft power. The international conditions were not in favour of the former superpower, 
either. Moscow was withdrawing from international politics and recalling most of its personnel 
deployed to faraway countries. Under those circumstances, the soft power projects gradually faded 
in the foreign policies of the Kremlin. Moscow was forced to cut back its soft power vehicles 
overseas. For example, Vladimir Shubin (2004: 110) writes that “in the 1990s approximately half 
of the Russian cultural centres in Africa were closed due to lack of funding.” Thus, the primary 
reason for the apparent disinterest amongst Russian politicians in soft power was not due to lack 
of understanding of its importance, as some have argued (e.g. Van Herpen 2015: Kindle location 
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715 of 8957), but rather Russia’s withdrawal from international politics and its enormous domestic 
socioeconomic and political problems. 
After the political turmoil, economic crises and an unsuccessful war in Chechnya in the 
1990s, Russia began an upward climb in the beginning of the new millennium. In the late 1990s, 
in response to the “unfriendly” geopolitical developments in its immediate neighbourhood Russia 
stepped into a more assertive foreign policy with overarching objectives. In 2003, the country 
managed to raise its GDP to the level it was in 1993 thanks to rising commodity prices. This 
propped up more assertive domestic and foreign policies of the new Russian President, Vladimir 
Putin. The growing military and economic capacity of the country allowed Russia to launch 
comprehensive policies to wield power over opinion beyond its borders. Moscow started to invest 
both in its military and non-military power to back up its international policies and counter the 
enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic military and political structures in the territories which it 
considered its “zone of privileged interests.”  
The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept stressed the importance of the promotion of “a positive 
perception of the Russian Federation in the world” and underlined the need “to popularize the 
Russian language and culture of the peoples of Russia in foreign states” and “to form a good-
neighbour belt along the perimeter of Russia’s borders” (Lankina et al. 2015: 103). It also called 
for defending “in every possible way the rights and interests of Russian citizens and fellow 
countrymen abroad” (ibid.). This strategy gained momentum in the wake of the “colour 
revolutions” in Russia’s backyard and the growth of the increasingly threatening Western soft 
power in the region. Russia’s perception of “colour revolutions” as a new type of warfare invented 
by Western governments aiming at destabilizing the region, overthrowing Russia-friendly 
governments, and bringing to power pro-Western leaders contradicted the Western portrayal of 
these upheavals as the peaceful expression of popular will against repressive authoritarian regimes 
(Gorenburg 2014: 1). Russia claimed that since the end of the Cold War the USA had spent around 
20 billion dollars in the former Soviet countries on non-governmental organizations, scholarly 
exchanges, civil society etc. for provoking pro-Western sentiments (Shilov 2014: 185). This urged 
both Russia’s political elite to initiate more projects to wield influence on popular opinion in the 
“near abroad” and to steer the intervening influence of non-state actors in the region.  
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In 2007, the Russian Foreign Policy Review for the first time mentioned “soft power” as a 
new approach in Russia’s foreign policy making (Kudors 2010: 2). The document stated that “A 
big role in modern diplomacy is played by factors, which are often described in terms of ‘soft 
power.’”102 The document made clear that the objective of Russia in using soft power was to build 
“the ability to influence the behaviour of other states.”  Both Russian officialdom and the expert 
community started speaking out about the importance of soft power as a tool to influence the 
domestic actors of other countries with the ultimate goal of affecting the policies of their respective 
governments. For example, a Russian expert, Gregory Filimonov (2010) argued that public 
diplomacy was “not just intervention in the minds, hearts and souls of people, but also an effective 
way of influencing the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.” Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister 
of the Russian Federation, asserted that “Today it is obvious that without the proper use of a solid 
resource of ‘soft power’ it is impossible to effectively defend the interests of a state in the 
world.”103 
Thus, amidst the geopolitical challenges in its neighbourhood Russia imported the Western 
concepts of soft power and public diplomacy and began to emulate the successful practices of 
Western powers. The import of these terms allowed the Russian authorities to avoid using old and 
pejorative terms, such as propaganda or psychological warfare about their own policies. The term 
“soft power” in Russia’s latest Foreign Policy Concept (2013) was defined as “a comprehensive 
toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, 
cultural and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy.”104 The concept 
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mentions wielding soft power as a foreign policy goal of the state and underscores the importance 
of “improving the application of ‘soft power’ and identifying the best forms of activities in this 
area that would take into account both international experience and national peculiarities and build 
on mechanisms of interaction with civil society and experts.”105  Russia imported not only the 
concept of soft power but also emulated the instruments that the West had established to wield this 
power. The primary soft power tools of the Russian governments were a copy of the ones in the 
West. For example, RT emulated international news channels like BBC and CNN, the ‘Russian 
World’ foundation, and Rossotrudnichestvo was built on the basis of the model of USAID, 
Germany’s Goethe Institute and the UK’s British Council (Makarychev et al. 2015: 241).  
  The breakout of the Ukraine crisis in early 2014 brought about new elements into Russia’s 
perception of soft power. The Kremlin reconsidered its soft power policies in general, its counter-
revolutionary agenda in particular (Huseynov 2016). On the one hand, Russia’s soft power policies 
with respect to the former Soviet Union, predominantly Ukraine, started to be more concentrated 
on one-way communication (i.e. propaganda) through media channels. Russian leaders began to 
put more emphasis on media and the dissemination of Russia-biased information. They described 
the media as “weapons”106 and the information war as “the main type of warfare” (Yaffa 2014). 
Hence, the Kremlin also boosted the budget of its international media channels, for instance, there 
was a 41% hike in the 2015 budget of television channel RT compared to the previous year 
(Raybman 2014).  Russia’s state-directed projection also began to put more emphasis on 
programmes to discredit pro-Western governments in the “common neighbourhood” states and 
undermine their policies (Mattis 2015; Sherr 2015: 28; Drent et al. 2015: 10).  
On the other hand, the Ukraine crisis made Russia become louder in declaring the possible 
use of military force to counter “colour revolutions” in the region (Golts 2015; McDermott 2015). 
Russia’s new Military Doctrine that was accepted in December 2014 and National Security 
Strategy that President Vladimir Putin approved at the end of 2015 characterize “colour 
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revolutions” amongst the security threats that Russia is facing. Nicolas Bouchet (2016: 1) 
interpreted these developments as Russia’s “[move] from securitizing the issue of anti-regime 
protests to militarizing it.” He (2016: 3) points out that the depiction of mass protests as a security 
threat will allow Russia to intervene to protect pro-Russian political elite in some of the former 
Soviet countries: 
“Russia would not need a fabricated scenario or disputed pretext – as in Crimea or Georgia 
– for sending troops to prop up a government against mass protests. Neither would it need 
to resort to hybrid or covert methods instead of standard military ones. It could act at a 
government’s invitation, bilaterally or under a multilateral agreement. In some 
neighbouring countries, Russia could act under its Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) commitments – alone, with other member states or through the organization’s 
rapid reaction force. If Russia now defines protests as a form of warfare, it could claim this 
fits under the CSTO treaty obligation of mutual defence against aggression.” 
However, although Russian leaders considered the possibility of responding to “colour 
revolutions” and hybrid warfare with conventional troops, they themselves were aware of the fact 
that this had little potential to be successful (Nagornykh 2016). That is why the Russian military 
was planning to develop its soft power concepts to fight against unconventional attacks 
(McDermott 2016). These concepts, which are not yet made public at the time of writing, are likely 
to include all the instruments that can be useful to influence popular opinion in and outside Russia. 
The statements of the Russian leaders demonstrate that the Kremlin is resolved to spare no effort 
to achieve this objective. For example, Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov (2013), 
who believes that “responding to [hybrid warfare and “colour revolutions”] using conventional 
troops is impossible,”107 had already written about these instruments in 2013: 
“The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, 
in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. 
                                                 
107 Sputnik (2016), “Russian Military Experts to Develop ‘Soft Power’ Concept – Reports,” available at: 
https://sputniknews.com/russia/20160301/1035564527/russia-softpower-hybrid-warfare.html (accessed: 18 June 
2017)  
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The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of 
political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures.”  
Thus, on the one hand Russia invests in soft power to influence the policies of the former 
Soviet states in the “common neighbourhood,” to re-establish its control over them, and to get its 
foreign policies accepted as legitimate by local people, on the other hand it threatens with and 
prepares the legal ground for the use of military force if it fails in “softer” ways. The Ukraine crisis 
has evolved these two elements in Russia’s foreign policy to an unprecedented level in the post-
Soviet period.  
 
2.2.2.1. Self-Projection 
 
Russia is the largest country in the world with an area of approximately 17 mln. square 
kilometres. It is well endowed with natural resources. Russia is the second largest producer of 
fossil fuels, the third largest oil producer, the second largest natural gas producer and holds a 
significant share of all the world’s available natural resources (Clemente 2015). The country also 
boasts the world’s largest forest areas which account for approximately half of its territories. These 
natural resources have been historically a major enabling factor behind Russia’s economic 
expansion and international standing. This has given the Russian people enormous potential to 
perform well in development of elements which this thesis regards as “human-constructed assets.”  
As a country that has a very old imperial past, Russia has been able to develop significantly 
attractive cultural properties over the centuries.  The literature, music, theatre and other cultural 
elements produced in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union have made enormous contributions to 
global cultural heritage. Millions of people over the world, particularly in the countries that were 
previously a part of the USSR, still watch, listen, and read the works of Russia’s cultural icons. 
Although its modern popular culture, arguably, fails to prevail over the attractiveness of that of 
America and Western Europe even in the former Soviet Union, Russia still has a strong cultural 
link with former Soviet countries. A public opinion poll conducted by the European 
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Neighbourhood Barometer in 2014 found out that while just 11% and 40% of respondents feel a 
similarity with American and European cultures respectively, the number of people that feel closer 
to Russian culture was significantly higher – 60% (See, Figure 3).108 
 
  
Figure 3. A public opinion poll conducted in the Eastern Partnership countries by the European  
               Neighbourhood Barometer in 2014 
 
There are millions of people in the region who live with the nostalgia of Soviet times. A 
public survey in 2016 revealed that the majority of people between the age 35 and 64 think that 
their lives were better during the Soviet period than the present: Azerbaijan – 69%, Armenia – 
71%, Belarus – 53%, Georgia – 51%, Moldova – 60%, Ukraine – 60%.109  Similar results were 
reached by earlier polls (e.g. Esipova et al. 2013). Russia, being the successor of the Soviet Union, 
                                                 
108 Enpi-info.eu (2014), “EU Neighbourhood Barometer Eastern Partnership” available at: http://www.enpi-
info.eu/library/sites/default/files/attachments/ENPI%20Wave%206%20-%20Report%20East_EN.pdf (accessed: 17 
January 2016).  
109 Sputnik (2016), “Residents of 11 Countries Compare Life Before and After Collapse of Soviet Union”, available 
at: https://sptnkne.ws/c4XH (accessed: 28 June 2017).  
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benefits from these sentiments and is able to wield power over the minds and feelings of the 
regional publics. It is partly due to the influence of shared history that a Gallup survey showed that 
61 percent of those questioned said they approved of Russia’s leadership. (Ray 2011). This is a 
staggering number considering that the median percentage of approval for Russia across 104 
countries over the world was only 27% in the same poll (ibid.).  
The Russian language is one of the most important attributes of Russian soft power in the 
entire former Soviet Union. Although the number of Russian speakers over the globe has 
plummeted from 350 million (in the early 1990s) to 270-300 million (Panova 2015: 91-92), it is 
still widely spoken across the former Soviet Union. Vladimir Rukavishnikov (2010: 79) has 
correctly assessed the importance of the language for post-Soviet countries:  
“… [I]t is still the single available means of interpersonal communication for over 100 non-
Russian-speaking communities and ethnic groups living in the territory of the former 
USSR. Knowledge of the Russian language helps millions of workers from the “near 
abroad” to find jobs in Russia, businessmen to do business in Russia, politicians to come 
to a better mutual understanding with their Russian counterparts, and so on. We are sure 
that the Russian language will remain the main regional means of communication in 
Eurasia in the 21st century.”  
Although the English language is being taught more frequently than other languages at the 
schools of most of the regional countries (Blauvelt 2013), Russian is still more widespread than 
English. For example, in Georgia, one of the most Western-oriented countries of the region, while 
Russian is spoken by more than 70% of the overall population, the proficiency of English among 
Georgians is lower than 20% (Blauvelt 2013: 191). Not only in Georgia, but in the entire post-
Soviet space, the Russian language is not considered by many as a “foreign” language in its real 
sense, “but rather a sort of second native language (regardless of how well they actually spoke it)” 
(Blauvelt 2013: 190).  There is even growing interest in studying at Russian-language schools in 
some countries, particularly in Azerbaijan.110 Moscow supports this interest by establishing centres 
                                                 
110 In Azerbaijan, it is largely related with the lower quality of education given at the Azerbaijani language schools. 
Lots of parents prefer to send their children to the Russian language schools, as it is said that these schools provide 
better education. In late 2016, 90,000 pupils study in the “Russian sector,” while 450,000 pupils learn Russian as a 
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for learning the Russian language. For instance, in Armenia, since 2012, more than 100 such 
centres have been founded, where Russian-language courses are provided free of charge 
(Vardanyan 2015). This has been initiated by the Armenian Institute for Strategic Development, 
whose head Andranik Nikoghosyan in 2010 was awarded by the Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev with the Friendship Order “for [his] great contribution to the development of cultural 
ties with Russia, for preserving and spreading the Russian language and culture abroad.”111  
However, although the Russian language is still popular in post-Soviet countries, the 
number of its speakers has faced a consistent decline in the region in recent years. Filimonov 
(2010) reports that “instead of the original 20,000 Russian-language schools in the former Soviet 
Union, now there are about 7,000.” Besides, in this territory the number of children educated in 
the Russian language has fallen from 5 million to 3.1 million (ibid.). Although Russian is still 
spoken widely in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, it has ceased to be a language of everyday 
communication in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, a recent study by the Institute for 
Strategic Studies “Eurasia” has found that Russian speakers comprise a major part of emigrants 
from the former Soviet countries: Armenia - 64%, Moldova – 50%, Azerbaijan - 35%-36%, 
Georgia – 40%, Ukraine – 32%.112 Tatiana Borzova, an expert of the Institute, called on the 
Russian leadership for more projects to support Russian speakers in those countries, stressing the 
fact that “Young people from Russian-speaking families are leaving the former Soviet Union, [if 
this remains so] in 10 years Russian influence in these countries will not exist.”113   
 
                                                 
foreign language at secondary schools. See, APA (2016): “Minister: ‘90,000 Pupils Study in the Russian Language in 
Azerbaijan’,” available at: http://www.apa.az/xeber-az/sosial_xeberler/nazir-azerbaycanda-90-min-sagird-rus-
dilinde-tehsil-alir.html (accessed: 28 November 2016).  
111 Armenpress (2010), “Ukazom prezidenta RF sopredsedatel' Rossiyskoy-armyanskoy blagotvoritel'noy organizasii 
"Delo chesti" Andranik Nikogos'yan nagrazhden ordenom Druzhby,” available at: 
https://armenpress.am/rus/news/624900/.html (accessed: 1 June 2017).  
112 Interfax.ru, (2015), “Armeniya lidiruyet sredi postsovetskikh stran po dole russkoyazychnykh emigrantov” 
available at: http://www.interfax.ru/presscenter/484894 (accessed: 17 January 2016). 
113 Ibid.  
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2.2.2.2. Narratives  
 
Russian officials are most likely aware of the fact that “Soft power is effective only if its 
application generates and spreads positive social impulses and meanings” (Makarychev 2011: 2). 
During Soviet times, Russia used to have this potential. However, the disintegration of the USSR 
destroyed the ideological appeal of the communist utopia. This also debilitated the institutional 
basis which was necessary to continue the quite successful soft power policies of the Soviet Union 
(Maliukevičius 2013). Starting in the beginning of the new millennium, the soft power policies of 
the Kremlin started to be re-built and reinvigorated under the administration of President Putin. 
Particularly following the “colour revolutions,” a wide range of fundamental measures were taken 
in this regard and the strategic narratives of the Kremlin began to be re-constructed. Russia began 
to develop its own “political and normative agenda” (Haukkala 2008: 37) and put forward 
particular concepts for using its non-military arsenal (culture, language, media, etc.).  
One of the most popular initiatives of the early 2000s was the concept of “sovereign 
democracy” that was prepared as a part of Moscow’s efforts to counter Western soft power. In 
2006, Vladislav Surkov, then deputy head of the presidential administration, pointed out that it 
was developed in response to the “colour revolutions” in the region (Surkov 2006).  Although the 
concept was never coherently outlined, its two core ideas were clear from the beginning. Firstly, 
underlying the idea of sovereignty, the concept rejected any attempts of the Western states and 
institutions to meddle in the domestic affairs of Russia. Secondly, it stressed the fact that Russia 
has its own set of values, which are democratic but based on Russia’s unique historical experience 
and its traditions (Popescu 2006). The concept, defending Russia’s democracy, rejected the 
allegedly universal character of the Western standards of democracy. For the Russian leaders, “if 
there is western democracy, there should be an eastern democracy as well” (quoted in Popescu 
2006: 1). However, Peter Shearman (2010: 23) correctly notes that Russia has not sought to export 
its model114 of democracy to other countries, or at least there is no evidence to argue otherwise.  
                                                 
114 I share Vladimir Rukavishnikov’s (2010: 93) view that it is wrong to argue that “Russia has developed the “specific 
variant of democracy (so called ‘sovereign democracy’)” because of peculiarities of political values and political 
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In 2012, the Kremlin began publishing its own “Report on the Human Rights Situation in 
the European Union” to counter the negative assessments of the European powers on the 
conditions of human rights in Russia. The report that was published in 2013 accused the EU of 
“aggressive propaganda of homosexual love” and of attempting to “enforce on other countries an 
alien view of homosexuality and same-sex marriages as a norm of life and some kind of a natural 
social phenomenon that deserves support at the state level.”115 The Kremlin benefits from and 
inflames homophobic sentiments in the post-Soviet space to push the regional people against the 
EU. For example, it is reported that an NGO in Ukraine, financed by an oligarch close to Putin, 
distributed pamphlets saying that “association with the EU means same-sex marriage” (Tafuro 
2014).  
The national narratives that constitute important components of Russia’s soft power 
policies are built on the combination of a set of diverse policies, primarily a state-promoted 
ideology of conservatism and the Russian World concept, manipulation of symbols and nostalgia 
for the glorious days of the Soviet past, the leveraging of socio-political, economic and cultural 
links with the post-Soviet states. These policies achieve greater success in Russia’s “near abroad,” 
compared to similar policies “far abroad.” Kiseleva (2015: 322-323) distinguished two prominent 
elements that the Russian elite prioritizes in their soft power policies to vanquish Western soft 
power in the countries that they confront: (1) shifting the major emphasis to cultural assets from 
political concepts (democracy and human rights) in rhetoric and also in practical policies; (2) 
downplaying and discrediting the soft power assets of Western powers and describing them as 
destructive and devious strategies to reach certain geopolitical objectives.  
The Russian World116 (Russkiy Mir) concept is an element in Russia’s soft power toolkit 
that puts emphasis on social, cultural, and historical issues and projects a collective identity based 
                                                 
history. High-ranking Kremlin officials (Vladislav Surkov and his associates) developed the false idea of so-called 
“sovereign democracy” to justify Putin’s regime, and presented this viewpoint in 2006.” 
115 The Official Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2014), “Report on the Human 
Rights Situation in the European Union,” available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/diverse/-
/asset_publisher/8bWtTfQKqtaS/content/id/713035 (accessed: 2 June 2017). 
116 Some of the ideas embedded in the Russian World concept associate also with those of Eurasianism, an ideology 
that has had various versions developed over its long history dating back to the late Middle Ages and in modern times 
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on Russian roots.117 Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, amidst an identity crisis, Russia 
began to recall the concepts of the Tsarist years. In those years, the Russian World appeared as a 
comeback of the Tsarist doctrine of pravoslavie, samoderzhavstvo, narodnost (“orthodoxy, 
autocracy and nationality”) which the Russia of the Middle Ages had developed as a 
counterbalance of France’s Liberté, égalité, fraternité (“liberty, equality, fraternity”).  In the late 
1990s, some architects of the concept, such as Efim Shchedrovitsky and Petr Ostrovsky (quoted 
in Laruelle 2015: 5), argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union divided the Russian World, and, 
hence, the existing borders of the Russian Federation did not constitute a complete area which 
historically had belonged to the Russian World.  The concept allows Russia to claim responsibility 
for 300 million Russian-speakers, 30 million ethnic Russians outside Russia across the world and 
also embraces people who feel culturally close to Russia. 20 million of those ethnic Russians reside 
in the countries of the former Soviet Union.118   
In the early years of the post-Soviet period, the Kremlin tried to sign agreements on dual-
citizenship with the former Soviet countries. This plan failed largely due to the disinterest of the 
regional states, as these agreements would give Russia substantive leverage over those countries 
(Zevelev 2008). Following this failure, Moscow re-evaluated its relations with Russians outside of 
Russia by describing them as “compatriots living abroad” within the framework of the Russian 
World concept. Although the concept was initially widely discussed amongst academics and 
                                                 
is promoted largely by Alexandr Dugin. Its adherents, similarly, stress the differences between the West and Russia, 
presenting the latter as part of a distinct Eurasian civilization. In the aftermath of the announcement of Eurasian 
integration projects, the ideology gained momentum in academic and research circles.  Although, Eurasianism as an 
ideological doctrine has some overlap with Putin’s project of the Eurasian Union, this overlap is confined mostly to 
its geographical focus and is not taken as an ideological guide by Russian policymakers. Marlene Laurelle (2015b) 
rightly argues that: “As we delve into the contents of the Eurasian project, in terms of political values and economic 
politics, critical dissonances soon emerge. The Eurasian Union takes nothing from (neo)Eurasianism in defining a 
political and economic strategy for the region. No official text produced in Russia about the Eurasian Union mentions 
Eurasianism as an ideology. Dugin has not been given any official status since the coming into force of the Eurasian 
Economic Union; he is not a member of the Public Chamber and he even lost his position at Moscow State University 
since the onset of the Ukraine conflict.” Therefore, in the analysis of Russia’s soft power narratives, this thesis will 
remain focused on the Russian World concept.  
117 See, Feklyunina 2016, for more details on Russia’s projection of collective identity.   
118 Sputniknews (2012), “Russia to strengthen ties with Diaspora, expats.” Available at: 
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2012_06_27/79525664/ (accessed: 29 October 2015). 
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experts, it came into official usage only following Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Using this term 
for the first time at an official level during his speech at the October 2001 Congress of Compatriots, 
supported the view that the Russian World comprises the territories where Russia’s compatriots 
live: “The term ‘compatriot’ is definitely not a legal category. [...] For, since the very beginning, 
the concept ‘Russian World’ has gone far beyond the geographical boundaries of Russia and even 
beyond Russian ethnic boundaries” (Putin 2001).  During his presidency, the concept gradually 
“expanded from an internal search for Russian identity in the 2000s to a foreign policy imperative” 
(Lough et al. 2014: 2). 
Previously all citizens of the former Soviet Union were considered “compatriots.” In 2010 
amendments, the term “compatriots living abroad” was redefined and started to be based on “self-
identification” formed through “spiritual, cultural and legislative ‘free choice’ of links with the 
Russian Federation” (Pkhaladze 2010: 52). The Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, like the previous 
two, particularly highlighted that “ensuring the comprehensive protection of rights and the 
legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad” was one of the goals of 
Russia’s foreign policy.119 These conceptual initiatives do not remain only in theory and are being 
pursued with practical consequences.  As the existence of compatriots gives Russia a leverage to 
meddle in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries (Morozov 2015), Moscow spares no 
effort in reinforcing its ties with these people. Most importantly, the distribution of Russian 
passports to these populations – a process known as “passportization” – has de facto generated a 
Russian contingent in the neighbourhood. The russification of these populations and promoting 
their linguistic and cultural attachment to Russia is of great strategic importance. This proved itself 
to be highly significant when the defence of their rights and physical security served as an excuse 
for a military intervention in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) and for exerting political pressure 
on the Baltic states and Kazakhstan.  
The concept Russkiy Mir delineates Russia as a unique civilization and superior to the West 
that is allegedly in a moral crisis due to its deviation from traditional and Christian values (Speedie 
                                                 
119 The Official Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013), “Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation,” available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186 (accessed: 11 May 2017).  
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2015). This civilizational approach is also reflected in the official narratives of the Kremlin. For 
example, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 specifically noted that “for the first time in 
modern history, global competition takes on a civilization level,” and that “the major states of the 
world…should be representative in geographical and civilizational terms.”120 By presenting 
civilizations as a new type of factor in international relations, the Kremlin aims to defend the 
uniqueness of Russian civilization. The presentation of the West as the victim and promoter of 
“degeneration” and “moral degradation” takes a central line in this context (Igumnova 2014: 51).  
This civilizational approach gives Russia both defensive and expansive tools. On the 
defensive line, the Kremlin calls upon others to respect the sovereignty of each civilization and 
thus the Russian civilization, as well. The Foreign Policy Concept (2013) presents it as “a priority 
for world politics to prevent civilizational fault line clashes and to intensify efforts to forge 
partnership of cultures, religions and civilizations” and highlights the threats (such as “a rise in 
xenophobia, intolerance and tensions in international relations”) of “imposing one’s own hierarchy 
of values.” The Kremlin also employs this ideological stance to expand its ideals and values over 
other countries and to challenge the foundations of Western liberal democracy. In conservatism, 
the Kremlin sees the potential for filling the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of the 
Soviet communism (Whitmore 2013; Lewis 2016). Russia’s enthusiastic promotion of 
conservativism and the establishment of strong ties with right-wing political parties and other 
groups in Europe are an example of this.  
In Russia’s international narratives the elements of the Westphalian system and warnings 
against the erosion of this system constitute a central role. “State sovereignty,” “respect for 
international law,” “non-interference,” and similar Westphalian norms are largely employed by 
the Russian officials for the purposes for both soft power cultivation and self-defence. With this 
intent, Russia presents itself as a “norm enforcer” rather than challenging the existing international 
systemic norms (Sakwa 2011: 970). The Kremlin openly talks about the USA’s “attempt to freeze 
the world order that has taken shape in the past decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with 
                                                 
120 The Official Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013), “Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation,” available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186 (accessed: 11 May 2017).  
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one single leader at its head, who wants to remain an absolute leader, thinking he can do whatever 
he likes, while others can only do what they are allowed to do,” and asserts that “Russia would 
never agree to such a world order.”121  
Simultaneously, Moscow behaves like a revisionist power that seeks to challenge Western 
predominance in international relations. Complaints against the misdeeds of the West, its 
catastrophic consequences for many people across the world, and the need to avert this trend are 
likewise central in the international-level narratives of the Kremlin. However, as Richard Sakwa 
(2013: 221) puts it, “Russia is certainly not a fully-fledged revisionist power.” Russia strives to 
enforce the normative basis of the existing world order and to get all other great powers, 
particularly the USA, to uphold these norms. As Moscow is largely unable to “pose a systemic 
alternative to the dominance of Western ideological and structural hegemony” (Wilson 2015: 297), 
the maintenance of the Westphalian system of international politics is considered as the most 
optimal choice for the Russian political elite. State-supported propaganda demonizes liberal and 
pro-Western political groups and instigates violence and aggression against them. The Kremlin 
has generated and supports a climate of hate against those groups which frequently leads to 
physical confrontations and bloodshed. The Russian propaganda vehicles broadcasting to the post-
Soviet space maintains similar political tones. Russia’s public diplomacy and propaganda 
institutions in those countries and pro-Russian political groups propagate anti-Western sentiments. 
Russian propaganda seeks to promote the harmony of interests between these people and Russians 
and creates an image of a devious external enemy which tries to destabilize these countries and 
ultimately to invade them.   
 
2.2.2.3. International Broadcasting  
 
                                                 
121 The Official Website of the President of the Russian Federation (2015), Vladimir Putin’s Speech at Congress of 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47636 
(accessed: 10 February 2016). 
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Arguably, in recent years the Kremlin’s most important broadcasting project was RT 
television channel (previously known as Russia Today) which was launched in 2005 with a $30 
million initial budget and broadcasts to more than 100 countries (Evans 2005). The network 
already offers 24/7 programming in 6 languages (English, Arabic, Spanish, German, and French) 
and claims to be the most-watched YouTube channel (with more than 2 billion views).122 Russia’s 
international broadcasting was further strengthened by the establishment of Sputnik News (an 
international multimedia news service launched on 10 November 2014), and Russia Beyond the 
Headlines (an international multimedia project which was launched by Rossiyskaya Gazeta123 in 
2007).  Russia’s influential political scientist Igor Panarin (2010; 2014) distinguishes two waves 
of information warfare against Russia. He argues that the first one was launched in the late 1980s 
and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to him, Russia is presently under a 
second information aggression which the West initiated at the start of this millennium. Russian 
media channels disseminate this perception extensively in its neighbouring countries. Both Sputnik 
News and RT claim to fight against the informational hegemony of the West and deconstruct the 
“lies” propagated by Western politicians and media channels. The two news agencies with 
intriguing taglines like “Telling the untold” and “Question more” have been able to attract 
significant attention across the world. The rhetoric of these channels is obsessively centred on anti-
Americanism (Gerber et al. 2016: 81).   
The Kremlin also founds or supports pro-Russian local media channels in the 
neighbourhood countries. For example, in Georgia, Russia has connections with a number of local 
media outlets, such as information portals Sakinformi, Iverioni, Geworld.ge, and Internet television 
channel Patriot TV. These media outlets have been either founded by or are connected to Russia-
oriented non-governmental institutions in Georgia (Eurasian Institute, Historical Legacy, etc.) 
(Bugajski et al. 2016: 343). In some of the regional countries, the audience of the Russian or 
Russia-supported local media channels even outnumbers that of the others. For instance, the local 
                                                 
122RT (2015), “Want more RT? Tune in for French and German,” available at: https://www.rt.com/news/232455-rt-
french-german-news/ (accessed: 28 October 2015). 
123 Rossiyskaya Gazeta is a Russian government paper, which publishes laws and decrees, and statements and 
documents of state bodies.  
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outlets of the Russian newspapers Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii and Argumenty i Fakty v 
Belorussii are the most widely read newspapers in Belarus (Szostek 2015: 2).  
Since Crimea’s annexation, Russian media channels and other soft power outlets are 
particularly focused on denouncing the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO, “colour 
revolutions,” and Ukraine’s pro-Western geopolitical shift. They echo Putin’s accusations that “the 
US instigated ‘colour revolutions’ in the former Soviet region, using grievances of people against 
their governments, in order to impose their values that contradict local traditions and culture. These 
efforts were directed against Ukraine, Russia and Eurasian integration.”124 These channels, when 
necessary, do not shy away from broadcasting disinformation and conspiracy theories to reach 
foreign policy goals. The Kremlin appears to firmly believe the maxim that “a lie told often 
enough, becomes the truth.” From this perspective, the policies of modern Russia are considered 
by many observers, including some Russians, more malevolent than those of the Soviet Union. In 
a similar vein, Gleb Pavlovsky points out that:   
“The main difference between propaganda in the USSR and the new Russia… is that in 
Soviet times the concept of truth was important. Even if they were lying they took care to 
prove what they were doing was ‘the truth.’ Now no one even tries proving the ‘truth.’ You 
can just say anything. Create realities” (Pomerantsev et al. 2014: 9).   
Russia also skilfully benefits from opportunities created by technological development in 
its information campaigns. It has given Moscow new instruments to project its narratives to 
millions of people in the “near abroad” at relatively low costs. The Kremlin’s media outlets 
extensively use social media (Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte, etc.). Some studies on social media 
have disclosed that the Kremlin also makes use of social media bots, fake accounts (known as 
“trolls”) for various purposes on social media125. With this purpose, Russia is reported to have 
built a “troll” army whose task is commenting on articles on social media and other websites. In 
                                                 
124 Translated by Lutsevych (2016: 6-7) from Vladimir Putin’s Speech about Crimea: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApP5sWCpjDY 
125 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (2016), “Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare,” 
available at: http://www.stratcomcoe.org/social-media-tool-hybrid-warfare (accessed: 2 June 2017).  
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2013, it was revealed by a Russian investigative journalist that a group of people in St. Petersburg 
have been hired on a permanent basis to comment on social media and to distribute the messages 
of the Kremlin on other online platforms (Garmazhapova 2013).  Those people managing fake 
accounts are supposed to both defend Russian positions on various issues and create confusion 
through disseminating conspiracy theories (Kottasova 2015). The seriousness of this issue made 
Russia’s opponents deploy similar tactics to fight (pro)Russian trolls. For example, in 2015 it was 
reported that Ukraine also started to build its internet army employing the same tactics as Russia 
used. 
Russia’s propaganda outlets appear to be reaching some of their objectives in the former 
Soviet region. Peter Pomerantsev, an expert on the Russian propaganda, writes that, “Take Estonia, 
where viewers who followed rival Russian and Western stories about the downing of flight MH17 
over Ukraine last year ended up disbelieving both sides” (Pomerantsev 2015). For the regional 
people, for most of whom Russian is a second language and for some of them a first language, 
there are not many alternative sources of information. In 2014, a public opinion poll conducted by 
Gallup in 12 countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union (excluding the three Baltic 
States) concluded that many people in these countries considered Russian media a more reliable 
source than Western media (Bernstein 2016).  The poll indicated that “majorities in most of the 
former Soviet states,” particularly “who lived in urban areas and were better educated tended to 
be more supportive of Russia’s policy in regard to Crimea” (ibid.). However, the “common 
neighbourhood” countries are not equally receptive to this rhetoric. Russian propaganda is less 
successful in countries that have territorial conflicts with Russia. The studies show that Russia’s 
use of force in and occupation of some territories of Georgia and Ukraine has damaged its image 
in these countries. This year a Gallup poll found out that Russia is seen as the biggest threat by the 
residents of Georgia (48%) and Ukraine (52%) (Esipova et al. 2016).  
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2.2.2.4. Academic Exchange Programs 
 
During the Soviet era, Russia was one of the most popular destinations for students seeking 
an education abroad. In 1980, the Soviet Union (62,942) evolved to being the third most popular 
destination for international students after the United States (311,882) and France (110,763) (King 
et al. 2010: 10). Russian experts admit that “the USSR for a long time used higher education as a 
geopolitical tool and as an ‘ideological weapon’ at the time of confrontation and the Cold War 
(Torkunov 2013). However, the collapse of the Soviet Union relegated Russia’s attractive power 
as an educational centre and decreased the country’s share of the world’s educational services 
market. In 2004, losing the position of the former USSR in the top list of most popular destinations 
for international students, Russia downgraded to the eighth place (75,786 foreign students) (King 
et al. 2010: 10). Presently Russia hosts a mere 2-3 percent of the global number of international 
students, most of whom come from developing countries and the former Soviet republics 
(Torkunov 2013).  
Russia considers the growing influence of Western academic and cultural institutions in its 
neighbourhood as threat to its influence over the regional countries. The official website of the 
Russian World Foundation makes clear that the exchange programmes and educational institutions 
of the United States, Europe, China, and Turkey pose “a serious threat to Russia’s interests in this 
region” (Starchak 2009). In the wake of the first wave of “colour revolutions,” the Russian political 
elite began to assess this threat seriously. The official documents started to feature public 
diplomacy and academic cooperation as a vital instrument of foreign policy. Public diplomacy was 
for the first time stressed in 2008’s Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation as a tool to 
promote “an objective image of the Russian Federation” and the “Russian language and the 
Russian peoples’ culture” abroad (Fominykh 2016: 20). The Concept also underlined the 
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importance of reintegrating the national education systems in the post-Soviet region as the “re-
establishment and development of common cultural and civilization heritage.”126 
These official statements were also reflected in the practice of the Russian government. In 
order to emerge as an attractive destination for the international students from its “near abroad” 
Russia invested more resources on its scholarship programmes for international students. If there 
were only 3,000 such students receiving financial help for their studies at Russian universities in 
1995, in 2008 this number was raised to 10,000 (Fominykh 2016: 20). Following the breakout of 
the Ukraine crisis, this number increased further from 10,000 to 15,000 – a 50% increase in a year. 
Until 2014 those students were given the same amount of living allowances as Russian students, 
but travel expenses and health insurance were not covered. In 2014 Russia began to pay for travel 
allowances for some students: in that specific year 1,000 foreign students obtained this opportunity 
(Koshkin et al. 2014). Presently, most of the full-time international students studying in Russia are 
citizens of post-Soviet states – more than 50%. This share nears 70% in the number of students 
arriving in Russia for short time studies (one-two weeks) (Fominykh 2016: 28).  
In its educational projects, the Kremlin also seeks to reverse the decline of the Russian 
language over the world and also in the post-soviet countries. In order to make progress in the 
expansion of the Russian language, the CIS Network University was created in 2008 on the 
initiative of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. This aimed to support education in 
Russian in the CIS countries (Filimonov 2010: 3). In 2011, the Federal Target Program “Russian 
Language” for 2011-2015 was adopted. The program operated under the control of 
Rossotrudnichestvo and the Ministry of Education of Russia.  
The Kremlin also adopted a concept named “Russian schools abroad” in November 2015, 
which aimed at promoting the Russian language abroad. According to the concept, Russia would 
help with informational, methodological, logistical and professional support to Russian schools in 
foreign countries. The concept underlined the significance of the Russian language for the 
realization of Russia’s “strategic foreign policy interests” and the formation of positive attitudes 
                                                 
126 The Official Website of the President of the Russian Federation (2008), “Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/785 (accessed: 2 June 2017). 
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amongst these people toward Russia.127  Thus, not only does Moscow invest in projects to attract 
the students from the “common neighbourhood” states to its educational institutions in Russia, but 
also builds such opportunities in these countries themselves, by opening Russian-language courses, 
establishing branches of Russian universities, and financing or supporting education programmes 
in the Russian language or Russian studies. One of the most noteworthy elements of Russia’s 
educational policies with regard to those countries is the establishment of the branches of Russian 
universities in the “shared neighbourhood.” According to the Ministry of Education and Science 
of the Russian Federation, there are 30 such institutions in this region.128  
 
2.2.2.5. Russia’s NGOs and Support to Civil Society 
 
In the wake of the “colour revolutions,” Russian politicians and political experts began to 
raise their voices for comprehensive counterrevolutionary policies both in Russia and in other CIS 
countries.129 In the immediate aftermath of these revolutions the Kremlin created the Presidential 
Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries which was entrusted 
with the task of conceptualizing Russia’s new policy toward the “near abroad.” Modest Kolerov, 
a political technologist and for whom “culture is a weapon that Russia is using to gain respect in 
the FSU” (cited in Jackson 2010: 110) was brought to the head of the Directorate. In an interview, 
shortly after his appointment, Kolerov admitted that his mission was to counter revolutions in the 
                                                 
127 The Official Website of the President of the Russian Federation (2015), “Kontseptsiya ‘Russkaya shkola za 
rubezhom,’” available at: http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/50643 (accessed: 2 June 2017).  
128 The Official Website of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (publication date is not 
given), “CIS Branches of the Russian Higher Educational Institutions (based on the data supplied by the Embassies 
of the Russian Federation),” available at: http://en.russia.edu.ru/zvuz/1067/ (accessed: 2 June 2017). 
129 Censor.net (2004), “Polittekhnolog Putina i Yanukovicha Gleb Pavlovskiy: ‘Posle Revolyutsii v Ukraine, Nam 
Nuzhna Kontrrevolyutsiya v Rossii’,” available at: 
http://censor.net.ua/news/45941/polittehnolog_putina_i_yanukovicha_gleb_pavlovskiyi_quotposle_revolyutsii_v_u
kraine_nam_nujna_kontrrevolyutsiya (accessed: 1 June 2017).  
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CIS countries, and, for this purpose, he underlined the importance of mobilization of “culture, 
“spirituality,” and the Russian language.130   
In a short period of time, a number of public diplomacy institutions were created, such as 
the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation (2007), Rossotrudnichestvo - the Federal Agency for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International 
Humanitarian Cooperation (2008), the Gorchakov Foundation (2010), etc.). In late 2013, new 
plans to create a network of Russian-language-learning centres abroad named Pushkin Institutes 
(analogous to Germany’s Goethe Institute and Spain’s Instituto Cervantes) were made (Obrazkova 
2013). Russia also began to support pro-Russian civil society, cultural and folklore clubs, youth 
movements, think thanks, and analytical centres in its “near abroad.” These cultural organizations 
promote the Russian culture and language, youth movements recruit young people who stand for 
Russian values, and Russia-supported think tanks and research centres provide largely Russia-
biased information. They are supposed to counter Western influence in their respective countries, 
defend ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people, and promote conservative values and the 
Russian interpretation of the history. The Chatham House reports that in Moldova alone more than 
100 pro-Russian organizations have been identified by Moldovan intelligence agencies (Lough et 
al. 2014: 4).    
In 2012, in Russia, there were around 5,000 registered non-profit organizations – 856 of 
which had the status of “international” – which were supposed to serve Russia’s public diplomacy 
objectives (Kosachev 2012). These organizations were tasked with countering Western soft power 
and the promotion of the Russian language and culture with the ultimate goal of spurring positive 
sentiments towards Moscow’s integration projects. Not only are they focused on countries that are 
on a pro-Western path but are also notably active in countries that are in the umbrella of the 
Eurasian Union (Bugajski et al. 2016: 308). On 5 March 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
noted that “the CIS remains our natural sphere of interest. As yet our NGOs there do not really 
live up to their potential. We are not only talking about supporting Russian language education, 
                                                 
130 Kommersant.ru (2005), “Vladimir Putin Naznachil Barkhatnogo Kontrrevolyutsionera,” available at: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/556859 (accessed: 1 June 2017).  
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helping war veterans, cultural exchanges, strengthening democratic institutions, protecting the 
environment or youth policy. The most potentially fruitful approach would be for civil society 
actively to promote Eurasian integration.”131   
Having minimized the foreign funding of domestic non-governmental organizations to 
prevent any threat of colour revolution, the Kremlin launched its own funding programme for 
NGOs in 2005. Over the years, the major beneficiaries among the NGOs that are supported by this 
programme have been the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and organizations that promote 
Eurasianism – both of which constitute primary elements of Russia’s soft power projection into 
the neighbouring countries.132  The study also found that since 2012, these non-commercial 
organizations have been receiving constantly growing government funding (from 1 billion roubles 
in 2012 to 4.2 billion roubles in 2015).  
The existence of pro-Russian civil society in the neighboring countries is of great 
importance for the Kremlin. Russia supports pro-Russian cultural and folklore clubs, youth 
movements, think thanks, and analytical centres. These cultural organizations promote the Russian 
culture and language, youth movements recruit young people who stand for Russian values and 
Russia-led integration projects, and research centres provide largely Russia-biased information. 
As was clearly mentioned above in the statements of Russian leaders, these groups are supposed 
to counter the interference of Western-backed non-governmental organizations and promote 
Eurasian integration.  They, in line with the general foreign policy narrative of the Kremlin, defend 
the human rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking peoples and promote conservative 
values as the core of Eurasian civilization and the Russian interpretation of history. These 
organizations provide access to works of authors who criticize US hegemony and NATO’s 
                                                 
131 ASI.ORG.RU (2013), “Glava MID RF Sergey Lavrov Prizval Rossiyskiye NKO Aktivneye Rabotat' v Stranakh 
SNG,” available at: http://www.asi.org.ru/news/glava-mid-rf-sergej-lavrov-prizval-rossijskie-nko-aktivnee-rabotat-v-
stranah-sng/ (accessed: 28 October 2015).  
132 CEPR (2015), “Prezidentskiye Granty NKO: Pooshchreniye Loyal'nosti Vmesto Razvitiya Grazhdanskogo 
Obshchestva,” available at: http://cepr.su/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Президентские-гранты-НКО_Поощрение-
лояльности-вместо-развития-гражданского-общества.pdf (accessed: 2 October 2016).   
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expansion and praise the virtues of a multi-polar world. Likewise, the books of foreign writers who 
share these views are translated into Russian and used in the propaganda of these groups.    
The rest of this section presents brief information about the key public diplomacy vehicles 
of Russian foreign policy which were operational in the “common neighbourhood” during the 
period under study (2004-2016). 
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC): The Russian Orthodox Church has been 
traditionally the largest and most influential Russian soft power tool. The adoption of the title 
“Third Rome” in 1517, a declaration of messianic ideals and supposedly unique merits of the 
church of Moscow, and the establishment of the Moscow patriarchate in 1589 were historically 
used “to justify the claim of the Muscovite ruler to lead a universal Christian Empire” (Duncan 
2000: 11). The ROC was drawn under total state control during the reign of Peter the Great and 
“came to be seen as a pillar of the state” (Anderson 2007: 185). During Soviet times, it was the 
only Christian church allowed to act but remained under the total control of the government.133  
After the collapse of the predominant communist ideology, the emerging ideological 
vacuum made Moscow return to the ideological traditions of Tsarism. The percentage of Russians 
who identified as Russian Orthodox made a dramatic rise from 31% in 1991 to 70% in 2012.134 In 
post-Soviet Russia, the ROC became of principal importance both for governing the country and 
promoting its foreign policy goals.135  
Preserving the relations with the Russian and Russian-speaking communities abroad is a 
primary foreign policy task of the church. The ROC, in close cooperation with the Ministry of 
                                                 
133 The Soviet archives opened to experts in 1990s indicated that the former Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church 
Alexei II and the incumbent patriarch Kirill were KGB agents, under the codenames respectively “Drozdov” and 
“Mikhailov.” The patriarchs never “acknowledged or apologized for their ties with the security agencies” (Satter 
2009). 
134 Levada Centre (2011), “Religioznaya Vera v Rossii,” available at: http://www.levada.ru/2011/09/26/religioznaya-
vera-v-rossii/ (accessed: 2 June 2017). 
135 In 2007, President Vladimir Putin, likening the importance of the traditional relations to the nuclear shield of the 
country, estimated them „equally important for its security.” (Interfax-religion 2007, “Putin regards the nation’s 
traditional religions and nuclear shield equally important for its security.” Available at: http://www.interfax-
religion.com/?act=news&div=2550, Accessed: 29 October 2015.)  
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Foreign Affairs, strives to preserve and reinforce the spiritual bonds in “Holy Russia,” which 
denotes the canonical territory of the Patriarchate, i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan 
(Laruelle 2015: 15). With this purpose, the church also established an international organization 
named Day of Baptism of Rus (Den Khreshchenia Rusi) in 2007. It was aimed at promoting the 
integration of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine as one Holy Rus. The organization was particularly 
active in 2013 prior to the Vilnius summit later that year. With slogans like “We Are One” and 
“Holy Rus is Indivisible” it tried to foment pro-Russian sentiments in Ukrainian society 
(Lutsevych 2016: 24).  
 The Russian Orthodox Church has branches in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and claims exclusive jurisdiction over the Orthodox Christians in other 
post-soviet countries, except Armenia and Georgia. However, the ROC’s fundamental 
subservience to the Kremlin complicates the activities of the church in those states (Petro 2015a). 
As Orthodox Churches are the most or one of the most respected institutions in most of the former 
Soviet countries and has significant influence over society, the ROC gives the Russian state 
leverage is some of the neighbouring countries (Coyer 2015). However, the church insistently 
claims to be an apolitical institution and eschews nationalistic claims and rejects the views of 
critics who accuse the Church of neo-imperial objectives (Zolotov 2010). The church sometimes 
pursues the policies which help them to substantiate their claims to be apolitical. For example, 
after the break of diplomatic relations with Georgia after the 2008 war, the ROC was the only 
national institution still maintaining formal ties with them.  
The Russian church firmly advocates traditional social values, demonizes “the cultural 
corruption of the West” and supports the Russian officials’ view that western standards of human 
happiness are not applicable to all countries. The ROC and its conservative ideals attack at the 
very foundations of contemporary Western values and strive to consolidate a strong social basis 
against them. This ideology rejects the liberal ideas, “which have united within themselves pagan 
anthropocentrism, which entered European culture at the time of the Renaissance, Protestant 
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theology and Jewish theological thought.”136 The worldwide spread of these ideas in the aftermath 
of the French Revolution and the simultaneous rejection of the normative significance of tradition 
are presented as a grave threat to humanity. One of the flagmen of the new conservative Russian 
ideology, Metropolitan Kirill states that “The liberal idea does not call for a liberation from sin 
because the very concept of sin is absent in liberalism. Sinful manifestations by a person are 
permitted if they do not violate the law and do not infringe upon the freedom of another 
person...”137 Henceforth, they call for a restriction of civil liberties, free competition, freedom of 
speech, which, for them, promote western style social and cultural degradation. 
The Russian Orthodox Church, in the same vein with the Kremlin, criticizes Western 
perceptions of democracy and human rights. According to the church leaders, Western democracy, 
promoting individualism and competition, damages the foundations of a unified and consolidated 
society.  Presenting competition and the clash of opinions as a threat to society, the church supports 
the Russian concept of “managed” or “sovereign” democracy and calls for a model of democracy 
in accord with national traditions (Anderson 2007: 191). According to the view of the church’s 
main ideologue Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, Russia should respond to the criticism of western-
backed international institutions by developing its own model and promote it internationally.  
The Russkiy Mir Foundation: The Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation 
institutionalizes the Russkiy Mir concept.  The foundation, according to its director, is “a 
nongovernmental centre to support and popularize the Russian language and culture.”138 But, like 
many other Russian non-governmental organizations, it was established by the government (in 
June 2007). This is a joint project created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Education and Science. The prime task of the foundation is to provide informational resources, 
educational programs, cultural events and the promotion of Russia’s intercultural 
                                                 
136 Russian Orthodox Church: Official Website of the Department for External Church Relations (2000), “Report by 
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad at the ‘Orthodoxy on the Threshold of the Third Millennium’ 
Theological Conference,” available at: https://mospat.ru/archive/en/2000/03/ne003161/ (2 December 2015). 
137 Ibid.  
138 The Official Website of Russkiy Mir Foundation (2012), “Vyacheslav Nikonov: Russia is Better than its Image in 
the West,” available at: https://www.russkiymir.ru/en/publications/140317/ (accessed: 7 January 2017).  
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communication.139 The Russkiy Mir foundation maintains special relations with ethnic Russians 
and Russian-speaking publics living abroad. As of 1 November 2015, the foundation has opened 
more than 90 Russian centres in 45 countries across the world, of which 28 (around 30%) are in 
the territories of the former soviet countries: Azerbaijan (1), Armenia (1), Belarus (1) Kazakhstan 
(3), Kyrgyzstan (3), Moldova (4), Tajikistan (4) and Ukraine (11)140. The centres are aimed at 
popularizing Russian culture and language in the countries in which they are operational. Although 
the former Soviet countries and ethnic Russians living there are the main focus of the institution, 
its activities address also “those who speak Russian in their everyday life, also think Russian, and 
as a result- act Russian” over the world (Kudors 2010: 2-6). 
Rossotrudnichestvo: The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) 
was established in 2008 and is focused on the countries of the former Soviet Union. The institution 
was built on the basis of Roszarubezhtsentr (Russian Foreign Centre), the roots of which date back 
to the early years of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Russkiy Mir Foundation, Rossotrudnichestvo is 
a government agency and more focused on the CIS region than the former. The geopolitical 
mission of the new organization, which is, according to its director, a principal cause for its 
establishment,141 is “to centralise activities undertaken with a view to maintaining Russian 
influence in the CIS area.”142  The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept fleshes out the tasks of 
                                                 
139 The Official Website of Russkiy Mir Foundation (2017), “About the Russkiy Mir Foundation,” available at: 
http://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php (accessed: 2 June 2017).  
140 This is also a fact that indicates the importance of Ukraine for Russia: around half of the centres in the CIS are in 
Ukraine.  
141 On 28 June 2012, in a speech before the Upper House of the Parliament, Head of Rossotrudnichestvo Konstantin 
Kosachov, commenting on the opening of a Russian centre of culture and science in Bethlehem, underlined its 
importance as a tool to help Russia in its quest for “a stronger geopolitical clout in their area” (Russkiy Mir (2012), 
“Head Of Rossotrudnichestvo Konstatin Kosachev Speaks To The State Duma On Diaspora Issues,” available at: 
http://www.russkiymir.ru/en/news/129179/ (acessed: 28 October 2015). Referring this statement, Herpen (2015, the 
Kindle location 982 of 8957) writes that “The goals of Rossotrudnichestvo were never more clearly expressed.” 
142 The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 2008: “Kremlin Reinforces Russia’s Soft Power in the CIS,” available at: 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2008-09-18/kremlin-reinforces-russias-soft-power-cis (accessed: 5 
November 2015). 
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Rossotrudnichestvo as “elaborating proposals and implementing the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation in the field of assisting international development, providing international humanitarian 
cooperation, supporting Russian compatriots living abroad, strengthening the position of the 
Russian language in the world, and developing a network of Russian scientific and cultural centres 
abroad.”143 
Rossotrudnischestvo deals with the promotion of the Russian language, cultural, scientific 
and education exchanges, cooperation with compatriots abroad, and international development aid. 
Together with a number of institutions, such as the Governmental Commission on Compatriots 
Living Abroad (GCCLA), International Council of Russia’s Compatriots, the Association 
“Homeland,” the International Associations of Youth Compatriots, and the Moscow House of 
Compatriots, the organization aims at reinforcing ties with compatriots.  Rossotrudnichestvo 
organizes regular events (such as forums, seminars, conferences) and scholarly exchange programs 
with neighbouring CIS states. The CIS countries are a priority for most of the programs of the 
agency, such as the “Russian Language 2011- 2015” programme which seeks to support Russian-
language instruction in the post-soviet area.144 In 2012, Rossotrudnichestvo, together with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, created the Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Russian 
Federation Compatriots Living Abroad. The Fund supports and finances pro-Russian non-
governmental organizations in foreign countries, and trains and guides them. The declared 
objective of the Fund is “to give Russian compatriots comprehensive legal and other necessary 
support in the case of violation of their rights, freedoms and legitimate interests in accordance with 
universally recognized principles and norms of international law.”145 
                                                 
143 The Official Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013), “Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation,” available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186 (accessed: 11 May 2017).  
144 However, the activities and representatives of the agency are not confined to the CIS region. Currently, 69 Russian 
centres of science and culture operate in 61 states, 24 representatives of the Agency serve in Russian Embassies in 22 
states. See for more details: The Official Website of the Rossotrudnichestvo (2016), “About Rossotrudnichestvo,” 
available at: http://www.rs.gov.ru/en/about (accessed: 20 December 2016).  
145 The Official Website of the Foundation for Supporting and Protecting the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad 
(2017), “O Fonde,” available at: http://pravfond.ru/?module=pages&action=view&id=6 (accessed: 11 May 2017). 
162 
 
The Gorchakov Foundation: The Gorchakov Foundation is a public diplomacy foundation 
named after Alexander Gorchakov, Russia’s Foreign Minister from 1856 to 1882.146 The 
foundation was established with the decree of President Medvedev in February 2010. It serves the 
goals of supporting Russia’s foreign policy strategy and to promote the participation of Russian 
non-governmental organizations in foreign countries. Leonid Drachevsky, Executive Director of 
the Foundation, proudly stresses the fact that the Gorchakov Foundation “is the first and unique 
mechanism of a state-society partnership in the field of foreign policy in modern Russia.”147 
Almost all the research, educational and cultural programs of the Foundation (such as “Dialogue 
in the name of the Future,” “CSTO Academy,” “School of Young Experts on Central Asia,” 
“Caspian Youth School,” and “Caucasus Dialogue”) are directed at the CIS region. These 
programs, which focus on young experts and scientists from regional countries, have heavy 
political content and objectives. The projects mostly cover issues of security, internal and external 
factors affecting the situation in the region and includes meetings and discussions with renowned 
Russian experts and politicians. 
 
2.2.2.6. Economic ties and Foreign Aid  
 
An important link between Russia and the “common neighbourhood” states is the fact that 
the economies of the regional countries have been deeply integrated with Russia’s economy 
through the long centuries of co-existence under common rule. For millions of people in the “near 
abroad,” Russia has been the only source of income for years. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia became the most popular destination for millions of labour migrants from the newly 
independent states.  The existence of a visa-free regime between Russia and most other former 
                                                 
146 Gorchakov’s success in rebuilding Russia as a great European power following the discreditable defeat in the 
Crimean War is often evoked as a model for Russia’s contemporary diplomacy. For example, see Igor Ivanov, The 
New Russian Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Nixon Center/Brookings Institution, 2002) pp. 26–28.  
147The Official Website of the Gorchakov Foundation (2015), “Executive Director’s Address,” available at: 
http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/about/, (accessed: 29 October 2015).  
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Soviet countries has also facilitated the flow of people to Russian cities. Remittances are a very 
important source of income for the post-Soviet countries. For example, in 2013, 25% and 21% of 
the Moldovan and Armenian GDP, respectively, depended on remittances.148 Around 70% and 
80% of those remittances received by Moldova and Armenia, respectively, originated in 
Russia.149150 The inflow of remittances, which can be considered a form of foreign aid, help a lot 
of its recipients to survive in the difficult economic conditions of their own countries (Jackson 
2010: 109). In 2006, Fiona Hill (2006: 341) writes that migration to Russia and remittances sent 
back to neighbouring countries had played an extremely crucial role in the life of millions of people 
during the turbulent years following the collapse of the Soviet Union: “Migration to Russia [had] 
become the region’s safety valve.”  
Russia seeks also to benefit from its economic superiority over neighbouring former Soviet 
countries in its pursuit to develop soft power. An Oxfam analysis in 2013 reported that the post-
Soviet region is the primary recipient of Russia’s humanitarian aid, of which the annual budget 
was around 51 million dollars in 2012 (Brezhneva et al. 2013: 7). The analysts underline that 
Russia’s allocation of aid in greater volumes and more frequently to the former Soviet countries is 
“often interpreted as a way of maintaining a degree of influence over these countries” (ibid.). The 
report concludes that the geographical distribution of Russia’s aid must be viewed in the context 
of its long-term strategic ambitions,” which shows that “Russia regards former Soviet republics as 
its sphere of influence, and its willingness to maintain close ties with them explains why they 
receive such a large proportion of its aid” (Brezhneva et al. 2013: 13). 
                                                 
148 The World Bank (2014), “Remittances to Developing Countries to Grow by 5 Percent This Year, While Conflict-
Related Forced Migration is at All-Time High, Says WB Report,” available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/10/06/remittances-developing-countries-five-percent-
conflict-related-migration-all-time-high-wb-report (accessed: 11 May 2017). 
149Teleradio Moldova (2014), “Almost 70% of remittances arrived in Moldova in 2013, originate in Russia,” available 
at:  https://www.trm.md/en/economic/aproape-70-din-transferurile-din-strainatate-au-provenit-din-rusia-in-2013/ 
(accessed: 11 May 2017). 
150 Arka News Agency (2015), “Private remittances to Armenia slash by 31 percent in 2014 November- central bank,” 
available at: 
http://arka.am/en/news/economy/private_remittances_to_armenia_slash_by_31_percent_in_2014_november_central
_bank/ (accessed: 11 May 2017). 
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It is estimated that Russia’s gas subsidies across the CIS region between 1992 and 2008 
amounted to $75 billion (Bochkarev 2009). In this period, Russia sold natural gas to those countries 
at a lower price than that of the world market.151 This is a form of external aid which is not added 
to Russia’s official data on foreign aid to the CIS countries (Sasse 2012: 557). Konstantin 
Kosachev, head of Rossotrudnichestvo, lamented this fact in 2014, stating that Russia helped 
Ukraine for many years by imposing lower gas tariffs and opened its market to Ukrainian products, 
but Ukrainian people did not see them. On the contrary, sums that were hundreds of times smaller 
from the USA and the EU “to support democracy” was seen as “bailout” to Ukraine. He 
emphasised that Ukraine was not the only such case (Khimshiashvili 2014).  
 
2.2.2.7. Limitations of Russian Soft Power 
 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned potential and accomplishments, self-projection is 
the main soft power element that is mostly disregarded by Russia’s political elite and is a largely 
underdeveloped aspect of its soft power. Many observers argue that “Russia lacks the 
attractiveness the EU has… [and] still needs to become sufficiently attractive in order to become 
the preferred partner for its neighbours” (Rostoks et al. 2015: 247).  Russia’s internal economic 
and socio-political structure, its authoritarian governance, economic backwardness, etc. destroy 
the image of the country and prevents it from developing itself as a worthy model to be followed 
or emulated. Despite having vast natural resources (e.g. 6% of global proven oil reserves and 
17.3% of global proven gas reserves), Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is far lower than 
that of the EU: the EU’s single market produced a GDP of $16.312 trillion in 2015, compared to 
Russia’s total of $1.33 trillion.152  
                                                 
151 In 2005, the Russian government began to increase gas prices for CIS countries (Bochkarev 2009). 
152 Statistics sourced from the World Bank, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/  
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Russian leaders are mistakenly focused mostly on the elements of soft power that are 
controlled and managed by the state. For example, in his 2012 article “Russia in a Changing 
World,” Putin defined soft power as “a complex of tools and methods for achieving foreign policy 
goals without deploying weapons, using information tools and other forms of intervention” (Putin 
2012). This incomplete understanding of soft power lays the foundation of future failures in 
Russia’s soft power policies. The Kremlin continues its clampdown on civil society, ramps up 
pressure on non-governmental organizations, intensifies its tight grip on the media and saturates 
the information landscape with nationalist propaganda while suppressing the most popular 
alternative voices.153 Despite the fact that some Russian leaders have acknowledged these 
problems and stress the importance of reforms, they have consistently failed to materialize them. 
For example, the former President Dmirty Medvedev, on many occasions, criticized the country’s 
“humiliating dependence on raw materials,” as well as its “inefficient economy, a semi-Soviet 
social sphere, a fragile democracy, negative demographic trends, unstable Caucasus” (Medvedev 
2009). Nonetheless, neither he nor his successor took effective measures to eradicate these 
problems.  
Russia is widely seen as a force that supports authoritarian governments in its 
neighbourhood and as such promotes autocracy (Kramer 2008; Tolstrup 2009; Kästner et al. 2010; 
Melnykovska et al. 2012; Furman et al. 2015). Although it might be inaccurate to argue that Russia 
exports autocracy to its neighbourhood (Tansey 2015; Qasimov 2017), Russian leaders develop 
policies and practices aimed at blocking democracy’s advance in its neighbourhood (Walker 
2016). Despite disagreeing on some issues, Russia and authoritarian regimes in the region broadly 
share the objective of preventing “colour revolutions.”  On this basis, David Lewis (2016) aptly 
points out that the mutual understanding in domestic governance among these leaders provides the 
ground “to talk about a kind of ‘Moscow Consensus’, a shared view among elites of how post-
Soviet states should be governed and what a modern state should look like. This gives leaders in 
the region a common language and a common worldview that makes it difficult for outsiders — 
                                                 
153 Freedom House (2016), “Country Report: Russia,” available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2016/russia (accessed: 28 April 2016).  
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particularly those with liberal ideas — to gain much traction.” This strategy of the Russian 
leadership to counter rival ideologies, particularly liberal-democracy, through cooperation with 
authoritarian leaders is strictly short-term and irrationally ignores the fact that the corrupted 
politicians in power in these countries cannot hold their positions forever.  
Russia’s image suffers also from its controversial efforts to preserve its traditional 
influence over the neighbourhood countries and from its aggressive reactions to the pro-Western 
geopolitical drift of regional countries. All the countries in the “common neighbourhood,” apart 
from Belarus, have been stuck in frozen conflicts in which Russia is a key player, directly or 
indirectly. Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in Ukraine are the conflicts which 
Russia has been manipulating to have a word over the foreign policy manoeuvres of these 
countries. Unlike Western powers, who have never deployed military power vis-à-vis the 
“common neighbourhood” in the post-Soviet period, Russia does not shy away from using it when 
regional countries make decisive moves to join Euro-Atlantic political and military institutes. 
Thus, Russia’s policies to fight against Western soft power have not been confined to soft power 
but also included hard power. This has been one of the most crucial problems in Russia’s policies 
that have damaged its overall policies to wield power over popular opinion in the “common 
neighbourhood” and made it be seen as a threat by numerous people (Esipova et al. 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed Russia’s policies to retain the neighbouring post-Soviet states under 
its dominance. On the contrary to the analyses (e.g. by Kroenig (2015: 53) and Khalifa-zadeh 
(2014)) which argue that Moscow sees military force as a means to re-establish its hegemony over 
regional states, this analysis concludes that the Russian leadership is aware that they could not 
establish a EU-like Union with military force. However, they tend to use military power as a last 
resort to prevent the loss of territories of existential importance to rival powers. The Georgia war 
of 2008 and Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2014 are such cases that in which Russia 
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became militarily involved and opposed the pro-Western drift of the two countries that it considers 
as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. It was Russia’s military force that succeeded in stopping 
the enlargement of NATO into the territories of the former Soviet Union. On this account, 
Karaganov rightfully writes that: 
“NATO’s expansion was stopped, alas, not by persuasion or calls for common sense. The 
show of Russia’s military muscle in Georgia did it” (Karaganov 2012).  
This supported the hypothesis about the use of soft power as an expansive instrument in 
the rivalries between great powers and the use of hard power as a defensive tool to preserve the 
existing sphere of influence and to back up foreign policies.  
The chapter built its analysis of Russia’s soft power policies on the basis of the soft power 
model presented in part one. In accordance with the principles of this model, firstly, the chapter 
explored Russia’s self-projection from the perspective of the “common neighbourhood” countries. 
It has found that Russia’s natural endowments and human-constructed assets give it significant 
potential in its soft power policies vis-à-vis the regional people. The fact that these countries used 
to live together under Moscow’s rule also affects their attitude to and perceptions of Russia. The 
public opinion polls cited in the chapter showed that most people in the region feel closer to 
Russian culture than to European or American cultures. The chapter has also analysed the role of 
the Russian language as a soft power asset. It concluded that although Russian is still of great 
importance for the regional people, many of whom speak this language, the number of its speakers 
is declining. This was mentioned as one of the problems of Russian soft power in general. 
However, Russia’s self-projection has other, more serious problems as well. Its domestic socio-
economic problems, relatively weak economic performance, authoritarian governance and 
economic backwardness damage the image of the country and prevent it from looking as the 
“shining city upon the hill” for the “common neighbourhood” countries. The image of the state is 
being damaged also by its foreign policies with respect to the regional countries. Russia’s military 
interventions in the regional countries make it appear as a loser in the competition with the West 
whose policies vis-à-vis this region have been always based on non-military power since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  
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The chapter focused also on Russia’s state-managed soft power projection and explored 
Russia’s strategic narratives, its international broadcasting, academic exchange programs, non-
governmental organizations and foreign aid as dimensions of its state-managed projection with 
regard to the “common neighbourhood.” This analysis showed that the existence of sufficient hard 
power resources (in particular, financial wealth) has allowed the Kremlin to establish a long series 
of propaganda and public diplomacy institutions to wield soft power in the region. The chapter 
concluded that the Russian political elite began to invest resources on this field in the aftermath of 
the “colour revolutions” in the beginning of this century. As expected by the soft power model of 
this thesis, Russia did not rely on only its hard power, but was forced to found numerous soft power 
instruments to fight the non-military power of the West.  
The chapter concluded that Russia has been successful in these policies to some extent, 
despite its non-democratic structure and profound socio-economic and political problems. 
However, Russia’s soft power cannot successfully compete against Western soft power unless the 
Kremlin resolves the above-mentioned problems that undermine the self-projection of the country. 
Probably this is why there is widespread pessimism about Russia’s soft power potential in the 
Russian political expert community. Ruslan Pukhov, director of Moscow-based military think tank 
CAST, argues that “‘Soft power’ doesn’t work for us. We need people to be afraid of us and we 
seem to be unable to find a proper substitute for military power” (Grove 2011). Likewise, a well-
known Russian analyst Sergei Karaganov (2009) writes that Russia “has to make emphasis on 
‘hard power’, including military force,” because “it has little ‘soft power’.”  
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PART 3. THE “COMMON NEIGHBOURHOOD” STATES AND 
GREAT POWER RIVALRIES  
 
Chapter 3.1. States with Relatively Strong State Autonomy: The Case of 
Belarus  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter, along with the following chapter, complements the discussion provided in 
the previous part which described the geopolitical nature of the Russia – West rivalries over the 
“common neighbourhood” countries and the use of soft power by the conflicting sides in the 
pursuit of their regional goals. Focusing on the case of Belarus, the chapter analyses the response 
of the regional countries to these rivalries. The chapter aims to test the hypothesis that if the leaders 
of a weak state, which is in between the rivalries of great powers who use soft power to expand 
their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis the society and other internal non-state actors, they can 
control the inflow of the soft power projection of the foreign states, offset the intervening influence 
of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy making, and augment their chances to more 
prudently and independently follow the imperatives of the international political system. 
Belarus, a Slavic country situated in the geographically strategic location between Russia 
and the EU, gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since 1994, the country has 
been led by Aleksander Lukashenko. He has amassed extensive control over the internal and 
external policies of the country by neutralizing oppositional forces and civil society. Since the 
early years of its independence, Belarus has remained Russia’s closest ally in the region. However, 
according to its constitution, the state declares itself neutral in international relations and has 
invariably strived to preserve its sovereignty. The willingness and attempts of the surrounding 
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great powers (i.e. Russia and the West) to pull Belarus into their orbit and the country’s economic 
dependence on its northern neighbour (i.e. Russia) have complicated its international relations and 
restricted the possibilities it has to manoeuvre.  
Belarus is of immeasurable geopolitical importance for Russia, inter alia due to its 
geographic proximity to Russia’s important regions and its location between Russia and NATO 
countries. Over the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has spared no efforts 
to maintain warm relations with Belarus and preserve its control over Minsk’s foreign policies. To 
this purpose, Moscow has invested a large sum of resources, including a huge amount of subsidies 
which, according to former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, accounted for $50 billion154 
between 1990-2009.155 Russia has also launched a number of projects to address the Belarusian 
people and wield soft power in the country. However, Russia has mostly worked with the 
Belarusian governing elite because of, on the one hand, the impediments the Lukashenko regime 
builds before the external soft power projection and, on the other hand, the already widespread 
attachment of the Belarusians to Russia. 
For many years, the European Union, in line with its broader neighbourhood policies, tried 
to extend its external governance to Belarus through democratic reforms in the country. The 
rapprochement of Belarus with the EU would boost the geopolitical leverage of the Union with 
respect to Russia. The detachment of the country from Russia’s orbit would deal a crushing blow 
to Russia’s geopolitical stance and preclude its integration plans. Likewise, the United States tried 
to build a relationship with Belarusian civil society and help the pro-Western political forces to 
come to power in the country. The fact that military power could not be deployed towards these 
goals, both the EU and the USA tried for many years to reach them via soft power policies. 
                                                 
154 RT (2009), “Everything’s ready for Customs Union” – Medvedev,” available at: 
https://www.rt.com/politics/official-word/medvedev-belarus-media/ (accessed: 16 January 2017).  
155 Some experts suggest higher figures about the amount of subsidies from Russia to Belarus. Alachnovič (2015), 
referring to the findings of the Economic Institute of the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences, pointed out that 
Russian subsidies had accounted for around 15% of Belarusian GDP annually. If Russia had imposed the prices gas 
exports to Belarus at the same level as the prices on gas exported to Poland, it would have costed $4.2 billion to 
Belarusian economy per a year (ibid.). 
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However, the Lukashenko regime’s relentless crackdown on independent voices has left no 
chances to Western powers to affect his policies through influencing domestic non-state actors.  
This chapter will discuss the role of domestic non-state actors in shaping Belarus’s foreign 
policy orientation and Minsk’s interactions with the surrounding great powers. The geopolitical 
context Belarus has existed in since the early years of its independence is presented in the first 
section coming after this introductory part. The following section will analyse the autonomy 
Belarusian leaders have wielded with respect to the general public and other non-state actors since 
the country gained independence but particularly during the period between 2004 and 2016. This 
section will be followed by a wider discussion on the power of the West and Russia wielded over 
public opinion in Belarus. The section is divided into two parts providing a separate take on 
Western and Russian soft power.  In its final section before the conclusion, the chapter will explore 
the attitude of the Belarusians towards the two geopolitical poles (i.e. Russia and West) and their 
role in the formation of the country’s foreign policy orientation. The concluding part will 
summarize the major findings of the chapter in the light of the hypotheses presented in the 
beginning of the thesis. 
 
3.1.1. Belarus between the West and Russia  
 
Belarus is the only Eastern Partnership (EaP) country whose Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) with the European Union (signed in 1995) never came into force. The decision 
to isolate Minsk in protest of the authoritarian build-up of President Aleksandr Lukashenko 
adopted by the EU and the USA in the early years of Lukashenko’s reign defined the framework 
of bilateral relations between the West and Belarus for the years to come. In 2004, the EU adopted 
sanctions on high-ranking representatives of the government (including President Lukashenko) 
and other persons who were blamed for undermining democracy in Belarus and human rights 
abuses. The sanctions consisted of travel bans and orders to freeze their assets at European banks. 
Similar sanctions were imposed by the United States, as well. In 2004, following the controversial 
referendum that lifted limits on presidential terms, the United States adopted the Belarus 
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Democracy Act that prohibited, with limited exceptions, any form of assistance to Belarus. 
European and American leaders underscored the significance of cooperation with and support to 
the pro-democracy forces in Belarus (Shepherd 2006). The meeting between the US Secretary 
Condoleezza Rice and the Belarusian democracy activists in Vilnius in 2005 – amidst the popular 
uprisings in the wider region – was therefore remarkably symbolic.  
President Lukashenko’s unbending rejection of the criticism of the Western community 
strictly restricted the foreign policy options of the Belarusian leadership and pushed Minsk towards 
Russia economically and politically (Rontoyanni 2005: 47). Initially, Lukashenko attempted to 
establish a Union State with Russia and to take leadership of the new state. During the years of 
President Yeltsin, the sides made significant steps towards the Union, and the two states ratified 
the foundational treaty in early 2000, guaranteeing labour rights in both countries, removing border 
controls, and laying the foundation for the unification of legislation and the creation of a single 
economic space and single currency. Belarus has been a founding member in most integration 
projects initiated by Moscow, including the Customs Union, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Union.   
Meanwhile, relations between Belarus and the West remained at a diplomatic impasse. The 
EU and the USA demonstrated an absolute aversion to Minsk’s Russia-leaning policies. Although 
Lukashenko offered cooperation on many occasions, he never received a positive response. 
Western leaders drew explicit parallels between Lukashenko and Middle Eastern leaders who had 
been overthrown in the course of the “Arab spring.”156  Some of them publicly spoke about the 
necessity of a government change in Minsk (Marples 2005: 895). Imposing financial sanctions and 
travel restrictions on Belarus, spending millions of dollars in aid to support the NGOs and 
independent media in the country, and thus basically seeking a regime change in and external 
governance over Belarus (Lynch 2005: 8; Myers 2006), the Western community has alienated 
Lukashenko in a way no other authoritarian regime in the “common neighbourhood” has ever 
experienced. Grigory Ioffi (2003: 1011; 2004; 2013) counts the frustration of the Western leaders 
                                                 
156 Deutsche Welle (2011), “Poland leads nations in raising millions for Belarus opposition,” available at: 
http://www.dw.com/en/poland-leads-nations-in-raising-millions-for-belarus-opposition/a-14811938 (accessed: 14 
January 2017).   
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in their expectations over the geopolitical reorientation of Belarus as a major reason for the rather 
critical attitude towards Lukashenko which remains unparalleled in the post-Soviet world.     
In the aftermath of the failure of the Belarusian opposition in the 2006 elections, in which 
Western powers expended massive amount of resources on civil society and anti-Lukashenko 
forces, the approach of the West to the Lukashenko regime began to gradually change (Ioffe 2011; 
Vieira 2014a). This was also affected by growing disputes between Belarus and Russia over energy 
prices (Ioffe 2013) and Belarus’s implicit support for Georgia following the 2008 war (Padhol et 
al. 2011: 3-4). Against this backdrop, relations between Belarus and Western powers improved: 
Belarus was invited to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (2009) and visited by senior NATO officials 
after a long standstill (2008). This rapprochement persisted, in varying degrees, in the following 
years, as well. However, the Belarusian leadership never strictly changed its pro-Russian 
alignment in its external sphere.  
Belarus, in return for its Russia-leaning geopolitical choice, insisted on discounts on the 
import of fuel and energy resources, demanding the prices found on the internal Russian market. 
On the one hand, it looked for alternative energy sources (from Venezuela and Azerbaijan) to 
decrease its energy dependence on Russia (Čajčyc 2010), on the other hand pressed Russia to keep 
the energy prices low and remove restrictions on trade. Lukashenko himself, on several occasions, 
reiterated that if Russia didn’t meet these expectations, Minsk “[would] not be able to stay in the 
Customs Union, since we would not see any economic benefits from it” (Bohdan 2013). Siarhei 
Bohdan (2013) reported that: 
“Since 2011, Belarus has been importing duty-free Russian oil to reproduce at its own 
refineries. These petroleum products partly are sold to third countries. For these exports, 
Minsk pays duties directly to the Russian state budget: in 2012 - $3.8bn, in 2011 – $3.07bn. 
Meanwhile, Minsk believes that Moscow should not demand this money from them as 
Russia owes Belarus something for being its close ally.”  
Although Lukashenko fought to extract as many benefits as possible from Russia in return 
for being its geopolitical ally, he also dealt responsibly with the task of preserving the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of his country. He never allowed Russia to transform Belarus into another 
autonomous republic of the Russian Federation. Belarus’s approach to Russia and its integration 
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projects was primarily driven by economic interests. Unlike the Kazakhstan leader Nazarbayev, 
Lukashenko did not demonstrate any affinity with the Eurasian ideology or the Russian World 
concept, either. The form of Belarus’s approach to its relations with Russia is characterized by 
some observers as “sovereignty entrepreneurship,” that means “the extraction of rents in the form 
of energy subsidies and credits in return for loyalty, or through the threat of a reorientation away 
from Russia” (Nice 2012: 7). Thus, it responds to Russia’s attempts to reduce subsidies by 
threatening to make changes in its choice of partners in foreign sphere. Against this background, 
Nice (2012: 1) detects a continuity in Lukashenko’s foreign policy: “the consolidation of 
Belarusian statehood and identity as an independent state.” 
The Lukashenko regime sees the Russian and Western approach to Belarus in the same 
context in which each of them seeks to influence the internal structure of the country and establish 
external governance over it through coercion and incentives (Nice 2012). Ioffe (2015) has 
identified three reasons that have allowed Lukashenko to adroitly manoeuvre in this hostile 
international context: the absence of a strong cultural divide in the Belarusian population, the 
existence of a consolidated political elite, and the absence of oligarchic power centres. These 
factors played important roles for Lukashenko to strengthen his domestic autonomy. Unlike 
Ukraine, where these three elements were the opposite, Belarus attained the ability to play the 
external great powers against each other, follow the imperatives of the international political 
system and sustain a favourable foreign policy course. Belarus has on various occasions 
demonstrated that it does not trust the Kremlin in most security issues. For example, it is due to 
this fact that despite Moscow’s offers and pressure, Belarus never recognized the independence of 
Georgia’s breakaway territories.157 Minsk has gradually sought more diversification in foreign 
policy and more intense ties with the West in order to balance Russia’s influence over the country, 
particularly in the wake of Crimea’s annexation (Vieira 2014b). To overhaul its image of “the last 
dictator of Europe,” in recent years Lukashenko eased the clampdown on his opponents in 
domestic politics. Belarus did not recognize the Russia-organized referendum’s results in Crimea. 
                                                 
157 According to Wikileaks, in 2009, Lukashenko’s Former Chief of Staff, Vladimir Makei told the EU ambassadors 
that Moscow had offered Minsk a loan in return of the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent 
states (Bolkunets 2017). 
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Lukashenko criticized the annexation as a “dangerous precedent” in the post-Soviet space 
(Bogutsky 2015: 91). He, along with Nazarbayev, resisted Russia’s attempts to adopt anti-
Ukrainian restrictive measures within the Eurasian Economic Community.  
Against this background, bilateral relations between Moscow and Minsk deteriorated and 
anti-Lukashenko statements swelled in Russia. The Russian media questioned the independence 
of Belarus, portrayed it as a natural part of Russia, began to discuss the possibility of a Western-
orchestrated Euromaidan-style upheaval in Belarus and highlighted the importance of Russia’s 
ability to intervene and prevent such a “colour revolution” (Čajčyc 2015; Fedirka 2016; Pankovski 
2016; Yeliseyeu et al. 2016). Simultaneously, contacts between Minsk and Western capitals 
intensified and the sides embarked on negotiatians to build cooperation in the field of technology, 
economy and security (Fedirka 2016). The visits of Pentagon officials and the EU Commissioner 
for the European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (2015) to Belarus for the 
first time after a long period signified a rapprochement between the sides. Despite the fact that 
there was not any substantial change in the political system and in the situation of human rights in 
the country, the EU, citing the release of some political prisoners as a sign of improvement and 
underscoring the need to encourage the Belarusian government for further democratic 
advancement, even permanently lifted the sanctions imposed on 170 individuals, including 
Lukashenko in early 2016 (Rankin 2016). Minsk’s policies and Lukashenko’s statements since the 
Ukraine crisis broke out indicate that Belarus was interested in the increasing involvement of 
Western powers in the post-Soviet region as a move to counterbalance Russia’s influence and to 
ensure that Belarus would not become the next battleground between Russia and West. This 
intention was particularly clear in Lukashenko’s interview with Bloomberg where he stated that: 
“The most worrying thing [about the Ukraine crisis] is that the United States hasn’t been 
openly involved in this process. I believe that there would be no stability in Ukraine without 
the Americans.”158 
                                                 
158 Bloomberg (2015), “We Are a Long Way from Peace in Ukraine: Lukashenko,” available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-04-02/we-are-a-long-way-from-peace-in-ukraine-lukashenko 
(accessed: 10 February 2017).  
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 However, despite this flirting with the West, Lukashenko’s Belarus remains dependent on 
and loyal to Russia and the prospects for a fundamental change in this respect are rather low. 
Although Belarusian leaders verbally criticize Russia’s foreign policy, the transfer of this criticism 
into tangible deeds has been limited. For example, although they have, on several occasions, 
expressed their support for Ukraine and its territorial integrity, Belarus never joined the countries 
recognizing Crimea’s entry into the Russian Federation as “annexation” (Pankovski 2016). Allison 
Fedirka (2016) is, to a large extent, right in arguing that “Belarus remains an unofficial Russian 
region, whether it wants to be or not.” 
 
3.1.2. State Autonomy Vis-à-vis Non-State Actors 
 
The influence of non-state players on the domestic and foreign policies of the Belarusian 
government had been already strictly limited when the first wave of the “colour revolutions” set 
foot on the post-Soviet space. In 2004, Belarus had already developed a “state ideology” devoting 
the country to the “Eastern European Civilisation” and rejecting Western liberal values (Zurawski 
vel Grajewski 2005: 89). President Lukashenko had already, through a manipulated popular vote, 
secured the right to run for an indefinite number of terms and consolidated power in his own hands. 
He had also nationalized around 80% of the economy (Lawson 2003: 127).  The Lukashenko 
regime was also receiving assistance from the Kremlin in developing “counter-revolutionary 
technologies” and appropriate preventive measures (Wilson 2011: 209). However, the 
unanticipated success of the popular uprisings across the region urged the Lukashenko regime to 
take even more measures to further diminish the power of non-state domestic actors and prevent 
the import of a colour revolution into his “kingdom.” All the NGOs whose agenda were at odds 
with that of the government encountered its consequences - mass media was suppressed in a way 
akin to the repressive years of the Soviet times, and ordinary people who publicly protested the 
policies of the regime were intimidated in various ways.  
In the wake of the “colour revolutions” in neighbouring countries, the Belarusian 
authorities unleashed a massive campaign against independent non-governmental institutions. In 
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2003-2004, Belarus shut down more than 50 NGOs for fabricated (mostly technical) reasons, 
forced others to self-liquidate, and adopted new regulations to make it practically impossible for 
NGOs with undesirable agendas to be registered (Silitski 2005: 31). In the course of this campaign, 
Viasna 96, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, Varuta, Civic Initiatives, Ratusha, Vezha and tens 
of other independent NGOs were forcibly closed down. Jarabik (2006: 88) reported that “as of 
2005, thus, virtually no independent civil society organization remained registered in Belarus.”  In 
the course of these preventive measures, the independent media in the country was brought to the 
edge of “virtual extinction,” while state media was provided with more support (Silitski 2005: 32). 
In two years (2003-2004), 34 newspapers were forced to stop working (ibid.). The access of the 
opposition politicians to the official media was totally blocked.  
The fact that the Lukashenko regime was remarkably successful in economic issues 
compared to other former Soviet states was often mentioned as one of the primary factors that 
created conditions for the silent acceptance of his authoritarianism by the general public (Ioffe 
2004; 2007; Korosteleva 2012: 48-49). Unlike many other post-Soviet countries, under 
Lukashenko’s leadership Belarus was able to sustain most of the achievements the country made 
during Soviet times. The Belarusian GDP in 1999 was 83.6% of its 1991 level with the second 
smallest decline among the CIS countries (Ioffe 2004: 91).  The country recorded consistent 
economic growth for 15 years (1996-2010) at an average annual rate of around 7% (Yarashevich 
2014: 1703-1704), which was possible thanks to the low cost of energy from Russia (Vanderhill 
2014: 275-276; Alachnovič 2015). Belarus also stands out in the post-Soviet space for its low 
levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality (ibid.). Amidst the spread of the “colour 
revolutions” in the neighbourhood, the number of Belarusians who said in a poll that the economic 
provision of their families was very good, good, or middle amounted to 56%, while this figure was 
less than 30% in Ukraine at that time (Petuxov 2004: 5).  
Very much like its external policies, the internal policies of the Lukashenko regime also 
demonstrated a remarkable continuity in the period under study (2004 – 2016).  Over the years, 
the crackdown on any form of anti-governmental protest persisted and increased. Belarus has been 
continuously rated as a “not free” country by Freedom House since 1996. As a result of the 
crackdown on independent media and civil society organizations, the leaders of the opposition 
parties remain unknown and unsupported in Belarus. This helps the regime survive even amidst 
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economic downturns. In 2009, when the Belarusian economy was in decline in the wake of the 
global financial crisis, a survey concluded that the majority of respondents would vote for 
Lukashenko (39.2%) and not for opposition leaders (Alaksandar Milinkevich (former presidential 
candidate) – 4.4%, Alyaksandr Kazulin (former presidential candidate and political prisoner) – 
2.3%, Sergei Sidorski (the Prime Minister) – 1.6%) (Marples 2009: 761).  In 2012, Alex Nice 
(2012: 12) reported that:  
“The opposition remains unknown to the broader population, civil society is undeveloped 
and horizontal linkages are weak… Operating any kind of grassroots campaign in the 
context of a police-state is extremely difficult.” 
 
3.1.3. Non-State Actors under the Influence of External Powers 
 
3.1.3.1. Non-State Actors under the Influence of Russian Soft Power 
 
Russia and Belarus share a history that dates back to the middle ages. The formation of the 
cultural and societal characteristics of the latter have been continuously affected by the former. 
The transformation of Belarus from a weak agricultural region into the industrial hub of the entire 
Soviet Union under Moscow’s rule further connected the Belarusian population to Russia. These 
bonds did not fade in the post-Soviet era, and, quite the contrary, were reinforced under the 
russification policies of the Lukashenko regime. The deep, inter-societal links between Belarus on 
the one hand, Russia and other post-Soviet countries on the other hand is a major reason often 
mentioned for the perseverance of pro-Russian sentiments in Belarusian society (White et al. 
2014). The two societies are so interconnected that a public polling concluded that for 80% of 
Belarusians Russia is not even viewed as a foreign country (Ioffe 2013: 1267). The visa-free travel 
between the two countries helps maintain the bonds between the two nations alive. More than 70% 
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of the 34,801 Belarusian students abroad in 2014 studied in Russia.159 Not surprisingly, during the 
period under study, the number of Belarusian migrant workers in Russia was approximately ten 
times higher than that of those who emigrated to the EU (Popescu et al. 2009b: 34). A public 
polling carried out in 2011 likewise proves the remarkable strength of this bond between Belarus 
and Russia:    
“More than half (54%) of our Belarusian respondents, in 2011, had at least one close 
relative living in Russia, and 42% had at least one close relative living in one of the other 
post-Soviet republics. Twenty years after independence, this was also where most of our 
respondents had travelled. More than three-quarters (76%) had visited Russia, and nearly 
as many (72%) had visited Ukraine; substantial numbers had also visited Poland (37%) or 
one of the Baltic republics, such as Lithuania (36%). But fewer than 5% had visited 
Hungary, and only 3% had ever visited the USA” (White et al. 2014: 3). 
The Belarusian language was severely marginalized under the Soviet regime. The number 
of Belarusians speaking and studying in their native language continuously decreased during those 
years. In early 1989, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic had the highest number of people 
who spoke only Russian (29,9%) or spoke fluently in Russian (over 50%) within the Soviet Union 
(Ryder 2002: 137). In that year, no major Belarusian cities had Belarusian-language schools 
(Ryder 2002: 137) – a stark decline in less than 40 years: 95% of Belarussian schools operated in 
the native language in 1955 (Astapenia 2016). At the time of Soviet collapse, only 20% of 
Belarusian pupils were studying in Belarusian. The proportion of these pupils declined to 13,7% 
towards the end of 2016, when only 0,1% of university students studied in Belarusian (Astapenia 
2016). More than 80% of the published books are in the Russian language in Belarus (Astapenia 
2014). The Belarusian constitution recognizes the Russian language as an official language along 
with the Belarusian language. But Belarusian is rarely used at the official level.160  
                                                 
159 UNESCO Statistics, available at: http://data.uis.unesco.org/# (accessed: 30 March 2017).  
160 Despite the lamentable situation of the Belarusian language, in recent years there are signs that its usage is 
expanding amongst both the population and at official meetings, religious ceremonies, schools, art galleries, etc. (Stern 
2014; Vasilevich 2016: 177). The government has also started to show more support for the revival of the nation’s 
language (Ioffe 2014). However, observers note that increasing government support might be simply aimed at 
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Over the years of co-existence and thanks to ethnic, religious, and linguistic proximity 
Russia has acquired various channels to project its power over Belarus and to transfer its soft power 
into tangible state policies. Its soft power outlets are distinguishably stronger in Belarus than those 
of Western powers. The approach of the state towards Russian soft power projection was also 
significantly friendlier than it was towards that of the West. For Lukashenko, who opted for Soviet 
ideology as the ideological foundation of his regime from the very beginning of his power, the 
Russian cultural influence was more acceptable than the Western or even national ones. This was 
why while allowing the Russian soft power instruments to more freely operate in Belarus, he 
strictly restricted the activities of the groups and organizations who promoted national or Western 
culture. For example, Belarusian (Civil Society Platform) National Platform complained that:  
“The Russian propaganda mass media are being broadcast without restrictions, while the 
values connected with the Belarusian people’s identity, i.e. the Belarusian language, 
culture, and historical memory, still have no state institutional support and remain 
marginalized.”161 
Nevertheless, it is often noted by some observers that, “until now Moscow was unable to 
build a serious pro-Russian political movement” in Belarus.162  According to some, it has been so 
due to the lesser incentives of the Russian leaders to develop pro-Russian civil society 
organizations in Belarus (Vanderhill 2014: 270; Astapenia 2014). As the Kremlin enjoys closer 
links to the Belarusian government, they are more successful in imposing more direct influence on 
the Lukashenko regime than in reaching out to and developing pro-Russian civil society 
institutions (Vanderhill 2014: 270). The fact that there is only one cultural centre (in the city of 
Brest) of the Ruskiy Mir Foundation in Belarus, which was established in 2014 — much later than 
                                                 
preventing the extinction of the Belarusian language, rather than reviving it and overtaking the Russian language 
(Astapenia 2016).  
161 Centre for European Transformation (2015), “The statement of the Belarusian National Platform on the eve of the 
EaP Summit in Riga,” available at:  https://cet.eurobelarus.info/en/news/2015/05/19/the-statement-of-the-belarusan-
national-platform-on-the-eve-of.html (accessed: 10 February 2017).  
162 Belarusinfocus, (2016), “The Kremlin is using soft power to ensure pro-Russian moods in Belarus,” available at: 
http://belarusinfocus.info/p/7206 (accessed: 27 January 2016).  
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many other such centres in other former Soviet countries — also indicates the unwillingness of the 
Russian officials to invest substantial resources in soft power policies concerning Belarus. This 
has been equally, if not more, affected by the limited political environment for the activities of the 
non-state actors in Belarus. Russia probably would have liked to develop strong pro-Russian 
movements in Belarus considering the long-term perspectives and possible internal shake-up in 
the post-Lukashenko period.  
One of the assets of the Russian government used to wield power over popular opinion in 
Belarus is religion. The Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC) is a branch of the Russian Orthodox 
Church (ROC). The two churches are administratively connected. The former is under the 
jurisdiction of the latter and thus depends on its cultural and ecclesiological settings (Vasilevich 
2014). Although other churches face continuous legal and bureaucratic impediments, the Orthodox 
Church, under the tutelage of the government, operates at a larger scale and disseminates pro-
Russian sentiments (Vasilevich 2016). However, in line with other non-governmental institutions, 
the activities of the BOC are also required to be registered by governmental agencies. The 
unauthorized activities of the BOC are usually persecuted (Vasilevich 2014: 9). The BOC is a 
substantial influencing tool in Belarus, considering that 63.5% of the Belarusian population define 
themselves as believers, 83% as supporters of the Orthodox religion (Vasilevich 2016: 172).    
President Lukashenko started to subjugate state media and imposed strict restrictions on 
independent media from the very beginning of his reign (Eke 2002; Sahm 2009; Szostek 2015). 
However, the Russian media was not banned from Belarusian media space - quite the contrary, it 
was “allowed and facilitated” to realize the cross-border flow of news from Russia to the 
Belarusian audience (Szostek 2015: 2). Belarus and Russia came to terms on the establishment of 
a “single information space” (yedinoye or obshcheye informatsionnoye prostranstvo) and thus 
provided unrestricted access to the same news providers. Szostek (2015: 2) has found that the two 
most widely read newspapers by Belarusians are Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii and 
Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii which are subsidiaries of the Moscow-based tabloids 
Komsomolskaya Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty. He (ibid.) reports that a similar situation exists in 
the television sector as well: “In the period under study [i.e. during the second half of 2010], three 
of Belarus’s major state-owned TV channels [ONT (Obshchenatsionalnoye televideniye), RTR-
Belarus, NTV-Belarus] had line-ups based wholly or substantially on Russian made content.” 
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Besides, as Russian TV channels produce programmes with higher standards than Belarusian local 
TV channels, they are widely watched across the country. The online media is also dominated by 
Russian internet outlets: Russian internet pages are much more popular in Belarus than local 
ones.163 Alas, Russian dominates Belarus’s information space. 
Usually the narratives of the Russian broadcasters have been in line with the official 
narratives of the Lukashenko regime. That is the reason why the Russian media has not been driven 
out of the country. However, from time to time, especially when there were disputes between the 
governments of the two countries, Russian media broadcasted programmes critical of 
Lukashenko’s policies. Thus, media was not always used by Russia as a tool to garner attraction 
amongst Belarusians for Russia, but it also aimed to “elicit aggravation” occasionally (Szostek 
2015). In order to minimize the hostile influence of the Russian media, Lukashenko reduced the 
number of Russian newspapers available in Belarus. Local transmitters of Russian TV channels 
(ONT, NTVBelarus and RTR-Belarus) dropped unwanted content from their broadcasting and 
introduced increasingly more domestically produced content along with programmes produced in 
Russia (ibid.). The transmission of Russian channels via cable network has been also complicated 
by local producers. As a result, Szostek (2015: 3) reports that for most of the population the three 
local re-broadcasting channels “are now the only platforms where Russian TV news can be 
watched.” 
 
3.1.3.2.      Non-State Actors under the Influence of Western Soft Power  
 
The domestic propaganda campaigns of the Lukashenko regime have been, to some extent, 
successful in countering the self-projection of Western countries. The regime’s massive use of 
propaganda has managed to blur the perception of the Belarusian population about the 
neighbouring Western countries (Raik 2006b: 173). The surveys indicate that over the years under 
                                                 
163 Gemius Global (2016), “Youth on the net,” available at: https://www.gemius.com/agencies-news/youth-on-the-
net.html (accessed: 12 February 2017).   
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this regime, the number of Belarusian people who considered the life standards of the neighbouring 
EU countries as lower than in Belarus gradually rose. For example, Manaev (2006: 41) reports that 
between 2004 and 2006 the percentage of people who considered the living standards of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland as higher than in Belarus plummeted from 24% to 12%. In 2009, Giselle 
Bosse (2009: 215) observed that: 
“Whereas the European Union (EU) has had some effect on political and economic reforms 
in the Ukraine and Moldova, it almost completely failed to impress the regime and 
population of Belarus.” 
The state-managed projection of Western powers also encountered interruptions 
deliberately posed by the Belarusian authorities. The contacts between Western 
(non)governmental groups engaged in the promotion of democracy and Belarusian civil society 
groups became strictly restricted under Lukashenko. Kowalski (2008: 189) reports that: 
“Legislative changes adopted after the presidential elections of 2001, and later after the 
“Orange revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, made the scope for the development in a standard, 
legal manner of formal co-operation between local NGOs and their partners abroad almost 
impossible. Even those organisations that can still work within the legal framework in 
Belarus are not allowed to receive financial support from abroad or to organise events with 
international participation on the territory of Belarus.” 
Referring to the United States as a “dark force” that seeks to destabilize Belarus (Finn 
2006), Lukashenko resisted American pressure which he called “stupid,” “immoral,” and “unfair” 
(Kudrytski et al. 2004). Belarusian authorities manipulated the financial assistance of Western 
powers and prevented it from going to anti-government forces in Belarus. This has paralyzed the 
agenda of Western non-governmental organizations whose priorities are the promotion of 
democracy and human rights. For example, Balazs Jarabik (2006: 86) notes that the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was not allowed to provide effective support 
to democracy groups and was forced by governmental structures to deal with non-political issues 
(e.g. children’s rights). This was one of the most important factors that distinguished Belarus from 
Ukraine and Moldova, where democratic reforms were being conducted by the government and 
thus supported by the EU (Raik 2006b: 170).  
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US government assistance to Belarus is formed in the frame of “selective engagement,” 
which confines assistance almost exceptionally to humanitarian assistance, educational exchange 
programmes, independent civil society and media institutions. From 1997, the International 
Republican Institute (IRI) was involved in programmes addressing political parties in Belarus. The 
Institute, with the financial backing of USAID, offered training for political parties in 2001-2002 
(Vanderhill 2014: 273). Afterwards it began to provide trainings to pro-democracy forces in 
developing campaign messages and strategies (ibid.). Similarly, the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) provided support to political groups in mobilizing voters and building pro-
democracy political party coalitions (ibid.). In the wake of the regional “colour revolutions,” prior 
to the 2006 presidential elections, which proved to be the last chance for regime change in Belarus 
for a long time, this assistance gained momentum. Many Western agencies (e.g. the National 
Endowment for Democracy, its British counterpart called the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy, the Foreign Ministry of Germany, and the US Department of State) and a large amount 
of financial resources were involved in this process. The US Secretary Condoleezza Rice met with 
some Belarusian NGO leaders in 2005. In the same year, a supplementary assistance bill gave a 
democracy assistance allotment worth $5 million earmarked for Belarusian political parties, civil 
society, independent media, radio and TV channels (Jarabik 2006: 89). For 2006 and 2007, the 
amount of this assistance sharply rose to $24 million (ibid.).  The amount of EU assistance to 
Belarus was raised from $10 million annually to an annual $12 million for 2005 and 2006 (Jarabik 
2006: 90). The EU member states supported the Belarusian democratic forces separately as well.  
For example, Swedish assistance to Belarus amounted to $3 million in 2005 and $4 million in 
2006, of which around half was earmarked to civil society (Raik 2006b: 176).  
The information space, since the early years of the Lukashenko reign, has been also an 
important part of the Western soft power projection to Belarus. The New York Times reported that 
a German organization, Media Consulta, signed a $2.4 million contract with the EU “to break an 
information blockade that has left most Belarussians isolated from, and ignorant about, even 
neighboring countries” (Myers 2006). Besides, Belarusian civil society leaders visited their 
Ukrainian and Serbian counterparts in their respective countries to learn about their experiences 
(Korosteleva 2012: 38). They were also visited by members of Ukrainian and Georgian civil 
society organizations (Markus 2010: 122).  
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In those years, there were several movements in Belarus that were heavily supported by 
the West. For example, Zubr, one of the three Belarusian youth movements in the early 2000s, 
whose manners and rationale were analogous to the other youth movements in Serbia (Otpor), 
Ukraine (Pora), and Georgia (Kmara), was reported by various sources as having received 
financial backing from the West. Andrew Wilson (2011: 2015) cites an interview with a former 
NGO leader who argues that: “Zubr was always more ‘externally inspired. Its activities were 
mainly based on money from US foundations.’ But ‘US money was destructive in the long term. 
When the flow of money ended, they [Zubr] disappeared.’” The other two youth movements – 
Khopits! (‘Enough!’) and the Youth Front – were less organized but still supported by the Western 
agencies (Myers 2006; Wilson 2011: 215-216).  
However, following the failure of the opposition in the 2006 presidential elections, the 
Belarusian leaders further silenced the independent voices. In 2009, according to the observation 
of some Western experts, “There… [was] no longer the slightest possibility of some form of 
‘colour’ revolution in Belarus: the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, in different ways, hardly foster 
enthusiasm for such a cause, and the Europeans… [had] evidently abandoned such an idea (along 
with isolation of the Lukashenka regime) as failed plans” (Marples 2009: 774). The failure of pro-
democracy forces in spite of massive external support made Western powers understand that 
regime change in Belarus through popular upheaval was improbable for the time being. They 
began to make changes in their approach to Lukashenko and reduced their assistance to anti-
governmental non-state actors in Belarus (Ioffe 2011). Prior to the 2010 elections, some Western 
Foreign Ministers visited Minsk. Lukashenko himself paid a visit to Lithaunia whose president 
Dalia Grybauskaite “endorsed him as the most suitable candidate for the presidency of Belarus” 
(Padhol et al. 2011: 3).  The diminishing Western intervention allowed Lukashenko to hold the 
2010 and 2015 presidential elections in a less oppressive environment.  In early 2016, the EU lifted 
sanctions that had been imposed in 2004 and began to normalize relations with Minsk.  
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3.1.4. Non-State Actors and External Alignment 
 
The previous sections indicated that the Lukashenko regime has effectively minimized the 
influence of civil society organizations on the formation of not only internal but also external 
policies. However, public opinion polls show that the external orientation of the state is in line 
with the preferences of the general public. Certainly, the elements of Russia’s self-projection, the 
domestic propaganda of the Belarusian government and Russia’s state-managed projection have 
played an enormous role in the formation of these preferences. The entrenched cultural attachment 
of the Belarusians to Russia, shared history, linguistic and economic bonds in combination with 
the pro-Russian cultural and political stance of the Lukashenko regime have minimized the 
chances of pro-Western groups to bring about substantial changes in the country.    
The results of the public opinion polls carried out between 2004 and 2016 by the 
Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), a public institution based 
in Lithuania (indicated in Figure 4) demonstrate that when Russia is in an intense confrontation 
with the West, supporters for closer relations with Russia (i.e. unification) tend to outnumber those 
who support European integration. Between 2004 and 2008, when pro-Western groups were 
marching “colour revolutions” across the post-Soviet world and later Russia was engaged in a war 
with Georgia, Belarusians appeared more Russia-leaning. In this period, the majority reported they 
would choose integration with Russia rather than joining the EU in a hypothetical referendum on 
the either/or question between Russia and the European Union (see, Figure 4). The difference was 
notable in a 2008 survey as well: 46% of respondents preferred integration with Russia to the EU 
integration (30%) in response to the question “If you had to choose between Belarusian 
reunification with Russia and integration with the EU, which would you go for?” (Ioffe 2013: 
1269). Over the period between 2000 and 2010, the number of Belarusians who self-identified as 
“European” declined as well (White et al. 2010).   
A similar tendency was noticed in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. While in the 2013 polling, 
the ratio between accession to the EU and integration with Russia in a hypothetical referendum on 
the either/or question was 45% vs. 37%, this ratio changed to the opposite in the following year 
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(34% vs. 45%).  The trend continued in the next two years as well: 2015 – 25% vs. 53%; 2016 – 
34% vs. 42% (see, Figure 4). The upward changes in public support for an alignment with Russia 
during the confrontational periods can be interpreted as evidence for the strength of anti-Western 
propaganda in Russian media which, as the previous sections showed, gets intensified when Russia 
is in a face-off with the West. However, the outcomes of the public opinion polls show that when 
Russia – West relations were at ease (2009-2013), Belarusians tended to be more supportive of 
European integration (see, Figure 4). For example, in the 2011 poll, half of the respondents said 
that they would vote for accession to the EU in a hypothetical referendum posing the either/or 
question between Russia and the European Union, while only 31% chose unification with Russia.  
 
 
Figure 4. Support for EU integration and unification with Russia in the Belarussian society. The question 
in the surveys: “If you had to choose between integration with Russia and joining the European Union, 
what choice would you make?164  
 
                                                 
164 Detailed information about these surveys can be found in the internet page of Independent Institute of Socio-
Economic and Political Studies: http://www.iiseps.org/?lang=en   
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However, the public support to Belarus’s admission into the Transatlantic bloc has been 
always low amongst Belarusians. A survey in early the 2000s identified that NATO was considered 
“a significant threat” by most of the Belarusian population. 47% of the respondents defined NATO 
as either “a platform for Western expansion” or “a relic of the Cold War,” while for 22% its 
objective was the “strengthening of international security” and for 30% it was “hard” to portray 
NATO’s aims (White et al. 2006: 179). The same survey found that for just a minority in Belarus, 
the country’s admission into NATO would be “very good” (6% in 2000; 5% in 2004) or “quite 
good” (23% in 2000; 17% in 2004). A similar antipathy towards the transatlantic bloc was also 
seen in a survey by Gallup which indicated that 44% of respondents considered closer relations 
with Russia as important even if this entails harming relations with the United States (Esipova et 
al. 2008).  
This attitude towards NATO is still prevalent amongst Belarusians. 54% of Belarusians 
considered NATO a threat in a Gallup poll in 2016 (a mere 3% associated the alliance with 
protection).165 This was the second highest such result in the former Soviet countries after Russia, 
where 67% thought NATO was a threat.166 In June 2016, a public opinion poll in Belarus found 
that 26,1% of respondents supported Russia’s actions in its confrontation with the West over 
Ukraine and believed that Russia would protect Belarus “from possible NATO aggression.”167 The 
proportion of those who supported the West and trusted it as a potential ally in the case of possible 
Russian aggression was significantly lower: 10,6%. However, another major finding of this poll 
was that for most Belarusians (58%), it is more important to maintain neutrality between the two 
conflicting geopolitical centres.  
The growing preference for neutrality and for policies aimed at maintaining national 
sovereignty rather than making a clear-cut choice about the geopolitical poles amongst Belarusians 
                                                 
165 Gallup (2017) “Most NATO Members in Eastern Europe See It as Protection,” available at: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/203819/nato-members-eastern-europe-protection.aspx (accessed: 13 February 2017). 
166 Ibid. 
167 IISEPS (2016) “The Most Important Results of the Public Opinion Poll in June 2016,” available at: 
http://www.iiseps.org/?p=4699&lang=en (accessed: 12 February 2017).  
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has been noticed also in IISEPS surveys. The 2015 survey concluded that more people would vote 
“against” joining an external power in a hypothetical referendum.168 19.8% of respondents would 
vote “for” and 56.1% would vote “against” in a referendum on joining the European Union. The 
survey identified that a negative outcome would be produced also in a referendum on the 
unification of Belarus and Russia: 29.7% of respondents would vote “for” and 51.5% of 
respondents would vote “against.” This signified a steady decline from back in 2002, when the 
ratio was 53,8% to 26,3% in favour of unification with Russia (Ioffe 2013: 1268).  
Thus, for most of the time during the period under study, particularly when Russia found 
itself in a face-off with the West, the public support for pro-Russian alignment in the international 
sphere prevailed in Belarus. This has forced even Western-supported oppositional candidates to 
refrain from publicly favouring integration into Western blocs (Manaev 2006: 43). However, as 
Ralp Clem (2011: 795) suggests, it might be wrong to suppose that the official foreign policy 
orientation of the country has been formed entirely under the influence of these pro-Russian 
sentiments. Apparently, President Lukashenko can disregard public opinion when he thinks it 
necessary. For example, during the Georgia war and the Ukraine crisis, when public support for 
unification with Russia outweighed public support for European integration (see, Figure 4), 
Belarusian leaders in fact tried to counterbalance Russia’s pressure and looked into opportunities 
to approach the West. However, Belarusians’ pro-Russian sentiments and the disinterest of the 
public towards pro-Western foreign policy changes contributed to the failure of Western-supported 
political groups’ attempts to topple the incumbent regime. It is one of the major factors that secures 
the persistence of a pro-Russian geopolitical alignment. A Belarusian political analyst argues that 
“Belarusians’ addiction to Russian culture and media is in large part responsible for the nation’s 
political dependence on Russia and the geopolitical situation in Belarus” (Astapenia 2014).   
  
                                                 
168 IISEPS (2015) “The Most Important Results of the Public Opinion Poll in December 2015,” available at: 
http://www.iiseps.org/?p=3865&lang=en (accessed: 13 February 2017). 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter tested the hypothesis that if states that are subject to a geopolitical 
confrontation between external great powers, enjoy autonomy from domestic non-state actors, they 
can control foreign attempts to influence these non-state actors and augment their chances to follow 
the imperatives of the international political system more independently and potentially more 
prudently. The analysis of the chapter supported this hypothesis. During the period under study 
(2004-2016), Belarus’s foreign policy was formed under a vigilant consideration of the distribution 
of capabilities between the two geopolitical poles (i.e. the West and Russia). In this period, the 
imperatives derived from the distribution of capabilities between the two poles could easily 
transfer into certain state actions. The internal dynamics of the state did not pose a serious 
challenge for the government in foreign policy. The fact that the Russia-leaning external 
orientation of the state corresponded to stronger, pro-Russian sentiments amongst the Belarusian 
people minimized the countervailing influence of the public as an intervening variable between 
the international political system and foreign policy. The influence of independent media, civil 
society, non-governmental organizations and other groups was offset by the repressive policies of 
the government against these actors. The relatively homogenous internal cultural environment, the 
absence of antagonist ethnic divides within society, and the constant crackdown on unauthorized 
non-governmental groups are the major factors that weakened internal non-state actors as the 
intervening variable between the international political system and foreign policy.   
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Chapter 3.2. States with Relatively Weak State Autonomy: The Case of Ukraine 
 
Introduction 
  
This chapter, along with the preceding chapter, complements the discussion provided in 
the previous part which described the geopolitical nature of the Russia – West rivalries over the 
“common neighbourhood” countries and the use of soft power by the conflicting sides in the 
pursuit of their regional goals. The chapter, focusing on the case of Ukraine, aims to portray the 
response of regional countries to these rivalries and analyse the impact of the lack of strong state 
autonomy on foreign policy. The chapter’s purpose is to defend the argument that when leaders of 
states are not autonomous vis-à-vis domestic non-state actors, the latter become politically more 
influential with the potential of affecting foreign policies, mostly in a negative way. The non-
existence of strong state autonomy in such states allows the external powers to more effectively 
pursue policies to wield soft power there. This gives external powers the chance to impact the 
foreign policies of these states through influencing their domestic non-state actors and push a 
favourable reconfiguration in their geopolitical orientation which might be at odds with the 
national interests of the regional states.  
In the wake of the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine emerged as a geopolitical actor that 
had never existed before. For the first time in history, Ukrainian leaders gained control over both 
the Western and Eastern parts of the country, including the Crimean Peninsula that had been part 
of Russia until recently (1954). However, the leaders of the newly independent Ukraine soon found 
themselves in the middle of an intense geopolitical competition between Russia and West. A large 
number of internal problems – inter alia the country’s political instability, the incapability of the 
Ukrainian governments to properly deal with economic challenges, the uncontrollable influence 
of oligarchic groups on the political establishment and their influence in internal and external 
policies, the entrenched economic ties with and dependence on Russia, and against this background 
192 
 
an enormous cultural divide within society – dramatically complicated the political landscape of 
the country.  
From the Russian perspective, the geopolitical importance of Ukraine is immeasurable. The 
“encroachment” of rival powers into Ukraine has been always considered by the Kremlin as an 
existential threat.  This is why, from the very beginning of the post-Soviet era, Russia tried 
everything possible to keep Kiev in its orbit and prevent its pro-Western aspirations. For this 
purpose, Moscow applied various strategies including sticks, carrots and soft power. Along with 
pressuring Ukrainian leaders into staying away from Euro-Atlantic organizations, the Kremlin 
maintained a compromising stance in bilateral deals. For example, Moscow put low prices on 
energy exports to Ukraine: it has been estimated that between 1992 and 2008 Russia’s gas 
subsidies to Ukraine alone amounted to $47 billion – out of the total $75 billion across the CIS 
countries (Bochkarev 2009). Currently half of Ukrainians working abroad are in Russia and the 
remittances sent by them back home is close to $4 billion – around half of the total remittances 
that Ukraine receives annually.169 For a country of which around 4% of GDP is formed on the 
basis of money transfers by its citizens working abroad, this is an important factor (Sakwa 2015: 
77).  The economic interconnectedness between Ukraine and Russia and the former’s energy 
dependence on the latter used to be a potential source of practical leverage for the Kremlin to 
influence Ukrainian leaders.  
Ukraine is an important, if not the most important, country in the coverage of the EU’s 
eastern neighbourhood policies. It is the largest country whose territories are entirely located in 
Europe and is one of the top European countries in terms of population size. Hence, any serious 
turmoil in this country or its submission to Russian control has been considered as a potential 
threat to the EU’s security. To counter this threat and promote the European integration of Ukraine 
has been a priority in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood policies for decades. Likewise, Ukraine is 
of a great geopolitical importance for the United States. For American geopolitical thinkers, 
Ukraine’s subordination to Russian control would lead to Russia’s re-emergence as a Eurasian 
                                                 
169The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2015), “Sending Money Home: European flows and 
markets,” available at: https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/3594696/money_europe.pdf/5ac7733f-39e6-4b1b-
a1dc-f7038b5caa0b?version=1.2 (accessed: 11 May 2017), pp. 20; 31.  
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empire (Brzezinski 1994). Therefore, Ukraine has also been in the focus of American efforts to 
prevent Russia’s alleged policies to “re-Sovietize” the region. 
Under these circumstances, the multivectorial stance between the West and Russia 
appeared as the most prudent option for Ukrainian foreign policy. As discussed in the first part on 
neoclassical realism, neutrality (nonalignment) is seen in the realist school as the most optimal 
strategy for weak states that are in between great power rivalries (Labs 1992: 385). For example, 
Kissinger (2014), in the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, rightfully argued that “Far too often the 
Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if 
Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should 
function as a bridge between them.” However, the growing tensions between the West and Russia 
did not allow Ukrainian leaders to maintain neutrality.  
The relatively more democratic environment in Ukraine and the restricted autonomy of 
Ukrainian leaders allowed Western powers to reach out to sizeable, non-state groups in the country 
and to affect the country’s foreign policies through influencing these groups. Russia also invested 
largely in its counter-revolutionary policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and sought to create politically-
active, strong pro-Russian, non-state groups. The competition between the two geopolitical centres 
(i.e. the West and Russia) over Ukraine over the period under study (2004-2016) was largely of a 
soft power nature and never evolved to a direct military confrontation though it entailed economic 
warfare to some extent. This chapter is going to pursue an in-depth analysis of the soft power 
confrontation between the West and Russia, the role of Ukrainian non-state groups in this 
confrontation and their impact on the formulation of the country’s geopolitical orientation.  
This chapter replicates the structure of the previous chapter on Belarus. It will discuss the 
role of domestic non-state actors in shaping Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation and its 
interactions with surrounding great powers. The geopolitical context in which Ukraine has existed 
since the early years of its independence is to be presented in the first section coming after this 
introductory part.  The following section will analyse the autonomy Ukrainian leaders have had 
with respect to the general public and other non-state actors since the country gained independence 
but particularly over the years between 2004 – 2016. This section will be followed by a wider 
discussion on the power the West and Russia have wielded over popular opinion in Ukraine. The 
194 
 
section is divided into two parts, providing a separate take on Western and Russian soft power. In 
the final section before the conclusion, the chapter will explore the attitude of the Ukrainian people 
towards the two geopolitical poles (i.e. Russia and West) and the role they have played in the 
formation of the country’s foreign policy orientation. The concluding part will summarize the 
major findings of the chapter in the light of the hypotheses presented in the beginning of the thesis. 
 
3.2.1. Ukraine between the West and Russia  
 
Ukraine, under the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leonid Kuchma 
(1994–2004), balanced between the West and Russia (Szeptycki 2014: 37, Fesenko 2015: 134-
135; Wolczuk 2002). For Ukrainian politicians in the 1990s, cooperation was more favourable 
than integration in relations with NATO, since integration into the Alliance would have risked 
economic relations with Russia and other CIS countries (White et al. 2006: 170).  During the tenure 
of President Kuchma, Ukraine – NATO relations gradually evolved through Ukraine’s active 
participation in Partnership of Peace, the establishment of the NATO – Ukraine Commission, the 
formation of A Polish – Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion and its dispatch to Kosovo, Ukraine’s 
support to the USA in the wake of 11 September terror attacks, etc. In 2002, Kuchma even 
expressed Ukraine’s desire to enter NATO. However, his administration did little to actually join 
the alliance. Integration was considered a more permissible option in the case of non-military 
organizations, such as the European Union and the World Trade Organization (ibid.). Membership 
into the European community had remained a priority in foreign policy ever since 1993, when the 
document “On the Key Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine” declared it as a priority 
(Domaradzki 2014: 278).   
 After the presidential elections of 2004, the Western-supported popular uprising – known 
as the Orange revolution –  defeated political groups led by Viktor Yanukovych who was supported 
by Leonid Kuchma and Russia. The uprising led by young movements and non-governmental 
organizations brought pro-Western political elite led by Viktor Yushchenko to power. It was a 
turning point in the history of the country. For the new government, EU and NATO membership 
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was a primary objective in foreign policy. Yushchenko launched formal governmental preparation 
for Ukraine’s entry into NATO and accelerated reforms with the hope of receiving the Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) from the alliance. Despite the fact that societal support to NATO membership 
was rather low (less than 20%), in January 2008, the Orange elite asked NATO to give the MAP 
to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit later that year (Samokhvalov 2015: 1383).  
 However, Yushchenko’s pro-Western course failed to realize the expectations of the 
Orange revolution in domestic politics (Kuzio 2011). The new goverrnment did not end the 
influence of the oligarchic groups on Ukrainian politics and against this background the popularity 
of President Yushchenko plummeted to 4% towards the end of his term (Wapinski 2014: 59). The 
disillusionment of the Ukrainian people with the Orange government resulted in an electoral loss 
for Yushchenko in the 2010 presidential elections which was won by Viktor Yanukovych (Åslund 
2015: 80). During the presidency of Yanukovych, the country returned to a multi-vector foreign 
policy. In 2010, Ukraine’s new Law on Foreign and Domestic Policy adopted a non-aligned status 
in the international sphere, prohibited the country’s participation in military blocs, and thus ruled 
out accession into the transatlantic alliance.170 This was a fundamental change to the 2003 Law on 
Fundamentals of National Security which had declared NATO membership as the country’s 
foreign policy goal. The new law named both Russia and the European Union as Ukraine’s 
strategic partners and underscored cooperation with each of them as the country’s foreign policy 
priority. In his article for the Wall Street Journal, Yanukovych (2010), just after his victory in the 
2010 presidential elections, highlighted the importance of the “non-bloc” status:  
“Ukraine should make use of its geopolitical advantages and become a bridge between 
Russia and the West. Developing a good relationship with the West and bridging the gap 
to Russia will help Ukraine. We should not be forced to make [a] false choice between the 
benefits of the East and those of the West.”  
                                                 
170 Law of Ukraine: About fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy, 1 July 2010, available at: http://cis-
legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=31604 (accessed: 25 February 2017).  
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However, EU membership remained a main foreign policy goal in the new law as well. 
The law also recognized the necessity for reforms in the Ukrainian legislation to bring it into accord 
with the EU’s acquis communautaire. 
During Yanukovych’s presidency, relations with Russia returned to a friendlier path. One 
of the most contentious issues in the bilateral relations – the extension of the deployment of the 
Black Sea Fleet – was resolved. In exchange for a $100 discount on the import of Russian gas, 
Kiev extended the lease on the naval facilities in Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia’s Black Sea 
Fleet beyond 2017 until 2042 (Shapovalova 2014: 252). This extension was another move that was 
to problematize Ukraine’s NATO admission, as this de-facto limited Ukraine’s sovereignty over 
some parts of its internationally recognized territories (Shapovalova 2014: 252).   
Although many critics used to portray Yanukovych as a Russian puppet, there is little 
evidence to defend this speculation (Götz 2015: 4). Yanukovych’s foreign policy strategy was in 
fact similar to Lukashenko’s: like his Belarusian counterpart, in pursuing a pragmatic foreign 
policy, Yanukovych tried to play the West and Russia against each other and to extract economic 
benefits from the geopolitical importance of Ukraine’s location; he pursued this strategy during 
his term in power (Samokhvalov 2015: 1379-1380). The attitude of the Russian leaders to him was 
not different from their attitude to Lukashenko. For the Kremlin, Yanukovych was the lesser of 
two evils. US embassy cables released by Wikileaks revealed that Putin, as a matter of fact, “hated” 
him (Götz 2015: 5). However, compared with Lukashenko, Yanukovych and his cabinet members 
were more suspicious of Russia’s Customs Union project. Yanukovych sought alternative sources 
of energy to reduce Ukraine’s gas dependence on Russia, thus hoping to offset Russian pressure 
and to bypass its integration projects (Fesenko 2015: 137; Samokhvalov 2015: 1379-1380; Åslund 
2015: 92-95).  
On the other hand, he continued cooperation with the EU, elevated the status of the 
Ukrainian Ambassador to the EU to the level of a State Representative, and seriously approached 
the adoption of EU technical norms (Samokhvalov 2015: 1380). Under his presidency, Ukraine 
finalized the negotiations on the Association Agreement and DCFTA with the European Union 
and initialled it. For several months before the Vilnius summit, his government “carried out an 
information and propaganda campaign for a closer association with the EU in Ukraine” (Savin 
197 
 
2014: 7). Although no immediate considerable economic benefits were expected from these 
agreements (Shnyrkov 2013), it was widely believed that the agreements would allow Ukraine to 
gradually evolve in political, legal and socio-economic standards to the European level (Åslund 
2013; 2015: 46-47). Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
on the contrary, promised no comparable development in the situation of the rule of law and human 
rights. In terms of the economic benefits of the two integration options, pro-Western groups had 
estimated that the AA and DCFTA would help the Ukraine economy grow more than 10% in the 
long run, while joining the Customs Union would reduce Ukraine’s welfare by almost 4% in the 
long run (Movchan et al. 2011: 11). The pro-Russian groups, on the contrary, argued that the 
DCFTA with the European Union would cause a 1.5% reduction in Ukraine’s baseline GDP” 
(Ivanter et al. 2012, 40). According to them, “Over the period of 2011-2030, the total cumulative 
effect of the creation of the SES [Single Economic Space] and Ukraine joining it on the four 
countries can reach $1.1 trillion in 2010 prices....” (Ivanter et al. 2012, 41). However, the 
methodology of the analysis of the pro-Russian groups is highly disputed (Åslund 2015: 48). 
Yanukovych’s Ukraine made a number of offers to Russia (e.g. exclusive rights to Russian 
Gazprom and an alternative 3+1 formula in cooperation with the Customs Union, which meant 
maintaining special status, but not membership, within the organization of Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Belarus) to assuage Moscow’s concerns about the Association Agreement and DFCTA with 
the EU. This attempt did not suffice to assuage Moscow’s geopolitical fears. Russia was pressing 
hard to prevent Yanukovych from signing the Association Agreement with the EU. Moscow both 
threatened Kiev with damaging consequences for Ukraine’s economic and political future (e.g. 
abolition of preferential trade agreements and imposing stringent customs and sanitary controls on 
imports from Ukraine) and offered huge amounts of loans, subsidies, and discounts on energy 
imports in return for its retreat from the deal. This pressure, along with deteriorating internal 
economic and financial situation, forced the Ukrainian president to withdraw from the EU 
agreements before the EaP Vilnius summit (Fesenko 2015: 137-138). Instead, he signed the so-
called Moscow agreements with Russia, according to which the Kremlin agreed to provide Ukraine 
with $15 billion in financial aid and a 30% discount in natural gas supplies (Fesenko 2015: 138). 
However, although the agreement was likely to increase Russia’s influence on Ukrainian politics, 
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it was not an accession agreement to the Customs Union and the Yanukovych government did not 
take on such an obligation for the future.  
The internal non-state actors, however, did not allow Yanukovych to implement his 
decision. Protesting the volte-face of the Yanukovych administration, pro-Western political groups 
and ordinary citizens marched to the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in central Kiev 
– or Euromaidan, as it later came to be known because of the pro-EU protests. US and European 
leaders rejected Yanukovych’s offer to hold trilateral negotiations between the EU, Russia and 
Ukraine on integration issues.171 Seizing the opportunity created by anti-governmental upheaval, 
they decided to finally pull Ukraine into West’s orbit. US Senator John McCain, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State 
Victoria Nuland and many other European and American officials met the demonstrators and 
encouraged them to stand firmly for their ideals. McCain’s “We are here to support your just 
cause”172 and Nuland’s meeting with protestors at Maidan are a few examples that demonstrated 
the extremely concentrated engagement of the United States in the process. These Western 
politicians could never have had this chance to support anti-governmental demonstrations so 
overtly in Lukashenko’s Belarus. From the very beginning of Euromaidan, these politicians openly 
stood with protests and encouraged them to fight for their cause despite the Ukrainian authorities. 
For example, the address of one of the first EU politicians to arrive in Ukraine and to speak to 
protestors at the beginning of Euromaidan in late November 2013, Polish MEP Pawel Kowal, the 
head of Parliamentary Delegation on Co-operation with Ukraine, deserves to be quoted here:  
“I could not just sit there, in Brussels, and watch you freeze on this square. I came so that 
the whole of Europe could see and pay attention to what is happening here. They will ask 
me why you are here. I think it is because you want to be able, just like every Polish, 
German or French person, to decide about your future. I would like them in Brussels to 
                                                 
171 RFE/RL (2017), “Yanukovych Still Wants EU Accord,” available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-eu-
/25183983.html (accessed: 11 May 2017). 
172 Guardian (2013) “John McCain tells Ukraine protesters: ‘We are here to support your just cause’” available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/15/john-mccain-ukraine-protests-support-just-cause (accessed: 22 
February 2017).  
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know that you, young people, are here for the sake of your country […]. Standing here, you 
are opening the European gates for Ukraine!” (cited in Przelomiec 2014: 300).  
These actions of the Western politicians have been characterized by some experts as a 
crude violation of international law and a form of interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. For 
example, Rein Müllerson (2014: 135), President of Tallinn Law School, at Estonia’s Tallinn 
University, in his article titled Ukraine: Victim of Geopolitics, fleshed out that: 
“…[I]t was the representatives of Western states who completely ignored one of the 
cornerstone principles of international law – the non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states. Such unconditional support of the opposition not only constituted a flagrant 
interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine but it also raised expectations and made 
uncompromising revolutionaries even more intransigent.” 
Truly, the Euromaidan protestors were seriously emboldened by and became more 
determined thanks to the clear support of the European Union and United States. In February 2014, 
they finally toppled President Yanukovych through an unconstitutional173 overthrow; and  
Western-supported174 politicians came to power in Ukraine. Following Yanukovych’s fall, the 
Kremlin realized that it would lose Ukraine to NATO unless it intervened immediately and 
unwaveringly. Therefore, regardless of all the risks, Moscow adopted the decision to occupy 
Crimea and instigate separatism in Eastern Ukraine. Only an intervention on this scale would 
suffice to deal a crushing blow to Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic prospects.  
                                                 
173 As a matter of fact, Euromaidan supporters argue that the removal of President Yanukovych from his office was 
consistent with the norms of the Ukrainian constitution, particularly because, in their opinion, “the change took place 
in an extraordinary situation” (Musiyaka 2014).  However, the four circumstances in which, according to the 
constitution, the president may cease to exercise his power were not present before Yanukovych’s removal from the 
presidency: (1) resignation, (2) inability to exercise his or her powers for reasons of health, (3) removal from office 
by the procedure of impeachment, (4) death (Morrison 2014).   
174 The role of the United States in the formation of the post-Yanukovych government “became embarrassingly clear” 
in a leaked telephone conversation between Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland and US ambassador to Ukraine, 
Geoffrey Pyatt (Sparrow 2014: 328). On the phone, the two American politicians assessed the skills of the Ukrainian 
opposition leaders to lead the government. (See, BBC (2014), “Ukraine crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call” 
available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 (accessed: 26 February 2017). 
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Thus, Ukraine became a victim of geopolitical rivalries (Müllerson 2014). Its 
democratically elected leader Yanukovych fell prey to these rivalries that pushed him to the 
either/or choice between Russia and the West. On one side, the Western fear of and distrust in the 
resurgence of Russia as a strong regional power has generated in the Western capitals a desire to 
tear away Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence and thus to undermine its projects to re-
integrate the post-Soviet countries. Russia’s determination to push back against such expansion of 
Western military and political structures and reinstate control over its immediate neighbourhood 
brought it into a stand-off with the West over Ukraine. On the other side, as expected by 
neoclassical realism, the internal factors (i.e. the general public and non-governmental 
organizations) played a crucial role in the formation of the state’s external alignment along with 
international pressure. The intervening influence of domestic non-state players empowered by 
Western forces made Yanukovych’s decision to retain neutrality a political suicide for him. Thus, 
the pressure derived from confrontation between the great powers and intensified by the 
intervening influence of domestic non-state groups did not allow Kiev to maintain its geopolitical 
neutrality which leading geopolitical minds have considered the best option for Ukraine (Kissinger 
2014; Mearsheimer 2014).  
The Euromaidan revolution and its aftermath costed Ukrainians a dramatic economic 
breakdown, political turmoil and territorial losses. Ukrainian sources have evaluated the economic 
damages incurred due to the occupation of Crimea to be $40 billion in the losses of oil and gas 
reserves in the Black Sea and $90 billion in other losses (Shapovalova 2014: 264). Donetsk and 
Lugansk – the two Ukrainian regions that have been under the control of Russia-supported 
separatists since 2014 – had contributed to well-nigh 16% of the Ukrainian GDP until the 
secessionist war broke out (Poluneev 2014). These losses are still growing. For example, 
government estimates show that Russia’s move to deviate the route of its gas exports from the 
pipelines going through the territories of Ukraine will cost Ukraine a 10% loss in its annual budget 
(Rapoza 2017). On the other hand, contrary to the optimistic prognoses of observers back in early 
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2014175, Yanukovych’s departure did not change Ukraine substantially and did not trigger tangible 
economic progress and democratic political reforms.  
However, in the wake of Yanukovych’s overthrow, Ukraine massively intensified its 
relations with Western powers. An Association Agreement and DCFTA were signed shortly after 
Yanukovych’s departure. The country has already launched the implementation of these 
agreements. The volume of trade with the EU currently accounts for 40% of Ukraine’s foreign 
trade, while the share of Russia has dropped from 27.3% to 11.5% over the last three years since 
early 2014.176 Ukraine is about to obtain a visa-free regime with the EU which will certainly 
increase the integration of Ukrainian society into the European community. The range of 
integration with the West expands beyond the borders of the Europe: in 2016, Kiev signed a free 
trade agreement with Canada (CUFTA). In the same year of Yanukovych’s fall, the Ukrainian 
parliament revoked the law on neutrality and declared the country’s goal to be NATO membership. 
A state programme for the adoption of NATO standards by the Armed Forces of Ukraine by 2020 
has been accepted and is being implemented.177 On the other hand, the gap between Russia and 
Ukraine is increasingly widening. The post-Euromaidan government took a series of actions in 
order to accelerate this process and minimize Russian cultural influence on Ukraine. Towards this 
end, the government-imposed restrictions on Russian language textbooks, Russian media, Russian 
language, Russian symbols and the promotion of Soviet heritage.   
 
                                                 
175 For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed the Euromaidan revolution as “overall extremely 
encouraging developments” (Official Webpage of German Federal Government (2014), “A chance for democracy,” 
available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2014/02/2014-02-24-ukraine-chance-fuer-
demokratie.html (accessed: 23 March 2017).  
176 Lb.ua (2017), “Ukraine-Russia trade drops by $30bn over three years,” available at: 
https://en.lb.ua/news/2017/02/14/3118_ukrainerussia_trade_drops_30bn.html (accessed: 13 March 2017).  
177 Interfax Ukraine (2017), “Ukrainian army will switch to NATO standards by 2020 and get new logistics system,” 
available at: http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/394507.html (accessed: 13 March 2017).  
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3.2.2. State Autonomy Vis-à-vis Non-State Actors  
 
The autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society in Ukraine has never been as strong as it has 
been in Belarus or Azerbaijan. The economic challenges that independence brought about, the 
existence of influential and politically-active oligarchic groups and the ethnic composition and 
social characteristics of the state have played a decisive role in the failure of Ukrainian state leaders 
to consolidate power entirely in their own hands. The revolutionary or anarchist attitude of many 
Ukrainians towards state authorities has also been an influential factor in curbing the power of 
their leaders and preventing them from using force to protect their regimes (Chernega 2015). The 
annual approval ratings of Ukrainian leaders since the Orange revolution indicate that, although 
the leaders are usually elected with some expectations and hope, they fail to live up to those 
expectations and the people withdraw their support en masse and rapidly (Table 4). Despite the 
fact that there have been consistent attempts by the state to limit the influence of non-state actors, 
neither have these attempts evolved to massive repression campaigns against independent voices 
nor were they sufficient to totally counterbalance them. This section will briefly discuss the form 
of interaction between the Ukrainian state and non-state actors and the scope of the latter to 
influence the policies of the former.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed the ambitions of Ukrainian businessmen to 
accumulate their wealth and expand their influence. The post-Soviet political history of the country 
is inherently related to the internal conflicts between these businessmen who are known as 
oligarchs, due to their involvement in politics. Most of the influential non-state actors, particularly 
non-governmental organizations and media channels, have been founded or are supported by 
oligarchic groups as part of their strategy to exert pressure on the internal and external policies of 
the state. Although President Kuchma was rather repressive towards non-state actors, he failed to 
entirely eradicate their influence on government. The crackdown on media during his presidency 
included attacks on or the murder of journalists, imposing censorship and specifying what could 
be covered, reducing access to Radio Liberty’s Ukrainian service and other Western radio 
broadcasts, etc. (Bunce et al. 2011: 120). However, unlike the authoritarian leaders of Belarus or 
Central Asia, Kuchma was not able to silence opposing voices across the country. His power was 
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structurally constrained by the relatively influential authority of the parliament and the 
oppositional forces that had, though limited, still some access to the media (ibid.). 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
President Viktor 
Yushchenko 
   17   7         
President Viktor 
Yanukovych 
    46   29   28   28    
President Petro 
Poroshenko  
         47    17    6,4 
 
Table 4. Job Approval of Ukrainian presidents (percentage)178 
 
There were around 40,000 registered non-governmental institutions in the country in early 
2003 (Puglisi 2015: 4). Almost one tenth of them were active and functional (ibid.). Despite these 
high figures, prior to the Orange revolution Ukrainian civil society had a long range of problems, 
particularly a lack of sufficient funding and a low level of public participation (Stepanenko 2006). 
In those years, state funding of civil society organizations was insufficient, complicated and non-
transparent. Consequently, only a few organizations could receive it. For example, around half of 
                                                 
178 The figures for the period between 2008-2015 have been retrieved from Gallup’s official website (available at: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/187931/ukrainians-disillusioned-leadership.aspx, accessed 20 March 2017). 2016’s 
figures are from the official website of Rating Group Ukraine (available at: http://ratinggroup.ua/en/, accessed: 20 
March 2017). 
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the direct budget funding of CSOs was allotted only to eight organizations (Ghosh 2014: 7). 
Therefore, most of the CSOs were dependent on external funding (ibid.: 7-10). However, thanks 
to the existence of a relatively more liberal environment many civic organizations were still in 
operation. They cooperated within small coalitions, such as the Freedom of Choice Coalition, 
“Ukraine without Kuchma,” “Rise, Ukraine,” the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, etc.  
Thus, the relatively larger scope of the media and a stronger civil society were one of the 
most important factors that facilitated the emergence of a social upheaval protesting election fraud 
in 2004 which went down in history as “Orange Revolution.” Assessing the political opportunities 
for a social movement prior to these events, Abel Polese (2009: 257) points out that: 
“[There] were many [political opportunities] ranged from a united and growing opposition 
to the pressure of international attention towards the country, through the organization of a 
protest network that was close to perfection, to the existence of an increasingly divided 
regime.” 
The Orange Revolution took place in such a political environment. The revolution, led by 
non-governmental organizations, particularly a civic campaign called PORA (in Ukrainian: It’s 
Time) that was “a united initiative of hundreds of NGOs” (Kaskiv et al. 2007: 132), empowered 
the potential of civil society in Ukraine and generated a favourable environment for non-state 
actors to directly influence the policies of their leaders. There were also consistent legislative 
improvements on the Law on Civic Associations in this period: each year throughout 2005-2009, 
progressive amendments were adopted on the Law (Ghosh 2014: 3). Some ministries founded 
public councils dealing with civil society organizations and holding policy dialogues (ibid.). A 
2014 study supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung notes that: 
“The number and variety, levels of registration and scope of activities in civil society and 
the free media in Ukraine made them among the most vibrant and diverse in the former 
Soviet Union countries (Ghosh 2014: 3). 
In the wake of these developments, the democratic environment of the country experienced 
some progress which was reflected in the assessment of Freedom House that upgraded the status 
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of Ukraine to “free” in 2006, for the first time.179 However, the advent of Yanukovych’s presidency 
negatively affected this process. President Yanukovych did in fact consolidate power largely in 
the hands of his family and close associates to an extent previously unaccomplished by any other 
Ukrainian president (Åslund 2015: 82). He initiated a constitutional amendment, expanded the 
presidential powers, and consequently got the de-facto chance to rule over all the executive, 
legislative and judicial institutions of the country (ibid.). Due to his undemocratic policies, 
crackdown on opposition, non-governmental institutions and media, Freedom House downgraded 
the score of Ukraine to “partly free” in 2011.180 Since then, Ukraine has been regularly rated as 
“partly free.” The country’s press freedom was also downgraded by various international 
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, etc. 
(Bachmann et al. 2014: 352-353; Åslund 2015: 82).   
The circumscription of political liberties and the growing authoritarian tendencies of the 
political leadership generated popular discontent with the Yanukovych administration (Solonenko 
2014: 224-228). Deteriorating economic conditions in the country, on the other hand, further 
decreased the popularity of his government. Similar to the situation before the Orange Revolution 
– when, although the state had managed some economic growth (5.2% in 2002 and by 9.6% in 
2003), it failed to generate noteworthy improvement in the living standards of the majority (Bunce 
et al. 2011: 118) – Ukrainians under the rule of Yanukovych struggled with substantial economic 
challenges. The economic situation was one of the most important factors that increased the 
vulnerability of the governments prior to both revolutions. Klaus Bachmann (2014: 424) has 
rightfully counted the economic challenges as a cause of the anti-governmental upheaval in the 
wake of Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU:  
“[Yanukovych’s volte-face prior to the Vilnius summit of the EaP] was a trigger, but not 
the only cause of the protests. During the last years of Yanukovych’s rule, Ukrainians had 
                                                 
179 Freedom House (2006), “Ukraine,” available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/ukraine 
(accessed: 17 March 2017).  
180 Freedom House (2011), “Ukraine,” available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/ukraine 
(accessed: 17 March 2017).  
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observed a steady decline of their economy, with rising unemployment, shrinking foreign 
currency reserves, high inflation and decreasing foreign direct investment...” 
Yanukovych, although had attempted on many occasions, failed to establish complete 
control over non-state actors and media (Szostek 2014: 467). The public effect of the independent 
news outlets (e.g. Ukrainskaya pravda, Weekly Mirror), television channels (e.g. Channel 5, 1+1 
and ICTV owned by businessmen Petro Proshenko, Ihor Kolomoisky, and Victor Pinchuk, 
respectively), online media services, internet-based TV channels (e.g. Hromadske.TV and 
Espreso.TV) and social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) cannot be underestimated (Åslund 
2015: 103-104). A public opinion poll revealed that the “vast majority” of the people who watched 
non-partisan television channels were more likely to support the Euromaidan (Bachmann et al. 
2014: 360). The growing access to the internet amongst the Ukrainian population – 46% of the 
whole adult population aged over 16 had internet access in 2013 while only 15% had it in 2008 
(Bachmann et al. 2014: 353) – affected the wider dissemination of information. The existence of 
independent television channels was, however, much more crucial, as for around 90% of the 
population local TV was the main source of political information (Szostek 2014: 467; Bachmann 
et al. 2014: 352) (Table 5).   
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 Whole Population 
Ukrainian TV  90,5 
Russian TV  22,7 
Western (American, European TV)  2,9 
Radio 28,9 
National newspapers 20,1 
Local newspapers  36,7 
Magazines 2,5 
Websites (news, political analysis) 21,0 
Social networking sites 5,7 
Internet TV & Internet radio 3,4 
Other 2,0 
Hard to say 0,6 
Table 5. The main sources of political information for Ukrainians in 2013 (percentage)181 
                                                 
181 The table has been taken from Bachmann et al. 2014: 352. 
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This environment was also favourable for the solid growth of civil society between 2004-
2014. Freedom House recorded an improvement in the rating of Ukrainian civil society’s 
performance from 3.00 in 2005 to 2.50 in 2014.182 The Ukrainian civil society was doing relatively 
well compared to other states in the post-Soviet region of which the median was 3.00 in 2014.183 
Solonenko (2014: 220-221) reports that: 
“Since the Orange Revolution, there has been a steady increase in officially registered civil 
society organizations (CSOs) in Ukraine. By 2014 there were already 75,414184 non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), known officially as “civic organizations,” as well as 
28,851 trade unions, 15,904 associations of co-owners of multiple-family dwellings, 
15,708 “charitable foundations or organizations,” 1,369 self-organized territorial 
communities, and 276 professional organizations.” 
Tellingly, the crackdown on anti-governmental forces in Ukraine under Yanukovych never 
evolved to the scale it was observed in the fully authoritarian post-Soviet states. Solonenko (2014: 
225) states that: 
“Despite… [the] brutal authoritarian policies, which became more acute during the 
Euromaidan protests, civil society organizations generally faced no serious restrictions in 
their everyday work during Yanukovych’s presidency. At this time, i.e. between February 
2010 and February 2014, civil society could function relatively freely, especially when one 
compares this with the situation in Russia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, where the phenomenon 
of imprisonment of civil society activists is widespread.” 
On 16 January 2014, during the Euromaidan protests, Yanukovych forced the parliament 
to adopt a list of laws to restrict the influence of anti-government protestors. These laws required 
                                                 
182 Freedom House (2014), “Nations in Transit 2014: Ratings and Democracy Score Summary,” available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Data%20tables.pdf (accessed: 25 March 2017). 
183 Ibid.  
184 Solonenko (2014: 220-221) later notes that not all of the officially-registered CSOs were active. She, referring to 
Ukrainian experts, points out that only some 3,000-4,000 of them “are active and functional, whereas the rest exist 
only on paper or terminate their registration after a short period of time”.  
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externally-funded non-governmental organizations to be registered as “foreign agents,” put 
massive restrictions on the internet and anti-government protests, etc. (Wilson 2014: 81-82). 
However, by the end of January, Yanukovych had to repeal most of these laws. Thus, his power 
to fight back against the forces who opposed him was structurally limited. Although the sniper 
shootings against the protestors were attributed to him, a wide range of sources and revelations 
disputed this claim (Sakwa 2015: 81-100). Later Yanukovych counted his restrained reaction as 
“the most important” mistake he made prior to his ouster: “I made a number of mistakes, and the 
most important one was that I wasn’t able to force myself to bring troops and impose martial law 
in Ukraine, this being the only way to stop the radicals. I didn’t opt for bloodshed.”185 
Retrospectively, some analysts consider the “inadequate response” of the Yanukovych 
administration to the Euromaidan upheaval as a more determining reason for the eventual fall of 
his government rather than “support for European integration, continued police brutality, or the 
size of the protest movement” (Peisakhin 2014).  
 
3.2.3. Non-State Actors under the Influence of External Powers 
 
Ukraine, as the “biggest prize” (Gershman 2013) in Russia – West rivalries over the 
“common neighbourhood,” has attracted a vast amount of soft power investment from the two 
geopolitical foes since the very beginning of the post-Soviet period.  The two great powers have 
strived to influence the political processes in Ukraine through influencing the minds and feelings 
of the Ukrainians via media, non-governmental organizations, exchange programs, etc. The 
following two sub-sections will briefly explore the soft power of the West and Russia over 
Ukrainian society and their policies to wield this power.  
 
                                                 
185 Nevertheless, he stated that he would have not made such a decision even if he could have returned to that time. 
For him, involvement of military against the protestors would have pushed the country into a civil war. See for details, 
BBC (2016), “Yanukovich: moya glavnaya oshibka - resheniye ne vvodit' voyennoye polozheniye na Ukraine,” 
available at: http://www.bbc.com/russian/news-38111369 (accessed: 15 March 2017).  
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3.2.3.1. Non-state actors under the influence of Russian soft power 
 
Ukraine is inherently connected to Russia through linguistic, religious, historical, cultural, 
ethnic and economic bonds. The long years of common existence within the same country have 
made these bonds distinctively strong and enduring. It has provided Russia with various assets to 
be used to affect the internal affairs of Ukraine through influencing the minds and feelings of the 
Ukrainian people. According to the only census carried out in the independence period (2001), 
17,3% of the Ukrainian population were ethnic Russians186 and 80% had fluency in Russian 
(Marples 2015: 9). Russian is the first language for more than a quarter of the Ukrainian people.187 
Most of the ethnic Russians living in the Eastern part of the country have demonstrated a strong 
tendency to support pro-Russian candidates in nationwide elections (Marples 2015: 9). On the 
contrary, the Western territories, which had been under Poland or Austria-Hungary dominance up 
until World War II, have an equally strong tendency to support Euro-Atlantic integration of the 
country and politicians who are on a pro-Western track. Beissinger (2014) has found that “Orange 
revolutionaries were more than eight times more likely to be from Western Ukraine… [and] 92 
percent of… [them] claimed Ukrainian as their native language.” The Westerners, of which 80% 
supported the anti-Yanukovych protests while only 30% of Easterners did so, constituted also the 
majority both in the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions (Andreyev 2014; Petro 2014). Eastern 
regions differed from the Western part also in their judgement of the post-Yanukovych bloodshed 
in eastern Ukraine: in a survey asking respondents who they found responsible for the bloodshed 
in the east of the country, only 19,1% of Easterners found Russia responsible, while for 81,6% of 
Westerners Russia was the aggressor to be blamed (Petro 2015b: 28).   
From the disintegration of the Soviet Union up until the Orange revolution, Russia did not 
have a substantial pro-Russian NGO network in Ukraine, and instead built ties with Ukrainian 
                                                 
186 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2001), “National Composition of Population,” available at: 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/ (accessed: 27 March 2017). 
187 Lenta.ru (2007), “Kolichestvo russkoyazychnykh ukraintsev za posledniy god sokratilos',” available at: 
http://lenta.ru/news/2007/12/17/language (accessed: 27 March 2017).  
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elites. As its governmental support to Viktor Yanukovych failed to reach its goals in the 2004 
presidential elections and Western-supported non-governmental institutions played a decisive role 
in this process, the Russian leaders realized the importance of these institutions and interactions 
with ordinary people. The Russian political elite and expert community widely related Russia’s 
failure to its negligence of civil society as an influential tool. Gleb Pavlovsky, a Kremlin political 
consultant, who had been dispatched to Kiev to assist Yanukovych in electoral processes, regretted 
the fact that: “during the electoral campaign in Ukraine there was an underestimation [by Russia] 
and a low level of cooperation between Russian society and Ukrainian NGOs. We will try to avoid 
such an underestimation in the future” (Socor 2005).  
Soon after the Orange revolution, the number of such organizations founded and supported 
by Russia started to rise. In the years before the Euromaidan, the Kremlin had already formed 
connections with a large number of NGOs in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea. For example, the 
“Russian-speaking Ukraine” organization, under whose umbrella 120 civic organizations and 
10,000 members come together, had been supported by Russian foundations such as Russkiy Mir, 
the Gorchakov Foundation and the Moscow House of Compatriots World Foundation (Lutsevych 
2016: 15). “Ukrainian Choice” (in Ukrainian: “Ukrayinsʹkyy vybir”) is another popular pro-
Russian civil society organization which opposes European integration and advocates for closer 
relations between Ukraine and Russia. The organization was established in 2012 by business 
tycoon and former lawmaker Viktor Medvedchuk who has close personal ties to the Russian 
political elite and President Putin. It organised regular demonstrations and posted billboards 
protesting the Association Agreement. In parallel with the mainstream Kremlin narrative, they 
equate closer relations with the EU to the adoption of same-sex marriage and warn against dramatic 
economic repercussions of signing trade deals with Europe.  
Russia-supported non-governmental organizations and political parties were more active 
in Crimea. Political parties (e.g. “Russkiy Blok” (Russian Block), “Russkoe Edinstvo” (Russian 
Unity), “Soyuz” (Union), and Rus’ Edinaya” (Russia United)), NGOs (e.g. Russkaya Obschina 
Kryma” (Russian Community of Crimea), “Russkaya Obschina Sevastopolya” (Russ Community 
of Sevastopol), Narodny Front “Sevastopol’-Krym-Rossiya” (Popular Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-
Russia”)), Cossack organizations (e.g. Ob’edineniye Kozakov Kryma (Crimea Cossack Union) 
and Chernomorskaya Kazachya Sotnya (Black Sea Cossack Sotnia)), and Coalitions of pro-
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Russian organizations (e.g. Sevastopol “Front protiv NATO” (Front against NATO)) helped 
Russia to sustain and reinforce pro-Russian sentiments amongst Crimeans and eventually to annex 
the region without shooting a single bullet (Bjorn 2014). 
However, arguably the most active and influential non-governmental organization in 
Russia’s soft power arsenal concerning Ukraine has been the Russian Orthodox Church. The fact 
that the majority of the people in both countries believe in Orthodox Christianity and that 
Ukrainians trust churches (60-70%) more than any other institution (Kochan 2016: 105) have 
helped post-Soviet Russia to deploy religion as a tool in its foreign policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. Before 
the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) – the 
largest religious confession in Ukraine (Balaklytskyi 2015: 1) – has had more or less equal popular 
support amongst the Orthodox believers in Western (19.8%) and Eastern (24,2%) parts of Ukraine 
(Suslov 2016: 135). The ROC has invariably considered Ukraine a major part of the Russkii Mir 
and generously invested to wield influence on Ukraine’s religious discourse and to maintain a 
“special relationship” with Ukraine (Suslov 2016: 133). Although the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) has financial and administrative independence from the 
Moscow Patriarchate, the latter has not granted autocephaly to the former. The Moscow 
Patriarchate maintains symbolic superiority over the UOC-MP: according to the UOC-MP Statute, 
“the patriarch blesses every new head of the UOC-MP, the patriarch’s name is mentioned first in 
all church services, and the UOC-MP maintains contacts with other Orthodox Churches through 
the ROC” (Suslov 2016: 134). The UOC-MP also has stronger institutional capacity than its main 
rival, the anti-Russian Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP): approximately 
40% of the 34,000 religious institutions in the country belong to UOC-MP, while the UOC-KP 
holds only about 15% of them (Suslov 2016: 136). 
 At the apex of the confrontation between the governments of the two countries, the ROC 
tried to look apolitical and prayed that the governmental disputes would not undermine “the single 
spiritual body and space of Holy Rus.”188 In those troubled times, the ROC sent unifying messages 
                                                 
188 ITAR-TASS, (2014), “Patriarch Kirill hopes Russian-Ukrainian spiritual unity is preserved,” available at: 
http://tass.com/russia/720955/amp (accessed: 28 March 2017).  
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to the Ukrainian people, glorified the historical past of the Russian World, and called on the people 
to preserve fraternal ties between the two “brother” nations.189 Likewise, the UOC-MP used to 
support closer relations between Ukraine and Russia. For instance, prior to the 2004 presidential 
elections, Volodymyr Sabodan, Metropolitan of Kyiv took part in Russia-supported candidate 
Yanukovych’s electoral campaigns, accompanied him on several occasions and gave his blessings 
to him in the elections (Gretskiy 2007: 8).  
However, this religious affinity did not inhibit numerous members of the UOC-MP from 
taking part in Euromaidan (Krawchuk 2016: 175). Most of the UOC-MP synod and church 
members condemned the “the criminal actions of the government” for committing bloodshed 
during the protests, refused to take a pro-Russian position, and declared their support for European 
values and Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Krawchuk 2016: 182; Karpyak 2014). Although there 
were many priests in Donbass and some Eastern regions who supported the separatists, none of 
the bishops of the Church “dared to openly support Russian aggression on Ukraine” (Olszański 
2014). As a matter of fact, there are substantial groups within the UOC-MP, particularly amongst 
the younger hierarchs, who support gaining full canonical independence from Moscow and 
European integration (Olszański 2014).  
In general, Crimea’s annexation and Russia’s support to separatist groups in Eastern 
Ukraine weakened the popular support for the ROC and its Ukrainian branch (Karpyak 2014; 
Olszański 2014; Suslov 2016). Olszański (2014) mentions that growing anti-Russian sentiments 
amongst the members and parish clergy and the fact that some of them have left the UOC-MP to 
join the Kiev Patriarchate and many others want to do so “will force the UOC to identify itself 
increasingly strongly with the Ukrainian state and nation.”  
Russia is one of the most popular destinations for Ukrainian students who go abroad to 
study. In 2015, approximately 16 thousand students from Ukraine were enrolled in Russian 
universities (Semonov 2016). The Russian authorities claim that more than 75% of these students 
                                                 
189 RISU (Religious Information Service of Ukraine), (2014), “Patriarch Kirill Compares Events on Maidan with 
Revolutionary Riots In 1917,” available at: http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthodox/moscow_patriarchy/56016 
(accessed: 28 March 2017).  
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choose to remain in Russia following their graduation (ibid.). Apart from that, millions of students 
used to study in Russian at Ukrainian schools: In Ukraine at the time of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, there were 4633 Russian schools where more than 3 million pupils were studying (ibid.). 
Over the years since then there has been a drastic decline in these numbers. In 2011, only 1149 of 
these schools remained in operation (ibid.). The number of pupils also dramatically decreased to 
below 700,000 (ibid.). In the 20 years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 
proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian increased from less than 50% to 83%.190 The Russian 
government could not take any effective counter measures to prevent or reverse this trend.  
As it happened in the case of non-governmental organizations, Russia came to understand 
the importance of educational programmes in the aftermath of the Orange revolution. In 2007, 
Russia started an exchange programme for international students, including Ukrainian students. 
The program covered the costs of study for a certain number of Ukrainians (less than 100 students 
per a year)191 at Russian higher education institutions (Semonov 2016). In the same year, it also 
opened the first cultural centre of Rossotrudnichestvo in Kiev. However, compared to scholarly 
exchange programmes of Western countries in Ukraine, Russia’s programmes were rather belated 
and provided limited opportunities. For example, the United States had already started an exchange 
programme addressing post-Soviet countries in 1993 and thousands of Ukrainians have obtained 
the support to study in the USA since then. Likewise, the educational channels of Western 
countries had been operating in Ukraine long years before Russia opened the first 
Rossotrudnichestvo centre in Kiev: the Ukrainian offices of the British Council (1992), the Goethe 
Institute (1993), and the French Institute (1994) had been in Ukraine since the first years of 
Ukraine’s independence (ibid.).  
                                                 
190 Polit.ru (2010), “YAzykovaya politika Ukrainy: deystviya vlasti, mneniya grazhdan,” available at: 
http://www.polit.ru/article/2010/11/09/language/, (accessed: 28 March 2017).  
191 In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia increased the quota for international students, including Ukrainians. 
For the period 2016-2017, 455 places were allocated for Ukrainian students (Semonov 2016). However, Semonov 
(2016) accurately argues that this is a rather small figure for a nation of 40 million. For example, the places (494) 
allocated for Moldovans (less than 4 million population) was even higher than that for Ukrainians. 
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In the post-Soviet period, the Russian media has experienced a steady decline in its 
reputation amongst Ukrainians. Several surveys conducted by Razumkov institute between 1999-
2013 concluded that the majority of the population in Ukraine found Russian media untrustworthy 
and biased (Petro 2015b: 38). Nevertheless, both Russian TV channels and newspapers are 
amongst the most watched and read in Ukraine. For example, in 2011, the three biggest Russian 
state-controlled TV channels, Pervyy Kanal, RTR Planeta and NTV Mir weekly reached out to 
32.8%, 24.9% and 19.8% of the Ukrainian population, respectively (Szostek 2014: 468). Similarly, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine and Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine – Ukrainian editions of 
Moscow-based publications – are one of the few publications in Ukraine that have readerships to 
compete with the viewership of the TV news bulletins that dominate Ukraine’s media space 
(Szostek 2014: 467-8). Besides, the Russian language had a predominant position in the cultural 
and information sphere of the country: Nicolai Petro (2014: 5) cites a 2012 study that has found 
that “over 60 percent of newspapers, 83 percent of journals, 87 percent of books and 72 percent of 
television programs in Ukraine are in Russian.” He (ibid.) points out that the predominance of 
Russian has been further reinforced in the wake of the massive use of the Internet by Ukrainians 
whose most preferred language on websites is Russian (80%). 
Crimea’s annexation and separatist escalation in Eastern Ukraine strictly worsened the 
conditions for Russian soft power projection in Ukraine. On the one hand, the aversion to 
everything Russian grew rapidly amongst the Ukrainian people which was reflected in various 
spheres of their daily life. This was wide-ranging as the Russian people also supported the 
Kremlin’s policies regarding Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.192 Tellingly, while just 4%193 of the 
respondents rated Russia unfavourably in Ukraine in 2010, the percentage of these people went up 
                                                 
192 UNIAN (2016), “Poll: Nearly two-thirds of Russians support Kremlin's policy toward Ukraine,” available at: 
https://www.unian.info/world/1253904-poll-nearly-two-thirds-of-russians-support-kremlins-policy-toward-
ukraine.html (accessed: 16 May 2017).  
193 ICPS (2010), “Inside Ukraine,” available at: http://old.icps.com.ua/files/articles/57/96/Inside_Ukraine_ENG_8.pdf 
(accessed: 18 January 2016).  
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to around 60%194 in 2014. The majority (68% of the Ukrainian people) found Russia’s Crimean 
policies as “an attempt to break Ukraine into several parts and threaten its independence.”195 These 
sentiments affected also the use of the Russian language by Ukrainians. Ievgen Vorobiov, a 
Ukrainian expert, points out that: 
“Now many Russian speakers in Ukraine — who live primarily in the country’s east and 
in large cities — are demonstratively turning to Ukrainian as a badge of self-
identification… Patriotic Russian-speakers in Kiev and big eastern cities are pledging on 
social networks to speak Ukrainian to their children, hoping to make the next generation 
more fluent and natural speakers of their native tongue. For the first time in decades, 
speaking Ukrainian is seen as fashionable rather than backward” (Vorobiov 2015a). 
On the other hand, the government adopted a series of measures against Russia’s soft power 
projection. The post-Yanukovych Ukrainian leaders imposed a range of restrictions on Russian 
media outlets, non-governmental organizations, and other soft power instruments that addressed 
the Ukrainian public. Immediately after Yanukovych’s fall, in March 2014, Kiev restricted the 
broadcasting of a number of Russian TV Channels (e.g. Vesti, Rossia 24, ORT, RTR Planeta and 
NTV-Mir) in Ukraine.196 Several media agencies had to cease operation in Ukraine. For example, 
Kommersant-Ukraina – the Ukrainian branch of Russian business daily Kommersant founded in 
2005 and owned by Russian tycoon Alisher Usmanov – terminated its activities in 2014 (Szostek 
2014: 469). These restrictions covered even films produced by Russians: in March 2016, the “films 
of the aggressor state” produced or released for the first time after January 1, 2014 were banned 
                                                 
194 Pew Research Centre (2014) Russia’s Global Image Negative amid Crisis in Ukraine. Available at: 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/09/russias-global-image-negative-amid-crisis-in-ukraine/ (accessed: 18 January 
2016).  
195 IRI (2014), “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine,” available at: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukra
ine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf (accessed: 16 May 2017).  
196 Union.net (2014), “Segodnya vecherom v Ukraine vyklyuchat neskol'ko rossiyskikh kanalov,” available at: 
https://www.unian.net/politics/895188-segodnya-vecherom-v-ukraine-vyiklyuchat-neskolko-rossiyskih-
kanalov.html (accessed: 25 March 2017).  
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from broadcasting.197 In December 2014, in a controversial manner, the Poroshenko government 
established the Ministry of Information Policy with the declared purpose of counteracting Russian 
propaganda.198 More importantly, the Poroshenko government adopted a law on de-
communization in 2015.199 The law prohibited the propagation of Soviet-style communism in 
Ukraine and ordered the removal of its symbols. In the course of this process, the remnants of the 
Soviet past were targeted by the Ukrainian authorities. In less than two years after Yanukovych’s 
fall, over 800 of the remaining 1400 Lenin monuments were dismantled across the country.200 The 
names of dozens of cities and villages which had been associated with a Russian past were 
changed.201 In some regions, even the use of the word “Russia” in signs at enterprises, offices and 
advertising spaces was banned.202 The communist parties were outlawed and prohibited from 
taking part in the political processes and elections (Antonovych 2015). In line with the previous 
policies countering Russian soft power projection, in May 2017, the Poroshenko government 
ordered the leading Russian social networks and search engines to be completely blocked or 
restricted in Ukraine.203 The list of websites that were affected by this order included VKontakte, 
Odnolkassniki, Yandex and the Mail.ru Group that had been widely used by the Ukrainian people. 
                                                 
197 RT (2016), “Ukraine bans all Russian movies released since 2014,” available at: https://www.rt.com/news/337728-
ukraine-bans-russian-movies/ (accessed: 5 May 2017).  
198 Interfax-Ukaine (2014), “Poroshenko: Information Ministry’s main task is to repel information attacks against 
Ukraine”, available at: http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/238615.html (accessed: 30 June 2017). 
199 Ukraynskaya Pravda (2015), “Poroshenko pídpisav zakoni pro dekomunízatsíyu,” available at: 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/05/15/7068057/ (accessed: 27 March 2017). 
200 UNIAN (2016), “Over 800 monuments to Lenin toppled in Ukraine,” available at:  
https://www.unian.info/society/1230568-over-800-monuments-to-lenin-toppled-in-ukraine.html (accessed: 27 March 
2017).   
201 Ukraynskaya Pravda (2015), “V Ukraí̈ní pereymenuyut' 22 místa í 44 selishcha,” available at: 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/06/4/7070191/ (accessed: 27 March 2017). 
202 TASS (2016), “Signs having the word ‘Russia’ banned in Ukraine’s Chernovtsy,” available at: 
http://tass.com/world/867237 (accessed: 5 May 2017).   
203 RFE/RL (2017), “Poroshenko Restricts Access to Russian Websites, Social Networks,” available at: 
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-poroshenko-restricts-access-yandex-vkontakte/28490951.html (accessed: 17 May 
2017). 
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3.2.3.2. Non-state actors under the influence of Western soft power projection 
 
From the early years of the post-Soviet era, the relatively more democratic political 
environment in Ukraine made it possible for Western countries to wield soft power in Ukraine 
through various channels. The existence of independent media outlets and a large number of non-
governmental organizations helped the West to easily deliver its narratives to the Ukrainian people 
and to successfully compete against Russia’s soft power. Unlike Russia, that tried to capitalize on 
the historical past and cultural bonds, Western powers have been projecting a future-oriented soft 
power armed with the attractiveness of European values, democratic ideals and the relative 
prosperity of Western countries. The relatively stronger desire of many Ukrainians for 
rapprochement with Western powers and their support for pro-Western political developments in 
the country have laid favourable ground for Western soft power projection. 
For numerous people in Ukraine, integration into the club of the European Union and 
NATO promised a chance to establish the rule of law in the country which for over 70% of 
Ukrainians was “the most important human need of which they felt deprived” (Ryabchuk 2014; 
Kochan 2016: 106). Although Ukrainians are culturally closer to Russia than Western countries,204 
considering Russia as a backward country with no progressive development model, many of them 
- particularly those who live in the Western part of the country - have seen geopolitical divorce 
from their northern neighbour as an imperative to pursue the Europeanization of Ukraine 
(Ryabchuk 2014; Chernega 2015). Due to the fact that Western Ukraine was historically under 
either the rule of Poland or the Austro-Hungarian Empire and had never been under Russian 
control up until World War II, the people currently living in this region feel a special attachment 
to the West. Hence, the Western power over popular opinion in Western Ukraine is especially 
stronger than in other parts of the country. These people are also politically more active than their 
fellow countrymen both in other regions of Ukraine and abroad. Western Ukrainians, comprising 
the major part of the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe and America, have advocated Ukraine’s 
                                                 
204 The majority of respondents in a survey in Ukraine said that “[cultural] values that are more characteristic of the 
EU generally do not coincide with those of Ukraine” (Stegniy 2011: 64). 
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integration into the Western community at the expense of its ties with Russia. Those Ukrainians, 
abroad and at home, promote the image of Russia as a historically aggressive neighbour that has 
committed a series of crimes against Ukraine, including the Holodomor. They also distinguish 
their ethnic identity from that of Russia, claiming that the latter is more of a mixed identity 
containing Slavic, Finnish and Tatar heritage (Rywkin 2014: 125). Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, this attitude towards Russia has been propagated at Ukrainian schools as well (Chernega 
2015).  
The “European dream,” associated with the rule of law, social justice, and freedom, was a 
key motive for Ukrainians in pro-Western social upheavals (Portnov 2014: 13; Ostrovs‘kyj 2014: 
21; Onuch 2014: 48). There has been an unrealistic expectation amongst many Ukrainians, 
particularly amongst younger people, that their country would progressively reform itself and 
establish high living standards in a short period of time if it were to succeed in integrating itself 
into the West. Ukrainian leaders, themselves advocating European integration, have never 
substantially opposed this discourse. Vladimir Chernega (2015), the Russian advisor to the Council 
of Europe, in his remarkably unbiassed analysis on Russia’s failure in the Ukraine crisis, writes 
that: 
“[In Ukraine] many sincerely believe that the rapprochement with the EU will not only 
quickly stop the impoverishment of the majority [of the public], that has never stopped 
since the country gained independence, but also will evolve Ukrainian welfare standards to 
the European level. It should be noted that this hope was strengthened by Ukrainian 
governments, including during Yanukovych’s period. In 2012, I took part in a conference 
in Kiev where the Minister of Labour and Social Policy declared that the average pension 
in the country would reach 1,000 euros in a few years after the signing of the Association 
Agreement. In Ukraine, the average pension did not exceed 100 euros at that time.” (my 
translation) 
The desire of Ukrainians to integrate into the European community has been augmented by 
the wide-ranging public diplomacy and propaganda campaigns of the Western countries which 
cover all the dimensions of soft power making including scholarly exchanges, mass media, non-
governmental organizations, etc. On the contrary to Russia’s strategy aimed at reinforcing ties 
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primarily with Ukrainian elites or pro-Russian political groups, Western powers have, since the 
beginning of the post-Soviet period, sought to promote their connection with the ordinary people 
and oppositional forces (Chernega 2015).  
European countries and the United States launched educational exchange programmes for 
Ukrainians in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The programmes provided by the 
United States (e.g. the Fulbright Program, Humphrey Fellowships, the Future Leaders Exchange 
(FLEX) Program, Global Undergraduate Exchange Program (UGRAD), Benjamin Franklin 
Program) and the European countries (e.g. German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), 
Erasmus Mundus (EM)), and Open Society Institution (OSI) have brought thousands of Ukrainians 
to study at Western universities. According to UNESCO statistics, the number of Ukrainian 
students studying in European countries (EU members plus non-EU Western European countries), 
in the USA and Canada (more than 31,000) far outweighed that of those studying in Russia 
(12,043) in 2014.205  The ratio of Ukrainian students studying at Russian universities to those 
studying at Western universities has further increased in favour of the latter over the period 
between 2004 and 2014 (See, Table 6).  
 
Host country or region 2004 2014 
Russian Federation 6 841 12,043 
Western countries 12,333 31,000 
Table 6. The number of Ukrainian students studying at the universities of Russia and West.206  
 
                                                 
205 UNESCO (2016), “Global Flow of Tertiary Students,” available at: http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-
flow#slideoutmenu (accessed: 30 March 2017).  
206 UNESCO Statistics, available at: http://data.uis.unesco.org/ (accessed: 30 March 2017).  
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Over the years since the 1990s, the West has supported emergence of an army of non-
governmental organizations in Ukraine. These organizations played a key role in the anti-
governmental protests and the pro-Western drift of their country. The Western NGOs operational 
in Ukraine have supported the local NGOs at a large scale and played a crucial role in their 
empowerment (Beissinger 2007: 261; Wilson 2005: 183–189). Without the financial and technical 
support of those Western agencies, it would have been hardly possible for Ukrainian NGOs to 
evolve to the current significantly influential level in the civil and political life of the country 
(Ghosh 2014: 7-10). By the virtue of the non-governmental institutions, Western powers 
succeeded in influencing political developments in Ukraine without direct involvement. 
Cooperation with those non-state actors also helped Western agencies in their rhetoric to downplay 
their own role in the anti-governmental upheavals that changed the tide of history for Ukraine. 
Ann Marie Yastishock, the deputy regional USAID director, refused claims that USAID had 
supported revolutions and protestors in Ukraine and pointed out that “We don’t finance 
revolutions, we support civil society and NGOs. We financed neither the Orange Revolution nor 
the Maidan protests in 2014. Those were citizens out there at the Maidan, rising up against their 
corrupt government” (Bota et al. 2015).  
The United States, as the “top bilateral donor” to Ukraine since the very beginning of the 
latter’s independent statehood (Shapovalova 2010: 2), played a crucial role in the Westernization 
of Ukraine. In December 2013, a couple of weeks after the Vilnius summit, Victoria Nuland, the 
US assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, declared that the United States 
had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 “on supporting the aspirations of the Ukrainian 
people to have a strong, democratic government that represents their interests.”207 The carriers of  
US aid to Ukrainian non-state actors – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 
the Public Affairs Section of the US Embassy, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), the American Bar Association, and others – significantly 
empowered the Ukrainian pro-Western forces. Not only were the American non-governmental 
                                                 
207 UNIAN (2014), “Since 1991 US has invested $5 billion to promote democracy in Ukraine, but they did not finance 
Maidan – Nuland,” available at: https://www.unian.info/politics/910206-since-1991-us-has-invested-5-billion-to-
promote-democracy-in-ukraine-but-they-did-not-finance-maidan-nuland.html (accessed: 11 May 2017).  
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organizations actively involved in political life in Ukraine and contributed to its pro-Western 
developments, European agencies participated in this process as well. One of the most prominent 
EU civil society initiatives in Ukraine was the establishment of the Ukrainian National Platform 
(UNP) of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum in January 2011.208 Uniting Ukrainian 
NGOs and in close cooperation with other National Platforms in EaP countries, the UNP 
coordinates public support for the implementation of the EaP programme in the country.  
Apart from the soft power projection of the European Union, member states also 
considerably contributed to the promotion of Western values in Ukraine. In 2007, Matthias 
Brucker (2007: 308) identified three German political foundations operational in Ukraine: the 
Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung (KAS). Involved in different sectors, they in general cooperated with the government in 
reforming the administrative apparatus, police and security forces and supported the emerging civil 
society, non-governmental organizations and trade unions (ibid.; Shapovalova 2010: 4). 
Coordinating the cooperation between German and Ukrainian NGOs, organizing conferences for 
Ukrainian non-governmental organizations, organizing trainings for political parties on efficient 
party management, election campaigns and professional public relations, German foundations 
were an influential supportive force for Ukrainian democratization. Burcker (2007: 311) makes an 
important observation about the function of those foundations: 
“…the foundations are more than norm entrepreneurs and agents of socialization – they 
actively interfere in domestic processes. Thus, the HSS educated police forces, which later 
refrained from the use of force against civilian protestors; FES fosters an emergent civil 
society; KAS has good contacts with all leading members of Nasha Ukraina and trains 
youth organizations, a social stratum that later represented the major part of the protesters 
in Kyiv’s central square. Hence, the work of the foundations is not simply about norm 
dissemination, but also about moulding domestic processes.” 
                                                 
208Eap-csf.eu (2017), “Ukraine,” available at: http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/national-platforms/ukraine/ (accessed: 11 
May 2017). 
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The other European countries, particularly Poland, have also taken part in this process 
individually. The promotion of European values in the European countries bordering Russia is a 
key part of Poland’s security strategy (Petrova 2014: 1). Thus, it is unsurprising that these 
countries, particularly Belarus and Ukraine, are the top recipients of Poland’s foreign democracy 
assistance (Kaźmierkiewicz 2008: 107). A 2008 assessment of European democracy aid calculated 
that Poland’s democratization aid to Ukraine outweighed the combined assistance of the UK and 
Sweden (Kucharczyk et al. 2008: 21). Poland’s support was more visible in the Euromaidan 
protests where Polish politicians and civic activists physically appeared and supported the cause 
of the revolution (ibid.). For most of the other Central European and Baltic members of the EU, 
the democratization and Westernization of Ukraine is of similar geostrategic importance and 
attracts a significant part of their foreign aid (Mesežnikov 2008).   
These countries have sought to affect the domestic political process in Ukraine also through 
international broadcasting and supporting “independent” (pro-Western) media outlets in Ukraine. 
Most of the above-mentioned Western non-governmental organizations that have been active in 
Ukraine have also supported the development of independent media in the country. 
USAID/Ukraine’s flagship media support program, Strengthening Independent Media in Ukraine 
(U-Media), launched in 2003 and has been one of the most prominent amongst these projects. In 
less than ten years of its existence, it supported 12 professional, independent, sustainable media 
support NGOs (e.g. Telekritika and Internews Ukraine) in the country addressing the challenges 
the independent media encounter in Ukraine.209 The NGOs supported by U-Media have become 
leaders in media monitoring, journalist training, legal support and awareness and investigative 
journalism.210 Stopfake.org is another media project that is supported by Western donors (the 
international Renaissance Foundation, the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic, the British 
Embassy in Ukraine and the Sigrid Rausing Trust). According to the website, its primary goal is 
                                                 
209 Internews (2012), “USAID Builds Sustainable Media Support Institutions,” available at: 
http://www.internews.org/news/usaid-builds-sustainable-media-support-institutions (accessed: 11 May 2017). 
210 Ibid.  
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“to verify information, raise media literacy in Ukraine and establish a clear red line between 
journalism and propaganda.”211 
In addition to these projects, the government supported international broadcasters of 
Western powers have also addressed the Ukrainian people in broadcasting programmes in local 
languages. The Ukrainian service of Radio Liberty has been in operation since 1954 in three 
languages (Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar). RFE/RL expanded its Ukrainian service in 
the aftermath of the outbreak of Crimea’s annexation. In September 2015, the Ukrainian Service 
began broadcasting to Crimea on AM and in July 2016 it began broadcasting to parts of separatist-
controlled Donbass on FM.212 The agency has also launched a website to broadcast news about 
events in Crimea in Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar, which in short time became one of 
the most quoted news sources on the peninsula.213 The BBG reports that the audience of the 
Ukrainian services of American international media significantly increased following the outbreak 
of the Ukraine crisis. While before the crisis (in 2012) only 9,8% of adults turned to Ukrainian or 
Russian-language American media platforms for news, the percentage of those people reached 
20,8% in 2014.214 However, the audience of the US media channels varies considerably across 
Ukraine: while more than 40% of Western Ukrainians choose these channels for news, only around 
10% of Ukrainians in the East and South regions chose these channels as sources of news in 
2014.215 
 
                                                 
211 Stopfake.org (2017), “About us,” available at: http://www.stopfake.org/en/about-us/ (accessed: 11 May 2017).  
212 RFE/RL (2017), “RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service: Radio Svoboda,” available at: 
https://pressroom.rferl.org/p/6139.html (accessed: 11 May 2017). 
213 Ibid.   
214 BBG (2014), “BBG audience reach doubles in Ukraine,” available at: https://www.bbg.gov/2014/06/05/bbg-
audience-reach-doubles-in-ukraine-2/ (accessed: 13 May 2017).  
215 Ibid.   
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3.2.4. Non-State Actors and External Alignment 
 
The discussion on the autonomy of Ukrainian leaders vis-à-vis non-state actors and the 
exertion of Western and Russian soft power in the country indicated that Ukrainian non-state actors 
have had relatively more opportunities to be politically influential and been subject to stronger soft 
power projection of the external powers. On several occasions over the last decade, Ukrainian 
society played decisive roles in shaping not only domestic politics but also foreign policy.  To say 
the least, the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions, which were movements of the ordinary people, 
civil society and other non-state actors, had more revolutionary implications for the foreign policy 
orientation of the country than its internal structure. This characterization of the Ukrainian public 
differs dramatically from observations by experts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For example, 
in 2003, some argued that “Ukrainian society is passive, atomized and its power is ‘submerged’ 
relative to that of the state” and thus “public opinion [in Ukraine] is of minimal importance in the 
area of foreign policy” (Chudowsky et al. 2003: 273). A year later, the Ukrainian public proved 
these estimations wrong by exerting substantial influence on the foreign policy orientation of the 
country. This demonstrated that in Ukraine “public opinion can force elites to rethink foreign 
policy and/or bring to power counter-elites whose preferences are different” (Munro 2007: 44).  
The internal socio-economic and political problems were often noted as the underlying 
reason behind the anti-governmental upheavals of the Ukrainians both during the Orange 
revolution (Stepanenko 2006) and Euromaidan (Bachmann 2014; Surzhko-Harned et al. 2017). 
This was the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian public with the performance of the government that 
fomented massive protests across the country. However, the geopolitical dimensions of these 
upheavals, particularly the Euromaidan revolution, should not be underestimated. For example, 
Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017: 3) argue that “Euromaidan’s unique frame centres on 
opposition to the Yanukovych regime” rather than on the “choice between Europe and Russia.” 
They underrate the significance of the fact that Euromaidan protests started in the immediate 
aftermath of Yanukovych’s refusal to further move on the path of integration to Europe which was 
seen by the protestors as a progressive alternative to the country’s traditional geopolitical master 
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(i.e. Russia) (Ryabchuk 2014). The involvement of Western powers in the Euromaidan protests 
and their support to the anti-governmental forces further reinforced the external dimension of the 
protests and its character as a choice between the West and Russia.  
In the period under study (2004 – 2016), the attitude of the Ukrainian people towards 
Russia and the West did not remain stable. In the beginning of this period, integration with one or 
the other of these two powers was not widely supported: public opinion polls showed that the 
Ukrainian public was ambivalent towards rapprochement with either of the two geopolitical poles 
(White et al. 2010: 359-362). For example, in 2008, supporters (42%) of integration into Russia-
initiated projects outnumbered those supporting European integration (34%) (Popescu et al. 
2009b: 28). However, as seen from the following chart, this ambivalence remained up until 
September 2013. The surveys prior to the Euromaidan uprising concluded that there were more 
supporters of EU integration (see, Figure 5) and the Association Agreement was supported by 
almost two-thirds of the Ukrainian people (Savin 2014: 7).    
Ukrainians used to be suspicious of the transatlantic alliance: more than 40% of the 
respondents found the alliance a “threat” in the 2008 and 2009 Gallup polls, while only less than 
18% perceived it as “protection” (Esipova et al. 2010). A 2009 poll concluded that 60% of 
Ukrainians said they were against NATO membership, while only 21% supported it (Vorobiov 
2015b). Therefore, it is not surprising that Yanukovych’s push to adopt the law on non-bloc status 
in 2010 did not face any substantial opposition. These foreign policy perceptions were noticed also 
in reaction to the Georgia war (2008). During the war, although the Orange government took sides 
with Georgia, 23.5% of the Ukrainian people found Russia’s use of force in the conflict justified 
and for 60.5% use of force by Georgia was illegal (Bogomolov et al. 2012: 10). However, the 
regional West – East difference was evident in the polls on Ukraine’s possibility of joining NATO: 
the 2010 polls indicated that while the majority in the East (72%) and South (60%) were more 
likely to oppose accession, most people in western Ukraine said they supported it (Sprehe 2010). 
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          Figure 5. Support for the EU integration vs. the Eurasian integration216 in the Ukrainian  
                             society.217  
 
                                                 
216 Eurasian integration in this chart implies joining the integration projects offered by Russia, primarily the Customs 
Union while the EU integration implies accession into the EU as a member.  
217 For the source of data from 2008, see: Popescu & Wilson 2009b: 28; For the source of the data for the period 
November 2011 – March 2014, see: IRI (2014), “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine,” available at: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukra
ine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf (accessed: 16 May 2017); For the September 2014 and July 2015 surveys, see: 
IRI (2015), “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine,” available at: 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2015-08-24_survey_of_residents_of_ukraine_july_16-30_2015.pdf 
(accessed: 17 May 2017). For the results of the March 2016 polls which were conducted by Gorshenin Institute, see: 
UNIAN (2016), “Ukrainians less support European integration – poll,” available at: 
https://www.unian.info/society/1287694-ukrainians-less-support-european-integration-poll.html (accessed: 17 May 
2017).  
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  Figure 6. Ukrainians on accession to NATO 
 
 The Euromaidan revolution and its aftermath caused drastic changes in the perception of 
the Ukrainian public of the foreign policy orientation of the country. The supporters of Eurasian 
integration dropped to 12% in two years after the revolution, while the percentage of EU 
integration supporters neared 60% of the Ukrainian nation. While before these events, many 
Ukrainians supported EU integration, but they were more reserved on NATO accession, after 
Euromaidan the Ukrainian public became increasingly more supportive of the latter as well. In 
2013, just before the start of the Euromaidan revolution, Ukrainian public opinion about NATO 
was the same as it had been several few years ago: 20% supported accession into the Alliance, 
while the majority remained against it.218 What happened after the Euromaidan revolution was 
stunning: In 2014, 44% of those polled said they would vote against joining NATO in a 
hypothetical referendum, whereas 34% said they would vote for accession. In 2015, however, in 
the course of the persistence of the Ukraine – Russia conflict in the East and the continuation of 
Crimea’s occupation by Russia, all of a sudden 64% said that their vote in a hypothetical 
                                                 
218 Radio Svoboda (2013), “Vstup Ukraí̈ni do NATO pídtrimuê lishe kozhen p’yatiy ukraí̈nets' – opituvannya,” 
available at: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25138975.html (accessed: 14 May 2017).  
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referendum on NATO accession would be in favour of it (Vorobiov 2015b). The percentage of the 
people who were against accession decreased dramatically to 28% (ibid.; See, Figure 6).  
The pro-Western dramatic shift in public opinion was reflected also in the parliamentary 
elections of October 2014. Compared to the previous elections (2012), the voters of the pro-
Russian parties decreased 28.3% to 16,4% and the pro-Western parties won a stunning 81% 
(Kochan 2016: 108).219 Late 2016 surveys showed that 73% of Ukrainians did not support 
Poroshenko’s presidency, 79% – his cabinet, and 87% – the parliament.220As the public support to 
him and his cabinet dramatically decreased and support to NATO membership conversely shot up, 
Poroshenko began to try to be seen as an increasingly stauncher supporter of the country’s pro-
Western course. In early 2017, Poroshenko announced that he would hold a referendum on the 
accession to the Alliance. In an interview to the German media, he pointed out that: 
“Four years ago, only 16 percent favoured Ukraine’s entry into NATO. Now it’s 54 
percent… As president, I am guided by the views of my people, and I will hold a 
referendum on the issue of NATO membership.”221 
The widespread anti-Russian mood in the country – which, as the previous sections 
demonstrated, was supported and intensified by the Ukrainian government – affects the foreign 
policy making of the state. The geopolitical situation over Ukraine, Russia’s seemingly irreversible 
decision not to return Crimea and its continuous support to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and 
against this backdrop, the West’s reluctance to counter Russia with heftier sanctions or military 
force might generate an international imperative for the Ukrainian authorities to sit down at the 
negotiation table with Russian and look for a solution. However, neither the public in Ukraine nor 
                                                 
219 Such results of the elections were also affected by the non-participations of the citizens lived in the annexed Crimea 
and parts of Donbas (Kochan 2016: 108). 
220 Kyivpost (2016), “Survey shows Poroshenko not supported by 73% of Ukrainians, Cabinet – by 79%, Parliament 
– by 87%,” available at: https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/survey-shows-poroshenko-not-supported-73-
ukrainians-cabinet-79-parliament-87.html (accessed: 14 May 2017). 
221Reuters (2017), “Ukraine's Poroshenko plans referendum on NATO membership: German media,” available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-nato-idUSKBN15H05K (accessed: 14 May 2017). 
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the Poroshenko government seems willing to launch such negotiations with the Kremlin which 
eventually could reverse the country’s pro-Western moves that have been made since the 
Euromaidan revolution. In August 2015, commenting on growing pro-NATO support amongst the 
Ukrainian people in the aftermath of the failure of negotiations on the settlement of the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine, Ievgen Vorobiov, a Ukrainian analyst, pointed out that: 
“Even if the Ukrainian political leadership were ready to make a behind-the-curtain ‘anti-
NATO’ deal with Russia, it would attract little support from the citizenry and would 
certainly backfire politically” (Vorobiov 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
  
This chapter aimed to explore Ukraine’s foreign policy amidst the rivalries of the West and 
Russia and the influence of domestic non-state groups on its formulation.  The chapter was guided 
by the hypothesis that when state leaders are not autonomous vis-à-vis domestic non-state actors, 
the latter become politically more influential with the potential to affect foreign policy and run the 
risk of undermining independent and potentially more prudent foreign policy making. The non-
existence of strong state autonomy in such states allows external powers to pursue more effective 
soft power policies there. This gives the external powers the chance to impact the foreign policies 
of these states through influencing their domestic non-state actors and push for a favourable 
reconfiguration in their geopolitical orientation.   
The chapter has found that the location of Ukraine in the geopolitically sensitive position 
between Russia and the West has shaped the country’s external policies since the early years of 
the post-Soviet period. The geostrategic and geo-economic environment of its location between 
two rival geopolitical centres necessitated neutrality as the most prudent option for Ukrainian 
foreign policy. Such a position would have allowed Ukraine to maintain its economic and political 
relations with both centres and extract benefits from each of them. The first leaders of the newly-
independent Ukraine of the 1990s were relatively more successful in pursuing a multivectorial 
foreign policy maintaining ties with Russia and the West but keeping both of them at bay. From 
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the beginning of the new millennium it became increasingly more difficult to maintain a 
multivector approach. The intensifying rivalries between the two geopolitical poles forced Ukraine 
to make a choice in its external orientation. In the aftermath of the inception of the integration 
projects by the EU and Russia, Ukrainian leaders found themselves in a serious dilemma between 
the two great powers. The internal non-state groups played a crucial intervening role in this process 
and reinforced the pressure to make a choice on the country’s external alignment. The Ukrainian 
leaders’ unconsolidated control over these groups opened room for their influential activities. The 
external great powers, making use of different public diplomacy and propaganda channels, were 
able to reach out to these non-state groups seeking to mould their feelings and opinions.  
The Orange and Euromaidan revolutions, being decisive events in the formation of the 
geopolitical destiny of Ukraine, demonstrated the superiority of Western soft power vis-à-vis 
Russian soft power. The combination of successful self-projection and state-managed projection 
allowed Western powers to realize their goals in Ukraine. Notwithstanding the existence of strong 
cultural, linguistic, ethnic, historical bonds between Ukraine and Russia, Western soft power won 
over Russia’s soft power. The latter’s corrupted political system, backward economy and 
stagnating living standards marred its state-managed soft power projection and reduced its 
potential to succeed in its mission. The West’s association with higher living standards and a liberal 
democracy model and its support for the pro-democracy politicians and civil society put itself in 
stark contrast with Russia’s authoritarian governing structure and its closer ties with Ukraine’s 
corrupted political elites. This situation affected the policy vision of the Ukrainian people and was 
ultimately reflected in their anti-governmental protests.   
The Euromaidan revolution, which erupted immediately after President Yanukovych refused 
to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, was thus also the triumph of Western soft power.  
The public intervention resulted in the overthrow of Yanukovych in February 2014, Crimea’s 
annexation by Russia next month and Russia-supported separatist upheaval in Eastern Ukraine. 
The post-Yanukovych Ukrainian leaders signed the Association Agreement and a free trade deal 
with the European Union, revoked the law on non-bloc status which opened the path to NATO 
membership, dramatically restricted Russia’s soft power channels in Ukraine, boosted trade 
relations with the West and minimized those with Russia, etc. Although Russia was able to secure 
its control over Crimea which was of supreme geostrategic importance and put obstacles on 
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Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic path by supporting separatism in Eastern Ukraine, it failed at large. It lost 
Ukraine as a potential member in its integration projects which are of lesser meaning without 
Ukraine. As Vladimir Chernega (2015), the Russian advisor to the Council of Europe, admits, 
Russia underwent its “worst geopolitical defeat” in the post-Soviet period in Ukraine.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section will summarize the findings of the research on the Russia – West confrontation 
over the “common neighbourhood” states (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
and Ukraine) from the perspective of the nexus of neoclassical realism and soft power. This 
concluding section proceeds as follow. The first sub-section will present the puzzle and theoretical 
arguments that formed the basis of this study. The next sub-section will summarize the empirical 
findings of the research in the light of the research hypotheses. The final sub-section will present 
the implications of the research for international relations theories. 
 
The Puzzle and Theoretical Arguments 
 
This study began with a puzzle identified in the external alignment of states that are in 
between great power rivalries. It questioned the rationale behind the fact that the post-Soviet states 
located in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus – a region which is known as the “common (or 
shared) neighbourhood” – have pursued dissimilar foreign policy strategies (i.e. pro-Western or 
pro-Russian) notwithstanding their similar geopolitical situations. The thesis presented the 
rivalries between Russia and the West (i.e. the EU and the United States) over the post-Soviet 
region as the independent variable, while the foreign policies of the regional states and the 
formation of their dissimilar geopolitical strategies served as the dependent variable of the 
research. Both of the conflicting great powers have made use of a diverse set of instruments to 
distance the regional states from the orbit of the rival geopolitical centre and draw them towards 
their own orbit. The thesis analysed the policies of the great powers to interact with and influence 
non-state actors (i.e. general public, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, etc.) in 
target states with the eventual aim of affecting the external alignment strategies of their respective 
states. This impact of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy has been treated as the 
intervening variable in the study. 
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Herein the thesis subscribed to realist assumptions about the intervention of the general 
public in foreign policy making and the conditions in which their intervention could be impactful. 
The thesis argued that this intervention could push the state to opt for a foreign policy strategy 
which is not expected by realist theories such as Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) “balance of power,” 
Stephan Walt’s (1987) “balance of threat,” or Randall Schweller’s (1994) “balance of interests” in 
the given circumstances. The thesis drew on the realist conviction that public pressure on foreign 
policy is likely to bring about detrimental consequences for the whole country as public 
perceptions of international threats and the subtleties of balance of power politics mostly are 
inaccurate because of a lack of proper expertise and complete knowledge (Christensen 1996: 17; 
Lobell 2009: 61). The thesis stressed the level of state autonomy as an important variable that 
defines the degree of the influence the non-state actors can exert on foreign policy. It argued that 
when state leaders have strong autonomy vis-à-vis the domestic non-state actors they can control 
the soft power projection of external great powers and offset the intervening influence of domestic 
non-state actors on foreign policy.  
The preliminary literature review found that neoclassical realists recognize domestic non-
state actors as a potentially influential intervening variable between the pressure of the 
international political system and foreign policy. However, the analysis of the school has not 
incorporated the policies of the great powers to reach out to these actors in the target states and 
mould their perceptions and attitudes with the ultimate objective of affecting the external 
alignment of their respective state. The thesis argued that these policies could gain momentum 
when the conflicting sides are nuclear armed great powers and the object of their conflict is a 
region that hosts smaller states. The policies that great powers pursue and the instruments that they 
deploy to deliver their narratives to the publics of target states have been analysed in this study 
under the notion of “soft power.” 
On this basis, the thesis built two major guiding hypotheses for this study: (1) if nuclear 
armed great powers compete against the same type of powers to expand or sustain their sphere of 
influence over a populated region, they use soft power as a major expansive instrument while 
military power remains a tool to defend themselves and back up their foreign policies; (2) If the 
leaders of a weak state, which is in between the rivalries of great powers who use soft power to 
expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis society and other internal non-state actors, they 
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can control the inflow of soft power projection of foreign states, offset the intervening influence 
of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy making and augment their chances to more 
prudently and independently follow the imperatives of the international political system. 
Conversely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the external powers find a favourable 
environment in which to wield soft power, the domestic non-state actors can influence the external 
orientation of the state, the state fails to offset their influence, and this may bring about suboptimal 
foreign policy decisions. 
The thesis also presented its model on the soft power policies great powers pursue in order 
to reach out to and influence public opinion in target states. This model differentiates two sources 
of soft power: attractiveness (self-projection) and state-managed projection (propaganda and 
public diplomacy). It argues that the attractiveness of a state is built on the basis of its natural 
endowments and human-constructed assets (policies, political values, economic standards, foreign 
aid, military power, technological and scientific advances, music, movies, TV channels, popular 
culture, ideas and customs, etc.). The thesis regarded international broadcasting as a one-way 
communication channel which was conceptualized in the model as propaganda. Two-way 
communication with foreign publics through non-governmental organizations, scholarly exchange 
programs, etc. were considered as instruments of public diplomacy. It also presented its 
conceptualization of the hard power – soft power nexus based on four principles: (1) The 
possession of hard power (i.e. economic and military power) is a precondition to develop strong 
soft power; (2) The diminishing utility of military power in international politics compels great 
powers to develop their soft power capacity in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals; (3) Soft 
power is not a substitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need and must pay adequate attention 
to the development of their hard power; (4) The possession of strong, hard power elements (i.e. 
economy) does not automatically produce soft power; states need to take appropriate measures to 
wield soft power.  
 
 
236 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
The thesis opted for the Russia - West (i.e. the EU and the United States) rivalries over the 
states located between the EU and Russia – a region which is known as “common (or shared) 
neighbourhood” in political and academic circles – as the case study. It particularly focused on the 
cases of Belarus and Ukraine representing regional states with relatively strong state autonomy 
and states with relatively weak state autonomy, respectively. The cases were discussed extensively 
in Parts 2 and 3.  
The second part, supporting the hypothesis on the use of hard power as a defensive 
instrument and soft power as an expansive instrument by nuclear-armed great powers in their 
rivalries, concluded that although both the West and Russia maximize their military power to 
ensure their security, it has been non-military power that they make use of to expand their influence 
over states in the “common neighbourhood.” The recent decades of Russia – West relations have 
shown that military power primarily serves the purpose of ensuring security, backing up foreign 
policy and maintaining international standing. Although both sides invest heavily in their military 
power, they cannot deploy it to completely kick the rival powers out of the areas of conflicts, as 
great powers used to do in the past. The possibly catastrophic costs of military confrontation, the 
relatively greater role of international organizations, conventions and laws in the management of 
international relations, and probably also Russia’s awareness of the far superior military 
capabilities of NATO countries strengthen the status of military power as ultimo ratio or as Mark 
Galeotti (2016) points out a “final, ‘just in case’ option.” Although Russia is militarily far superior 
to its post-Soviet neighbours and is the second strongest military power after the United States, 
this does not suffice for Moscow to establish its unchallenged hegemony over its entire immediate 
neighbourhood. Another political analyst aptly points out that:  
“We live in a military world fundamentally different from that of the last century. All-out 
wars between major powers, which is to say nuclear powers, are unlikely since they would 
last about an hour after they became all-out, and everyone knows it” (Reed 2016).  
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The analysis of Russian and Western policies concluded that as expected by the theoretical 
foundation of this study, the diminishing utility of military power in international politics compels 
great powers to develop their soft power capacity in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals. The 
circumstances portrayed in the West – Russia competition over the “common neighbourhood” 
require both sides to develop strong, non-military means to realize their goals with regards to the 
post-Soviet region. This increases the importance of soft power. However, this analysis concluded 
that soft power is not seen by Russia and the West as a substitute for hard power. Therefore, they 
do not downplay their policies to produce more hard power resources.  This is where some 
Russians mistakenly argue that strong military power may offset Russia’s relative weakness in 
non-military spheres – economy, ideology, culture, technology, etc (Karaganov 2012). On the 
contrary to these views, the weakness in soft power cannot be effectively counterbalanced by 
relative strength in hard power. Russia’s strong military has demonstrated impotence against the 
growing influence of the West in the post-Soviet region. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, countries 
that are of the utmost geostrategic importance for Russia, have signed agreements with the EU that 
have prevented their integration into the Russia-promoted Eurasian Union. The driving force that 
led these countries to making pro-Western geopolitical moves was primarily the superiority of 
Western soft power.   
Analysing the self-projection (attractiveness) of Western powers (i.e. the EU and the USA) 
and Russia, the thesis found that each side has its own strength and weakness in terms of self-
projection. However, it concluded that the problems concerning Russia’s self-projection are more 
serious and damage its potential to successfully compete against Western soft power. Unlike the 
EU and the USA that produce more than 45% of the global gross domestic product (US$73,502 
trillion),222 Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on natural resources and remains inferior to 
Western economies. The success of the Western model is one of the major factors that attracts the 
attention and admiration of the post-Soviet people. On the other hand, while the Western model of 
liberal democracy based on freedom of speech, human rights, the rule of law, and accountability 
                                                 
222 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU-US-1W (accessed: 16 June 
2017). 
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has been able to build power over public opinion in post-Soviet countries, Russia has failed to 
develop an attractive ideology. Moscow’s aggressive reactions to the pro-Western drift of the 
“common neighbourhood” states have further worsened its image in the region.  
The last part of the thesis explored the cases of Belarus and Ukraine to test the hypothesis 
on the external alignment choices of smaller states caught between great power rivalries, the 
potentially strong influence of the intervening variables (in this case: domestic non-state actors 
(i.e. general public)) on the formation of their foreign policy decisions, and the role of the 
(non)existence of strong state autonomy in this context. This choice was especially important as 
one of these cases (i.e. Belarus) represents the “common neighbourhood” states (Azerbaijan and 
Armenia) in which state leaders possess relatively strong autonomy with respect to internal non-
state players, while the other case (i.e. Ukraine) represents those with relatively weak state 
autonomy (Georgia and Moldova). The thesis concluded that in each case the external great powers 
(i.e. the West and Russia) have strived to wield power over public opinion in these countries.  
However, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko’s consolidation of power in his own 
hands and thus his build-up of strong autonomy vis-à-vis the society has allowed him to prevent 
the inflow of external soft power projection which his regime deems hostile. He has also 
circumscribed the influence of the general public, civil society and media on the governance of 
domestic and external politics. Consequently, Belarus, as expected by the hypotheses of this study, 
has been able to adroitly manoeuvre amidst the confrontation of the two surrounding great powers 
and economically benefit from its alignment with Russia. Although Belarus officially aligned with 
Russia and joined its regional integration projects, it sought to maintain warm relations with 
Western powers and prevented the Kremlin from violating its sovereignty. The analysis concluded 
that in the case of Belarus the soft power projection of the West and Russia was largely ineffective, 
and the intervening influence of internal non-state players was mostly minimal.   
The analysis on Ukraine produced results opposite to the Belarusian case. The relatively 
more democratic political structure of Ukraine and the stronger influence of media, civil society 
and the general public on the government considerably impacted the foreign policy of the state 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the first leaders of the country in the 1990s 
managed to maintain neutrality between the West and Russia, which was in fact more beneficial 
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for the country both in terms of economic and political benefits, this gradually became impossible 
due to the intensifying rivalries between the two conflicting great powers and the growing pressure 
of internal non-state actors on foreign policy. The thesis concluded that internal non-state actors 
played a crucial role in the decision the state eventually made between these two powers in its 
external alignment. The superior self-projection and profound state-managed projection of 
Western powers succeeded in neutralizing Russian soft power and wielding influence over popular 
opinion in Ukraine. The limited internal autonomy of Ukrainian leaders circumscribed their 
chances to offset the pressure of the domestic non-state actors and follow the imperatives of the 
international political system. The systemic factors pushed the state to abandon neutrality which 
would have been more advantageous for Ukraine (Kissinger 2014), and the domestic non-state 
groups affected its choice in external alignment through massive anti-government protests (e.g. 
the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions). Thus, as expected by the hypotheses of this research, 
limited state autonomy created a favourable environment for the external powers to wield soft 
power over Ukrainians, the domestic non-state actors of the state were able to influence the 
external orientation of the state, the state failed to offset their influence, and this brought about 
suboptimal foreign policy decisions which inter alia led to the loss of state control over some parts 
of the country (i.e. Crimea and Eastern Ukraine). 
 
Implications for Theory  
 
This study has a number of theoretical implications. Firstly, the analysis it carried out 
supported the hypothesis that soft power is deployed as an expansive instrument amidst the 
territorial rivalries between nuclear-armed great powers while military power remains a tool for 
defence and backing up of foreign policies. The thesis exhibited that this is caused by several 
factors – primarily by the nuclear dimension of the conflict which significantly discourages the 
use of military power, but also by the growing role of numerous international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, conventions, international courts, etc. in the management of 
international relations. The great powers cannot easily intervene in smaller states and invade them 
anymore. Instead they make use of soft power to win over public opinion in the target state and 
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eventually push it to an alignment through influencing its internal non-state players (i.e. general 
public and non-governmental organizations).  
Although Russia and the West neared the verge of an all-out war over the “common 
neighbourhood” states twice (2008 and 2014) during the period under study (2004-2016), none of 
them dared to launch such a war. Russia proved itself much more determined than Western powers 
to do “everything possible” to prevent the admission of regional post-Soviet states into Western 
military and political structures. The Kremlin demonstrated this determination by deploying 
military force against Georgia and Ukraine in response to the possibility of their admission to 
NATO. Russia occupied some of the territories of these two states and as such rolled out 
insurmountable obstacles on their pro-Western path. The case shows that military power remains 
relevant as the ultimo ratio in international relations, and therefore, states (must) invest in 
developing their military capabilities. However, the case also indicates that Russia tried to prevent 
the pro-Western integration of Georgia and Ukraine through soft power and invested sizeable 
resources in these policies since the first wave of colour revolutions (2003-2005) in the region. 
However, its soft power failed in the competition with that of Western powers who also deployed 
soft power to prevent the integration of the regional countries into Russia’s re-integration projects.  
This result is particularly relevant for neoclassical realism, the mission of which is defined 
as “building theories of foreign policy, rather than theories of the system within which states 
interact” (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 19). The incorporation of soft power as a foreign policy tool for 
the great powers to expand their influence enriches the theory and allows it to develop its analysis 
of situations akin to the Russia – West confrontation over the “common neighbourhood” (e.g. 
USSR – West rivalries over the Third World countries). Although some scholars, such as Felix 
Berenskoetter and Adam Quinn, have discussed the integration of the soft power concept into the 
analytical framework of neoclassical realism, their emphasis has been different. They have stressed 
the importance of ideas to preserve the hegemony achieved through the use of military and 
economic superiority (Berenskoetter et al. 2012). Thus, this thesis presented a different perspective 
and allowed for an examination of great power policies to encourage smaller states to bandwagon 
through the use of non-military power.  
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Secondly, the thesis supported the hypothesis that lower autonomy from internal non-state 
actors restricts the ability of state leaders to offset the intervening influence of these groups in 
foreign policy. This opens up the possibility for great powers to effectively pursue soft power 
policies vis-à-vis that state and affect its external alignment through influencing its general public 
and civil society. This hypothesis was tested in the case of Ukraine. The pro-Western choice Kiev 
made in its external alignment in the aftermath of the Euromaidan uprisings can be explained by 
neither “balance of power” nor “balance of threat” theories. In the given geopolitical context, 
Russia was the more powerful and more threatening power. The Kremlin was more resolved to 
deploy military power and even nuclear weapons if necessary to defend its interests in the post-
Soviet region. The West, on the contrary, held a reserved position and was unable to employ 
military force in the region against Russia. These two theories would predict Ukraine’s 
bandwagoning with Russia, since it was more powerful, geographically close and more 
threatening; on the other hand, no real ally was available to fight against Russia. Nor can the 
“balance of interests” theory convincingly explain Ukraine’s pro-Western alignment in the 
aftermath of the colour revolutions. The consequences of the Ukraine crisis (2014) indicated that 
the abandonment of neutrality between the West and Russia and the disruption of economic 
relations with Russia could not be quickly offset by the benefits Ukraine gained in its pro-Western 
alignment.  
This thesis provided another analytical tool to predict the choices made by small states 
amidst great power rivalries in their external alignment when the maintenance of neutrality 
becomes impossible. It implies that domestic non-state actors could play a crucial role in this 
process. Even a small state would opt for an alignment which is at odds with the imperatives of 
the international political system and potentially dangerous when its non-state actors, under the 
soft power projection of external powers, intervenes in foreign policy making. The popular 
uprisings in Ukraine and the state’s dramatic changes in its foreign policy direction under the 
pressure of the public support this argument. While the geopolitical location of the country, the 
distribution of power between the West and Russia, the threats posed by the Kremlin and the state’s 
economic relations with these powers necessitated non-alignment in foreign policy or predicted 
bandwagoning with Russia should non-alignment have not worked out, the country opted for 
balancing against Russia. This turned out catastrophic for Ukraine: Russia occupied Crimea and 
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territories in Eastern Ukraine. More than 10,000 people died in the clashes with Russia-supported 
separatist groups, the country encountered a severe economic crisis and lost important sources of 
revenue.  
Third, the thesis reconsidered the principles of the soft power concept. The analysis of 
Western and Russian soft power showed that soft power is not a given power; it must be garnered 
and wielded through appropriate policies and strategies. The soft power model presented in this 
thesis distinguished two sources of soft power as self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed 
projection (propaganda and public diplomacy). The comparison of Western and Russian soft 
power in the “common neighbourhood” demonstrated that self-projection is a necessity for 
effective soft power making abroad. When a state fails to build attractive human-constructed 
qualities (political values, high living standards, good quality of education, culture, etc.), its 
chances to be seen as a role model by foreign publics considerably decrease.  
However, attractiveness does not suffice to vanquish contending narratives in the target 
regions. To this purpose, states also need to develop a comprehensive network of state-managed 
projection. The case of Belarus was a relevant example to defend this assumption. The comparative 
perspectives provided in Parts 2 and 3 showed that the self-projection of Western powers (i.e. the 
liberal democracy model, higher living standards, political values, etc.) performs more 
successfully in the “common neighbourhood” than Russia’s self-projection does. However, the 
superiority of Western self-projection failed to defeat Russian soft power in Belarus. The blockage 
of the entrance of Western soft power outlets into the country by the Lukashenko regime has 
succeeded in isolating people from Western narratives. Compared to the West, Russia had more 
channels to interact with the Belarusian public and dominated Belarus’s information space during 
the period under study (2004-2016). Nevertheless, in spite of the non-existence of any significant 
state-managed projection and weaker societal and cultural links with Belarus than Russia has, the 
EU succeeded in becoming a challenge for Russia in the fight to win approval amongst 
Belarusians. The public opinion polls by the IISEPS (see, Figure 4) show that if Belarus opens its 
doors to soft power outlets of West, in a short period of time Western soft power has the potential 
to further grow and provoke the emergence of powerful pro-Western movements in the country.   
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